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ABSTRACT
The British Army was sent to Northern Ireland in 1969 as a peacekeeping force
between the Catholic and Protestant communities Against a backdrop of sectarian
violence, emerging paramilitary organizations began to contest British authority
throughout the province The British peace operations then evolved into counter-
insurgency and counter-terrorism operations As the mission of the British Security
Forces changed, the role of British intelligence became increasingly important. This
thesis is a history of British intelligence operations against the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) from 1969 to 1988. It critically examines the role of the British intelligence
community in Northern Ireland and focuses on the major intelligence agencies that
participated in the war against the IRA. The tradecraft of British intelligence is analyzed,
particularly the use of informers as the primary vehicle of information about the IRA.
Four representative operations conducted by British intelligence are presented as
historical case studies and illustrate covert intelligence collection, propaganda operations,
clandestine penetration, and the involvement of intelligence in so-called "shoot-to-kiir
incidents. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the uneasy relationship between
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
In August 1969, the British government sent troops into Northern Ireland to assist
the civilian authority in restoring order to the province of Ulster following the most
destructive sectarian violence since the partition of Ireland in 1921 . Nearly thirty years
after the "Troubles" began and numerous peace plans later, sectarian violence between
the Catholic and Protestant communities remains a component of the political landscape
of Ulster and the British Army remains deployed in force in Northern Ireland.
The British were unprepared to deal with the sectarian violence between the two
Irish tribes and the imposition of what was effectively martial authority was singularly
inappropriate for a problem demanding even-handed law enforcement. Yet the use of the
British Army may have been inevitable as the provincial police, known as the Royal
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), were unable and perhaps unwilling to protect the minority
Catholic population from Protestant violence and discrimination. Moreover, Ulster
Catholics considered the Protestant-dominated police force and its reserve force known
as the B-Specials as a fundamental part of the problem of sectarian discrimination
Consequently, as the British Army was deployed in force in Northern Ireland, the
decision was undertaken to disarm the RUC and disband the B-Specials Law
enforcement responsibilities then shifted to the military, as the British Army became the
de facto police for Ulster.
During the summer and fall of 1969, the few successfully integrated communities
in Northern Ireland began to fall apart as a consequence of the sectarian nature of the
l
violence. Even as the British Army was deploying as a peacekeeping force, community
defense organizations began to organize and arm themselves in support of the respective
tribes. On one side of the divide were Protestant organizations such as the Ulster
Defence Association (UDA) and the militant Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Opposing
the Protestants and the British Army were Republican organizations, most notably the
Irish Republican Army (IRA). 1 The IRA proved unable to protect the Catholic
community during 1969 and the organization split in December of that year between the
Marxist-oriented Officials and the militant Provisionals. 2 Despite the immediate threat
from Protestant militants, both the Official and the Provisional IRA saw the intervention
by the Westminster government as the greater threat to the Republican cause. This was
partially because of the step away from a united Ireland that increased British authority
implied, but also because of the relative diminution of IRA authority in the Catholic areas
that resulted from the British presence as peacekeepers. However, of the Republican
paramilitaries in 1969 and 1970, only the Provisionals were prepared, psychologically if
not militarily, for violence against the Security Forces.
With the benefit of hindsight, one can speculate that given the nature of Anglo-
Irish history, the only way for British troops to avoid becoming the focus of Republican
violence was to restore order quickly and then withdraw its troops to garrison or out of
1 None of these organizations were new to Ulster politics, but they were all energized by the
sectarian violence. Some important distinctions he in the political labels used in Northern Ireland.
Nationalists and Republicans are similar in that both groups are almost exclusively drawn from the Catholic
community and desire unification of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. They differ, however,
in that Republicans view violence as a legitimate means in their pursuit of Irish unification Nationalists
seek the same end through peaceful means. On the other side of the political divide are those who wish
Ulster to remain part of the United Kingdom. Protestants largely dominate this group, which is divided into
Unionists and Loyalists. Unionists seek a peaceful maintenance of the status quo. Loyalists regard
violence as a legitimate tool to protect what they perceive as their historical prerogatives.
2
Unless otherwise noted, references to the IRA are to the Provisionals.
Ulster. History records that the British failed to see this danger and were unable to return
authority back to the civilian power. As the troops remained in Ulster through 1969 and
into the beginning of the 1970s, the British experienced what has since become a familiar
model for peacekeeping operations: involvement in local politics, the appearance of
taking sides, and the nearly inevitable mission-creep.
The peacekeeping phase of the Troubles, which can also be thought of as the
honeymoon period between the British Army and the Catholic community, ended
quickly. The catalyst for the changing perception of the British Army came with the
beginning of marching season in Northern Ireland. In April 1970, the Protestant Orange
Order routed a scheduled march through a Catholic community. The Nationalist leaders
requested a British ban on the march, which was refused. When the Protestant march
provoked a Catholic neighborhood to riot, the British soldiers responded forcefully
against the rioters. In the aftermath of this riot, Army headquarters at Lisburn announced
that rioters would be shot under certain circumstances. The honeymoon period was
over.
3
The situation in Northern Ireland steadily worsened over the course of the next
two years. In the summer of 1971, the Northern Ireland government at Stormont Castle
introduced internment without trial of suspected terrorists in response to the growing
level of violence. Internment, which is discussed in Chapter VIII, was a political disaster
for the Northern Ireland government. If internment had not destroyed all governmental
capital with the Catholic community, then "Bloody Sunday" would be the final straw
Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland, 1969-1984 (London:
Methuen. 1985). 30-32.
On 30 January 1972, soldiers from the 1 st Parachute Regiment shot and killed 13
unarmed civilians during a Nationalist march in Londonderry. Following Bloody
Sunday, the province erupted in violence at levels unmatched in any other year of the
Troubles. Integrated communities were forcibly segregated by the respective majority
population, or to use the current vernacular, neighborhoods were ethnically cleansed.
Both Catholic and Protestant communities in Londonderry and Belfast erected barricades
behind which were "no-go" areas declared by their inhabitants.
4
The Stormont
government was losing control of the province.
In March 1972, the British government prorogued the Northern Ireland
Parliament and assumed direct rule of Ulster. In the zero-sum mentality of Northern
Ireland, this was seen as a defeat for the Unionists and a corresponding victory for the
Nationalists. Both sides perceived that the British government would be more amenable
to an eventual unification of Ireland than would a Northern Ireland government. The
violence did not abate as a result of direct rule. Republicans felt that the most
expeditious route to unification was through exerting violent pressure on the British.
This pressure took the form of insurgency and terrorism. The British felt that the road to
normalcy lay in establishing and exercising control over the province. The two
approaches proved mutually incompatible and the antagonistic course of Ulster history
was basically set by the summer of 1972.
As the British Army was forced by events to transition from peacekeeping to
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, so was the British intelligence community. It
4 To better understand the religious enclaves in the cities, see the appendix for maps of
Londonderry and Belfast.
is in the context of this rapid evolution from peacekeeping operations to counter-
insurgency and counter-terrorism operations that the British intelligence community
faced its greatest operational challenges since the Second World War In the conflict in
Northern Ireland, intelligence has been a pivotal aspect of British operations against the
terrorist threat. However, despite the critical importance of good intelligence to a
counter-terrorism campaign, the British intelligence community failed to rise consistently
to the challenge. Despite numerous courageous and inventive operations successfully
conducted by British intelligence operatives, in the aggregate, British intelligence was
disorganized, routinely operated beyond the pale of British law, and adopted methods that
were ultimately counter-productive.
This thesis will discuss British intelligence operations against the IRA in Northern
Ireland from 1969 to 1988. The overriding concern of this history is to show the
complexities of not only intelligence operations conducted by a democratic society, but in
particular the complexities of operations which are conducted within a democratic
society. The importance of this thesis lies primarily in two areas. First, it is hoped that
this thesis will fill a gap left thus far in the histories of the Troubles. Despite the fact that
British intelligence played a critical role in the war in Northern Ireland, there are few
published accounts dealing specifically with the participation of British intelligence
Second, if, as the saying goes, history is a letter of instruction from the past, then the
story of British intelligence in Northern Ireland is a particularly poignant letter to both the
intelligence profession and its political masters The lessons that can be learned from the
British experience not only have universal applications to any intelligence service, but
aiso serve as a particular warning to iiberai democracies of the consequences of an
unbridled intelligence community.
B. THESIS OVERVIEW
This thesis is organized into two parts. The first part of this history is largely
descriptive and is covered in Chapters II and III, which describe British intelligence in
Northern Ireland and its tradecraft. Chapter II sets forth the main protagonists of British
intelligence in Ulster and explains how the evolving intelligence community was
constituted to perform its mission. This lays the groundwork essential to understanding
the British intelligence experience in Ulster. Chapter III describes the tradecraft, i.e., the
tactics and techniques, employed by British intelligence in Northern Ireland. This
chapter is critical in understanding the nature of the intelligence war in Ulster as it
describes the arena in which the war was fought. A significant portion of this chapter
deals with the pervasive use of agents and informers, which more than any other aspect of
intelligence characterizes the war in Northern Ireland.
The remainder of this thesis is more analytical in nature. Four representative
operations conducted by British intelligence are presented as case studies and are used to
illustrate British motives and tradecraft from a historical perspective. The case studies
examine different aspects of the intelligence war including British covert intelligence
collection operations, propaganda operations, clandestine penetration of the IRA, and
intelligence participation in so-called "shoot-to-kill" operations. The final chapter looks
at the uneasy relationship between British intelligence and British democracy. In this
chapter, the antagonism between British intelligence and the courts is examined as are the
societal consequences and morality of intelligence operations in Northern Ireland.
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II. THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN
NORTHERN IRELAND
The British intelligence community was divided in the early 1970s between those
who believed that Northern Ireland was a sideshow that detracted from the main event,
which was the Soviet Union, and those who adopted the attitude of "it ain't much of a
war, but it's the only war we've got." Among those of the latter persuasion, the
competition to be involved in Northern Ireland was fierce. The motivations of the
intelligence officers volunteering for assignment in Northern Ireland varied from
ambition to altruism, but regardless of the motivation, Northern Ireland offered it all:
adventure and danger certainly, but perhaps more importantly, a chance to test oneself
personally and professionally The competition to get into Northern Ireland did not stop
at the individual level, but also entangled the various intelligence institutions of the
government. To be involved in Northern Ireland showed activity, which implied
purpose, which translated into budgetary rewards and, hence, institutional prestige
This chapter is the foundation of this chronicle of British intelligence in the war
against the Irish Republican .Army. The existence of many of the organizations discussed
in this chapter has not been confirmed to the British public by the Westminster
government. Furthermore, most of the activities of these organizations remain classified
under the Official Secrets Act. Yet, despite these obstacles, it is not impossible to sketch
out a reasonable picture of the British intelligence community and its recent history in
Northern Ireland Even more than the American intelligence community, much of what
is known publicly about British intelligence operations is derived from the failures of the
British intelligence community. For a variety of reasons, some of which are laid out in
7
the course of this work, intelligence organizations seldom choose or are afforded the
luxury of public approbation, and consequently little is known about their successes.
Failure itself, however, may not lead inevitably to public disclosure, but the fact that
failures are made public with greater frequency than success tends to color the public's
perception of the efficacy of intelligence operations. However, it is in the interest of the
British government, in general, and the intelligence community, in particular, to be
occasionally portrayed in a favorable light. Therefore, many aspects of intelligence
operations that have come to light in the histories of the Troubles were the result of off-
the-record interviews with sources in the intelligence community. 5 Given the normally
taciturn nature of the intelligence community, explicitly reinforced by the British penal
code, it is possible that such interviews had the sanction of the British government.
The truth of the intelligence participation in the war in Northern Ireland is that
British intelligence has, not surprisingly, a mixed record of success and failure, both of
which are covered here. That British intelligence in Northern Ireland has had a mixed
record, incidentally, is a valuable proposition to bear in mind when judging the endurance
and longevity of various intelligence organizations in Northern Ireland.
A. THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE POLICY
The intelligence community in Northern Ireland can be divided into three main
categories: national level intelligence agencies, civilian law enforcement intelligence, and
military intelligence. Each of these categories will be discussed below, but first a few
comments regarding British intelligence activities in Northern Ireland in general. All of
5 Two reliable authors on intelligence operations in Northern Ireland are Mark Urban and Martin
Dillon. Both authors frequently cite anonymous sources in the intelligence community.
the organizations that comprise these categories ran significant intelligence programs in
Northern Ireland and for the first decade after 1969, intelligence programs were run
independently and without centralized coordination by the respective organizations or the
British government.
During most of this first decade of the Troubles, at Stormont there was a Director
and Coordinator of Intelligence (DO) who theoretically was responsible for establishing
a central intelligence policy in Northern Ireland. However, as neither military
intelligence nor law enforcement intelligence felt subordinated to the DCI's authority, not
much direction or coordination was accomplished despite the common-sense imperative
of such a coordinator 6
It was not until August 1979, after the simultaneous assassination of Lord
Mountbatten and the IRA's ambush of a British Army patrol at Warrenpoint (which
killed 18 soldiers), that the British decided that their intelligence, in particular their
human intelligence (HUMINT) programs, needed to be upgraded and coordinated. 7 Both
incidents, in addition to being tragic losses for the United Kingdom, were profoundly
embarrassing to the British. 8 Without sustaining casualties itself, the IRA inflicted the
largest single-day casualties suffered by the British Army since the Korean War and
murdered a member of the royal family. Interestingly, Peter Taylor wrote that it was the
Mark Urban. Big Boys ' Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IRA (London: Fabcr
and Faber, 1992). 97.
7
Peter Taylor. Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Fein (New York: TV Books. 1 997). 296.
8 Tim Pat Coogan. The IRA: A History (Niwot, Colorado: Roberts Rmehart Publishers. 1994). 36
1
Coogan wrote that despite the negauve reaction in both Ireland and Britain regarding the assassination of
Mountbatten. the IRA's propaganda machine made much of the incident. A Republican News article cited
by Coogan had "...a photograph of Mountbatten with Executed" emblazoned across it. a sneenng half-
page article signed by the Brigadier' described how the Queen took the news without a blink, merely
informing the butler that there would be one fewer for dinner." but groaned in anguish" when the
Brigadier' accidentally smashed the Meissen tea set
"
attack on the patrol, not the assassination of the Queen's cousin that really shook up the
British intelligence community.
9
The former Director of MI6, Maurice Oldfield, was appointed by British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher to straighten out the intelligence situation in Northern
Ireland. He conducted a review of the British intelligence community in Northern Ireland
and recommended to the government that British intelligence coordinate its activities
through a set of regionally-based Tasking and Coordination Groups (TCGs).
The first proto-TCG actually predated Oldfield in Northern Ireland by a year, but
it was only upon the force of his recommendation that the TCGs were set-up with the
mandate to link together the policies and operations of the respective intelligence
agencies in Northern Ireland. J. Bowyer Bell wrote that despite revelations that Oldfield
was a homosexual, which cost him his security clearance and his position in Northern
Ireland, "His legacy in Ireland was not scandal but the foundation at last of a coherent
British intelligence effort. . .
" 10
Three Tasking and Coordination Groups were commissioned in the province.
One TCG was established at Castlereagh to coordinate Belfast operations; a second at
Gough Barracks in Armagh coordinated intelligence activities in the south of Ulster; and,




Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix:
TCG was created as an agency which would task the right
surveillance or undercover unit to carry out a specific operation and at the
9
Taylor, 296. British intelligence could not be sure of the whereabouts and intent of every British
VIP so protection for them was recognized as problematic, but it was regarded as a fundamental failure of
intelligence that the IRA was allowed to get to the soldiers.
10
J. Bowyer Bell, The SecretArmy: The IRA, 3
rd





same time monitor the day-to-day running of that operation. In other
words, undercover units could no longer run around acting independently
on their own behalf to their own agendas: they were now answerable to a
centrally based unit. TCG would also coordinate other units to work
together where different areas of an operation required different skills.
This coordination would also minimize the danger of a blue on blue'
situation ever arising again.
12
Each TCG was directed by a Special Branch officer and had permanent
representatives from Army intelligence assigned to it with MI5 officers assigned on an ad
hoc basis. 13 The TCG concept was to dramatically improve intelligence coordination
throughout Northern Ireland, but while it might be argued that the adage "better late than
never" is applicable in this case, it should be remembered that British delay in
centralizing its myriad intelligence organizations hampered British efforts in the
intelligence portion of the war.
B. NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
The United Kingdom has three national level intelligence agencies: the Security
Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The latter agency is the British intelligence
agency responsible for signals intelligence (SIGLNT) and thus is the British intelligence
community's counterpart to the National Security Agency (NSA). No discussion of
GCHQ participation in Northern Ireland is found in the histories of the Troubles, yet
although supposition, it is likely that GCHQ was actively involved in the overall
intelligence effort in a supporting role. GCHQ would have been one of the organizations
that viewed Northern Ireland as a distracter from the primary target of the Warsaw Pact,
Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix, Phoenix: Policing the Shadows, The Secret War Against




but would have been involved in Northern Ireland as circumstances permitted. Although
it would not be entirely accurate to offer a "mirror" comparison between NSA and
GCHQ, some similarities in tasking can be inferred. For example, even during the height
of the Vietnam War, NSA's primary mission was intelligence collection against the
Soviet Union. Yet NSA was able to provide intelligence support to military operations in
Southeast Asia while continuing with its primary mission. Moreover, even as NSA
retained its focus on the Soviet Union after the end of the Vietnam War, it was available
for tasking in support of a variety of non-Warsaw Pact crises that followed. It is not
unreasonable to assume that GCHQ's role in Northern Ireland followed a similar path.
Signals intelligence collection can be accomplished through a variety of means,
few of which require a large presence in the immediate vicinity of the target signals. In
other words, much of the GCHQ mission for Northern Ireland could be accomplished
from England, which would tend to downplay the apparent role of the highly secretive
organization. Moreover, services such as the Army have their own organic SIGINT
collection capabilities, and would be able to operate in this mission area independent of
GCHQ. The extent ofGCHQ's role was probably limited to passing communications
intercepts to other agencies and perhaps advising on intelligence tradecraft such as
wiretapping and bugging.
IfGCHQ was not overtly involved in Northern Ireland, the other two national
level intelligence agencies were embarrassingly so. As the roles ofMI5 and MI6 were
decidedly intertwined, it might be helpful to look at both organizations together.
MI5 is the organization responsible for domestic intelligence collection and is
constituted with the primary responsibility for British counter-intelligence. In this regard,
12
MI5 performs a function roughly analogous to the counter-intelligence role performed by
the FBI, although MI5 lacks the law enforcement authority of its US counterpart MI6 is
responsible for foreign intelligence operations and is more closely analogous to the
Central Intelligence Agency. Both MI5 and MI6 have been extensively involved in
Northern Ireland and since 1969 have devoted considerable effort to driving the other out
of Ireland. It is not entirely hyperbole to state that during the secret war in Northern
Ireland, the view was widely held among M15 and MI6 that the IRA might have been the
adversary, but the other service was the enemy.
Although Northern Ireland was considered a domestic problem, MI6 received the
initial nod from the British government as best situated to deal with the resurgence of
Republican violence. 14 The government of Prime Minister Edward Heath felt that MI6
not only had a more extensive history in Ireland, but also was better suited to the work at
hand, i.e., the establishment of networks of informers. 15 This was not to stand without
challenge from MI5 and subsequent to the first IRA bombings on the British "mainland"
in 1972, MI5 was able to convince London that "its efforts to protect the realm from acts
of this kind required an expanded presence on the far side of the Irish Sea. ,,u> This
undoubtedly touched off a rivalry between the two services, although the extent of the
rivalry is a matter of historical contention. Was the competition between MI5 and MI6 a





Much of the historical reporting of the intelligence competition between MI5 and
MI6 maintains that the rivalry went beyond traditional bureaucratic competition and
portrays an intelligence community on the verge of fratricidal warfare. Most of the
writings of this cast stem from the allegations of Fred Holroyd, a former Army
intelligence officer who worked with MI6 in Northern Ireland. Holroyd maintained that
by the mid-1970s relations between MI5 and MI6 had worsened to the point that the two
services had crossed the boundary into open warfare and were deliberately undermining
each other's operations.
17
However, these allegations in their most virulent form have
been widely repeated throughout the literature on Northern Ireland, but have a hard time
standing up to critical scrutiny.
Martin Dillon and Mark Urban have written perhaps the two best and objective
surveys ofNorthern Ireland's intelligence war.
18
Both authors dismiss Holroyd's
allegations as well as those of Colin Wallace, another disgruntled former intelligence
officer, as pursuing a specific agenda. In the case of Holroyd, his motivations may be
linked to revenge for his dismissal from Army intelligence for reasons of mental
instability. Wallace may have used similar claims as a way to clear his name following
his own dismissal.
19
An example of these assertions that is damaging to British intelligence on the
surface, but the veracity of which is easily called into question is Holroyd's allegation
that MI5's actions during the turf war with MI6 resulted in the deaths often MI6 "grade-
17
Martin Dillon, The Dirty War (London: Arrow Books, 1990). 195-204.
18
Historians of the Troubles tend to be highly partisan in their treatment of most issues, but
Dillon, a Catholic schoolmate of Gerry Adams, and Urban, a former English soldier, tend to reach the same
conclusions more often than not.
19
Urban, 55; Dillon, 193-200.
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one" agents in one week Martin Dillon's conclusions are that it was unlikely to have
occurred as the IRA did not gloat about it afterwards, which they surely would have done
had the killings taken place. If true, this would have rivaled the IRA massacre, at the
direction of Michael Collins, of several British agents in 1920 This is an important event
in Republican history, and one that if repeated would also become part of IRA folklore. 20
According to Dillon, 'There is no evidence that ten agents were ever wiped out by the
IRA within such a short space of time, and the IRA told me that they regarded such
claims with derision." 21 Nevertheless, it is important to address such claims as this story
and others like it have been widely circulated in the literature on Northern Ireland
Moreover, even if this allegation is not true, the fact that it could be accepted as truth in
not only some Republican circles but in some British ones as well illustrates the degree of
tension between the two services.
Following the entrance of MI5 into Northern Ireland, MI6 was left with a liaison
office at Stormont and the consolation prize of being able to continue operations in the
Republic of Ireland. Even this was poor compensation as MI6 operations in the Republic
had already been curtailed after two MI6 agents, brothers Kenneth and Keith Littlejohn,
were implicated in several Dublin bank robberies. These robberies were allegedly at the
behest of MI6, which wanted to blame the crimes on the ERA. The British government
was deeply embarrassed by having to extradite the two men to Dublin for trial 22 In any
case, given the proximity of Dublin to Belfast, the demarcation between M15 and MI6
was most probably in name only as collection against specific IRA targets obviously




transcended the national borders. As a result of being outmaneuvered by M15 and by
becoming a victim of its own mistakes, MI6 transitioned to a secondary role in Northern
Ireland. MI5 was clearly in the ascendant.
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE
In 1977, Downing Street embarked on a policy known as Ulsterization (frequently
likened to Vietnamization), wherein the conflict was to be civilianized and the primacy of
law enforcement was reestablished. 23 In essence, Ulsterization meant letting the natives
do the fighting. The RUC then became the recipient of Westminster's attention and
money as the security aspect of Ulsterization became known as police primacy. The
RUC was rearmed and subsequently built-up to reassume law enforcement duties from
the Army.
The intelligence service of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Special Branch,
was built-up accordingly and a network of intelligence informers was developed by the
police organization in Northern Ireland. There were advantages and disadvantages to the
growth of Special Branch. The main advantage of Ulsterization was from the perspective
of long term operations. Long after MI6 and MI5 return to Britain and duties elsewhere,
the RUC will remain in one form or another. In dealing with the citizens of Northern
Ireland, the RUC has the advantage of being "local boys." The accents match, they know
the terrain, they grew up in the same environment as the ERA, but most important, they
understand the unique culture of Northern Ireland. They also have better contacts with
23
Caroline Kennedy-Pipes, The Origins ofthe Present Troubles in Northern lrelcaid. Origins of
Modern Wars, ed. Harry Hearder (Harlow, England: Longman, 1997), 79.
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the national police of the Irish Republic (the Gardai) than do the other elements of the
Security Forces.
One downside to the RUC aspect of Ulsterization is that the RUC is
predominantly, although not exclusively, Protestant and is seen by some as not only
Unionist, but sympathetic to Loyalist paramilitaries. This has had two effects: first, the
perceived link to the Loyalist paramilitaries naturally has eroded support in the Catholic
community; and second, has led the Army periodically to restrict intelligence exchanges
with the RUC for fear of the information going to the Protestant "hard men."24 In respect
to this latter problem, mutual trust between Army intelligence and the Special Branch had
eroded to the point that during the early 1970s, Army intelligence was marking
documents "for U.K. eyes only." As Tim Pat Coogan aptly points out, "A more sensitive
choice of wording might have been employed in a situation whose intensity derived from
the fact that those excluded, and their community, wanted to be considered 'U.K.
only.'"
25
Regardless, in the absence of clear victory over the IRA and unless the British
were prepared for perpetual martial law, they had little choice but to pursue Ulsterization
with all of its attendant evils. For those on the front line of the counter-terrorism
campaign, this meant that establishing a degree of trust between the intelligence services
was imperative and the road to this was through a proficient and professional
constabulary.
4
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This degree of trust was a particularly rough and rocky road for the Special
Branch and was made more difficult by its legacy as an ineffective intelligence
organization. In evaluating the RUC's contribution to intelligence, any assessment
inevitably begins with the debacle of internment and the failure of intelligence to support
that traditional Irish solution to disorder. Special Branch was largely, and rightly, blamed
for the intelligence failures relating to internment. The organization was further set back
following allegations of abuse of prisoners during interrogation. Regarding internment,
"The poor quality of the [Special Branch] intelligence assessment soon became apparent.
Soldiers arrived to arrest men who had been in the campaigns in the 1940s and 1950s:
there was another suspect age 77 who had first been jailed in 1929; another was blind and
yet another, in Armagh, was found to have been dead for four years."
26 By the time of
police primacy in 1977, the Special Branch had recovered somewhat from the earlier
failures but was not regarded by the Army as particularly effective.
27
The solution to the RUC problem was felt by the RUC leadership to lie in the
creation of special operations units modeled on those in the Army. Previous to 1977, the
RUC had experimented without much success with special operations units, most notably
the Special Patrol Group (SPG). In 1976, within the SPG, the constabulary established a
firearms and observation unit known as Bronze Section. 28 Bronze Section was to last for
only a year and the SPG itself would be disbanded in 1980. The RUC realized that
Bronze Section had too broad a mission and was improperly trained, and in 1977 the







RUC decided to establish a more professional surveillance unit modeled on the Army's
14
th
Intelligence Company. This unit was to become known as Echo Four Alpha or
E4A. 29
E4A was to prove to be an enduring institution despite later allegations that it was
a RUC assassination squad. The E4A designation derives from the internal organization
of the Special Branch. Within Special Branch there were two intelligence collection
divisions, Echo Three (E3) and Echo Four (E4). Echo Three was tasked with running
agents, i.e., informers for Special Branch, while Echo Four was in charge of undercover
surveillance.
30 Echo Four itself was further subdivided according to surveillance
specialties:
E4A... dealt with man-to-man surveillance; E4B comprised the
department's technicians who were adept at planting and concealing bugs,
phone tapping and the use of other electronic gadgetry; E4C and E4D
specialized in photographic surveillance such as the use of hidden
cameras, miniaturized cameras designed for concealment in cars, suitcases
and other items. These experts also used hidden video cameras to record
events in known terrorist haunts or to maintain surveillance of an
identified arms dump 31
In a similar manner, Echo Three was subdivided: E3A was responsible for
overseeing informer penetration of Republican groups, E3B had the same responsibilitv
for the Loyalist paramilitaries; and E3C collected against run-of-the-mill leftist
subversives.
32
Complementing the intelligence collection capabilities of Special Branch were






1980. These units were formed at three organizational levels. At the lowest level were
the Divisional Mobile Support Units (DMSUs), which were "trained in riot control, basic
observation post techniques and firearms"
33
At the next level ofRUC command, two
Headquarters Mobile Support Units (HMSUs) were established. The HMSUs consisted
of approximately 25-30 specially trained constables and were largely deployed in rural
areas, as opposed to the urban DMSUs, in situations requiring special tactics and
firepower.
34
The most elite of the RUC special operations units was the Special Support
Unit (SSU), which was used as a Special Branch reserve force. Members of the SSU
were largely recruited from the Army, in particular the paratroopers and the SAS, and
were trained in special tactics and firearms by the SAS in Aldershot. 35
Following the implementation of the regional TCG plan in 1979, the RUC Special
Branch began to work in greater cooperation with its counterparts in national intelligence
and the Army. Beginning in the early 1980s, liaison positions were established between
the RUC and MI5 to assist in deconflicting operations and facilitate the reciprocal flow of
intelligence between the two organizations. The coordination between the organizations
improved after the establishment of the TCGs, but remained less than perfect. MI5, the
Army and the RUC often retained the same informers on their respective payrolls with
the unfortunate result that untrustworthy informers often provided conflicting intelligence









When the Troubles began in 1969, the entirety of the Army intelligence presence
in Northern Ireland consisted of one intelligence corps captain and one sergeant.' 6 That
would soon change. The Army is the single largest component of the Security Forces in
Northern Ireland and had frequently operated with a truly remarkable degree of
independence. Military intelligence was no different and it is here that some of the more
innovative counter-terrorist tactics were adopted.
Organizationally, military intelligence came in several diverse forms at different
levels of echelon. The Army headquarters at Lisburn naturally maintained an intelligence
staff, which was nominally in charge of establishing military intelligence policy in
Northern Ireland. The various brigade staffs maintained their intelligence functions and
the rotating and resident battalions also had their own intelligence personnel.
In 1969, when the British Army moved into Belfast and Londonderry, operational
intelligence was abysmal. The Army was initially reliant upon the RUC for intelligence
support, but the Special Branch intelligence on the paramilitaries was outdated and
incomplete. Exactly how poor this intelligence was in the first few years became
apparent to the British commanders in Northern Ireland when internment without trial
was introduced in 1971. The RUC failure to maintain adequate intelligence on the
emerging paramilitaries is perhaps understandable in light of the confusion of the time,
but the net effect of this was an intelligence vacuum during the critical early days of the
crisis. It was a long time before military intelligence was able to build the necessary
contacts within both Irish tribes to adequately support operations
36
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In support of the counter-terrorist/insurgency campaigns, there are four
noteworthy military intelligence or associated organizations that have operated in
Northern Ireland: the Mobile Reconnaissance Force (MRF), the 14th Intelligence
Company, the SAS, and the Force Research Unit. Regular Army battalions conducted
significant low-level intelligence collection and their contribution will be examined
briefly as will the role of one specific unit, the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), which
was a locally raised Army regiment that was permanently garrisoned in Northern Ireland.
Arguably, the first effective British operational commander in Northern Ireland
was Brigadier Frank Kitson who had gained a reputation during Britain's decolonization
experience as an expert in counter-insurgency. His experiences and observations in
Britain's collapsing empire had resulted in the publication of two counter-insurgency
works, Gangs and Counter-gangs ( 1 960) and Low Intensity Operations (1971)
Brigadier Kitson was appointed commander of 39 Brigade in 1970, which effectively
gave him control of the city of Belfast and allowed him the opportunity to put his theories
of counter-insurgency into practice.
37
According to Dillon,
...during his short stay he devised a system of intelligence gathering, of
penetrating the ERA and of exploiting propaganda that was in some
respects extremely successful. His critics have attributed him with the role
of devising every conceivable dirty trick ever used in Northern Ireland.
Indeed, sections of the Provisional IRA became paranoid about Kitson.
They saw events as though in double vision, and happenings which
seemed inexplicable at any point in time were deemed to be part of a
Kitsonesque experiment. The IRA incorrectly credited Kitson with the
introduction of internment in August 1971; in fact, he was opposed to the
policy because, as he told his military superiors, it would prove counter-
productive.
38
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It was with the formation of the Mobile Reconnaissance Force (MRF) that Kitson
had his tool to meet the IRA on their own territory The MRF was a small unit assigned
to 39 Brigade and consisted of several three or four man teams that could be comprised of
any combination of regular soldiers, military intelligence, and sometimes "Freds'" (Freds
were turned IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries who were housed at the MRF barracks in
Holywood). 39 The teams, in addition to conducting some interesting covert operations
that will be discussed in Chapter IV, were driven through both Catholic and Protestant
neighborhoods in armored personnel carriers so that the Freds could identify active
members of the Republican or Loyalist paramilitaries. In addition, the MRF often
operated in the same neighborhoods driving unmarked cars and using plainclothes
soldiers.
40
The Mobile Reconnaissance Force was disbanded in 1973 following a set of
unique operations in Belfast during the turbulent 1971-1973 timeframe The decision to
decommission the unit was made following IRA penetration of the Freds associated with
the MRF. The IRA doubling of the Freds resulted in an ambush of an MRF operation
and the death of a British soldier Additionally, following the shooting of a civilian by an
MRF sergeant, public attention became focused on the unit and it was decided to quietly
replace the covert organization.
The next military intelligence unit of note in Northern Ireland was the 14th
Intelligence Company, also known as the Reconnaissance Force, 14th Independent
Company; the 4th Field Survey Troop of the Royal Engineers; the Northern Ireland
39




Training Advisory Team; and the Intelligence and Surveillance Group.
41 The 14th
Intelligence Company was created in 1974 to be the premier surveillance unit of the





Intelligence Company, which recruits from all the services,
was raised to special forces status and together with the SAS and the Royal Marines'
Special Boat Service (SBS), forms the triad of British special forces. 43 According to
James Rennie, a former 14
th
Intelligence Company operator, the three special forces units
had distinctly different missions but shared some training and personnel:
When 14 Intelligence Company was first set up in 1974 it was initially
trained by SAS instructors, but since then it had become so expert and
specialized in the field of covert surveillance operations that it had
developed its own unique operational methodology and, of course,
supplied its own instructors. In a bid to recover some of the skills, 22 SAS
decided in the mid-eighties to send a couple of troopers each year to serve
with 14 Company. They were exempt from the selection course, but
obviously had to complete the full training successfully. The SBS also
sent the occasional member across. . . u
Unlike the SAS and the SBS, however, 14th Intelligence Company was not
intended to be at the sharp end of the spear. Its mission was specialized intelligence
collection. Despite extensive firearms and special tactics training, the operators of the
14
th
Intelligence Company were intended to identity and track the terrorists, both Loyalist
41
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and Republican, and to cue the RUC or the SAS in to make the arrest or, alternately, the
lethal ambush.
Three 14th Intelligence Company detachments were co-located with the three
brigade headquarters in Northern Ireland, and after 1979, the TCGs tasked the "dets" for
surveillance operations. Being responsible to the TCG meant a broad range of tasking
that might originate from beyond the Army chain of command. For example, it would
not be unusual for a 14 ' Intelligence Company detachment to be tasked to conduct
surveillance in a mission that originated with the Special Branch. The advantage of the
TCG centralization was that it allowed tasking across the intelligence community
according to the preferences of the commanders and the requirements of the mission.
According to Mark Urban, "The attitude of these people [the tasking commanders]
differed for quite arbitrary and individual reasons: one SB [Special Branch] member
might be a great believer in 14 Company but another might veto its use because of an
unhappy experience on a previous operation."45 Furthermore, as the TCGs were utilized,
the concept was perfected to the point that some units became interchangeable for certain
missions. For example, 14
th
Intelligence Company and the Special Branch's E4A
adopted similar methodologies, and in most surveillance operations, one could be used in
lieu of the other. There were some differences, however, as E4A tended to be used more
for urban operations while the Army surveillance detachment was used more frequently





Although not an intelligence organization per se, the 22
nd
Special Air Service
(SAS) Regiment was deeply involved in intelligence collection and covert operations in
Northern Ireland, although when the SAS actually arrived in Northern Ireland is a matter
of some historical contention. Some authors, such as Raymond Murray, state
categorically that the SAS began operations in Northern Ireland concomitant with the
imposition of the British Army between the warring tribes in 1969.
47 The official British
line is that the SAS was not committed to Ireland until 1976, although that seems
somewhat disingenuous as individual members of the SAS had previously served in
Northern Ireland in support of specific operations.
48
Moreover, the SAS had been used to
train other special units like the MRF and the 14th Intelligence Company since the early
1970s.
49
Nevertheless, the squadrons of the SAS Regiment were not allowed to operate
in Northern Ireland as independent SAS units until 1976 for two reasons. First, virtually
the entire SAS was committed in Oman in support ofthe Omani government until the
Sultan's victory over Soviet-backed guerrillas in December 1975. Without prior
consultation with the Ministry of Defence, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson
committed the returning SAS to Northern Ireland in January 1976. 50 Second, the SAS
had a lethal reputation dating back to the Regiment's origins in World War Two and
through Britain's decolonialization period. The commitment of any of the four squadrons
47
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or the entire Regiment was seen on both sides of the divide in Northern Ireland as an
escalatory move.
51
In accordance with its traditional mission, the SAS was more involved in
operations than intelligence collection, and when the SAS was used in collection, it was
more focused on surveillance requiring special talents and tactics. However, the 14th
Intelligence Company conducted most of the special surveillance and the SAS often
provided back-up support to the surveillance team Moreover, intelligence provided by
the 14 Intelligence Company was frequently used to cue an SAS arrest or ambush.
In 1980, less than one year after Maurice Oldfield established the TCGs, the SAS
and 14l Intelligence Company were merged into a single command in Northern Ireland
known as the Intelligence and Surveillance Group. The Intelligence and Surveillance
Group allowed the British to maximize their special operations resources in Northern
Ireland and, accordingly, the British were able to reduce the number of SAS troopers in
Ulster from a squadron of 70 personnel to a reinforced troop of about 20 soldiers. 52 The
SAS element of the Intelligence and Surveillance Group was centralized in one location
for emergent ad hoc tasking, while the 60 plus operators of the 14th Intelligence Company
remained dispersed in the three detachments across the province. The Group was
commanded by a lieutenant colonel and was made available for the operational purposes
of the TCGs. 53
The SAS relationship with other intelligence organizations in Northern Ireland





operations with those organizations. To many Republican observers, the SAS fought a
dirty war in Northern Ireland, but from the perspective of the British, they were
absolutely critical for specialized work that was beyond the capabilities of Regular Army
units or the Special Branch. For example, when the situation called for expertise beyond
that of the HMSUs or the SSU, the talents of the SAS were then brought to bear against
the problem. According to Sir John Hermon, the Chief Constable of the RUC during the
mid-eighties:
The SAS are used in any situation where we believe that there's
going to be a level of fire power which could transcend that which the
RUC are capable of dealing with and that the army are trained to respond
to. That's why they are in Northern Ireland, available to the RUC and
available to the military. That's the best instrument you've got and you
• 54
use it.
This relationship between RUC Special Branch, MI5 and the SAS had the effect
of improving the coordination effort in Northern Ireland and also gave an additional edge
to British covert operations in Ulster. In some respects, the SAS took over as the English
bogeyman after Frank Kitson left. Such is the reputation of the SAS in Northern Ireland
that inexplicable mistakes on the part of the IRA are frequently blamed on the SAS.
55
One last special intelligence unit that merits examination is the Field Research
Unit (FRU), or the Force Research Unit, which was an Army HUMINT organization
devoted to handling informers.
56
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Until 1977, the rotating Regular Army battalions in Northern Ireland ran their
own informers. The prevailing belief was that human sources were too valuable to be left
to either the Special Branch or to MI5, but even so, the Army-run program until that time
did not seem particularly cognizant of the value of human sources. The battalions moved
through Northern Ireland on a four-month basis, and as a battalion rotated out, the
informers on its payroll were turned over to the intelligence officer of the relieving
battalion. HUMINT requires particular skills in managing people—skills that cannot be
perfected in the classroom or in four months of on-the-job training. Sources, whose lives
were at stake, were understandably nervous at the prospect of new handlers every four
months.
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Moreover, the system was open to abuse from sources as the handlers had
little time to learn and evaluate the informers and their information.
The Army ceased the practice of battalions running agents in 1977, but as
informer intelligence was the main conduit of information in Northern Ireland, the Army
believed they needed to be in the business of human sources. The FRU brought a long-
term approach to informer intelligence as its case officers, recruited from all services,
were brought into Northern Ireland for full tours. 58 Not surprisingly, the return of Army
intelligence into this arena was not roundly applauded throughout the intelligence
community in Northern Ireland. The RUC and MI5 viewed Army intelligence in these
matters as amateurish and as potential competition for resources. Furthermore, as most
recruitment of informers came from exploiting the legal indiscretions of the prospective




Branch. Even so, the Army proceeded with the FRU with one officer arguing that "Many
Catholics feel much happier talking to a Brit than to a policeman." 59
Not all intelligence units in Northern Ireland were special purpose units like the
14
th
Intelligence Company or the FRU, and more traditional military intelligence units
associated with the Regular Army accomplished substantial intelligence collection over
the years. As mentioned above, the British Army quickly adopted a policy of rotating
battalions through Northern Ireland at four-month intervals. This was done for a variety
of reasons, namely, to avoid unit burnout and to spread the positive and negative aspects
of the experience around as evenly as possible. Despite the above reasoning, the four-
month rotation was detrimental to both regimental operations and intelligence. Desmond
Hamill states that most units at the battalion level "... felt that they were not fully
effective until they had been there a month, and it would be almost halfway through their
tour before their intelligence became effective."
60 One way of addressing this problem
was to have the battalions that were due to rotate into Northern Ireland send an advance
intelligence party to the province a month prior to the battalion's arrival.
For the units that were operating in the cities, primarily Londonderry and Belfast,
the intelligence required to support patrolling operations, i.e., peacekeeping operations,
was essentially derived from low-level HUMINT. This might be in the nature of getting
to know the neighborhoods, both in personal and geographic terms. Collection was
mostly overt, conducted by regular soldiers (Squaddies) while on patrol in the hard areas
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of Belfast and Londonderry, and sometimes consisted of nothing more than conversations
with the locals.
It was through the debriefing of the Squaddies in the 1970s following patrols
(sometimes after the battalions had departed Ireland) that the profile of the typical IRA
terrorist emerged:
It showed that the Provisional gunmen were usually unemployed, working
class Catholics, some ofwhom probably would have been ordinary
criminals if it were not for the movement; this was not altogether
surprising because the Catholic areas had very high levels of
unemployment. They were mostly young, under twenty-three, and those
who survived did so because they became "street-wise 7 " and cunning.
However, as the leaders were picked up so the volunteers became even
younger. The single greatest factor in their joining the Provisional IRA
was a family connection.
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Thus, it was really through the intelligence gathered by the Regular Army that the
IRA organization became known to British intelligence. The earlier files kept by the
RUC were outdated and obsolete by the time British troops were introduced in 1969 and,
consequently, files on suspected ERA personnel were begun anew by the British
regiments. Over time, extensive files were developed by the British Army on the
Catholic population as a whole and the profile ofthe IRA was refined even further. 63
In 1977, in an attempt to improve the intelligence collection of the Regular Army,
the British Army adopted what became known as "Close Observation Platoons"' (COPs)
COPs were specially trained surveillance units pulled from the battalions that rotated
through Northern Ireland as well as the residential battalions that served in the province
for a two-year stint. The seven COPs were under the operational control of the
Hamill. 123
Ibid.
Commander Land Forces (CLF) in Northern Ireland as well as the three brigade
commanders and they were available for tasking anywhere in Ulster.
Typically, surveillance teams would be infiltrated into bombed out (or otherwise
derelict) buildings at night, and be literally boarded in for periods up to three weeks at a
time. The surveillance team would create peepholes through niches in broken bricks and
then photograph the local population. Not all surveillance teams were put into derelict
buildings though; Belfast and Londonderry housing areas usually consisted of row houses
where access to one attic essentially gave a surveillance team access to the attics of an
entire street. Once ensconced in an attic, the soldiers could generally gain visual access
to the street or could listen and record the conversations of the residents below them.
Rural operations involved the establishment of covert observation posts to
observe, for example, houses or suspected arms caches. According to Mark Urban, the
COPs were to become an important tool in understanding the pattern ofIRA activity,
"Although 14 Intelligence Company or SAS operators were usually brought in when
there was good intelligence of a forthcoming operation, the COPs often provided the
basic data about an area and ERA activities in it."
Even as the rotating units experienced difficulties in Northern Ireland, so did the
residential battalions and the permanently garrisoned forces. The regimental system has
a long and proud tradition in the British Army, but it was frequently the source of tension
in Northern Ireland. Certain regiments had poor reputations with the Catholic








None, however, were as controversial as the Ulster Defence Regiment
(UDR) The UDR was established in 1970 as a locally raised regiment of the British
Army and was intended to support Army operations in Ulster. It was originally planned
that recruitment for the UDR would be from both the Catholic and Protestant
communities. Unfortunately for Northern Ireland, the UDR emerged as an almost
exclusively Protestant organization and one that was further infiltrated by Protestant
paramilitaries. This has led in part to allegations of collusion between the Security
Forces and the Loyalist paramilitaries, in particular regarding the transfer of intelligence
on the IRA from the Security Forces to the Protestant hard men. 6 ' Colonel Michael
Dewar argues, however, that the advantages of the UDR outweigh its disadvantages, and
that one of its primary strengths is the "...great depth of local knowledge available in the
Regiment." Dewar goes on to add "The Battalion Intelligence cell and the small,
company-level Intelligence cells ensure that this potential is fully exploited."
68
Even so,
the sensitivities involved with the UDR were such that its members were restricted from
patrols within the Catholic estates and were not used in covert operations.
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In conclusion, it is apparent that the British intelligence community in Northern
Ireland acted not as a single entity, but rather as a loose conglomeration of organizations.
The history of these organizations in Ulster shows a chaotic explosion of participants,
which unfortunately never evolved into a coherent whole with a fixed purpose As the
intelligence community in Northern Ireland proliferated, it grew increasingly more





complex and only reluctantly came under the influence of any centralizing tendencies.
The most important of these tendencies was the development and implementation
of the Tasking and Coordination Groups. The TCGs were not a panacea for the ills of
British intelligence, but did go a long way towards checking the self-destructive impulses
of the British intelligence community in Northern Ireland. In the next chapter, the
methods of the various intelligence units are examined as the focus turns to British
intelligence tradecraft in Northern Ireland.
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III. INTELLIGENCE TRADECRAFT IN NORTHERN IRELAND
The intelligence profession encompasses numerous disciplines, many of which
were used in Northern Ireland. One noticeable feature of the war in Northern Ireland,
however, is the lack of a clear delineation between the traditionally distinct communities
of operations and intelligence. This perhaps serves to highlight the prominent role that
intelligence played in the war against terrorism in Northern Ireland One is struck by the
frequency of the incidents throughout the history of the Troubles where intelligence units
were involved in direct and violent interaction with the IRA and the other terrorist
organizations. This is illustrated during the period between 1976 and 1987, when the
roughly 100 personnel of the Intelligence and Surveillance Group were responsible for
the deaths of three times as many Republican paramilitaries as the remainder of the
10,000-strong British Army in Northern Ireland. 70
Naturally, not all of the British intelligence activities were as visible as those
involving lethal confrontation with the ERA, but visible or not, the intelligence presence
in Northern Ireland was to have a direct impact on not only the conduct of the war, but on
the lives of the average citizen of Ulster as well. This chapter looks at the tradecraft
employed by the British intelligence services in Northern Ireland or, in other words, how
the British utilized the tools of the trade Such an examination is necessary because it
offers unique insights into the shadowy world of the secret British operations.
u Mark Urban, Big Bovs ' Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IR.4 (London: Fabcr
and Faber. 1992). 248-252.
35
Understanding how British intelligence operates is an important step forward in gaining a
complete picture of the undercover war in Ulster.
More than any other discipline within intelligence, human intelligence or
HUMINT defined the intelligence war in Northern Ireland. HUMINT, itself,
encompasses a broad range of activities, all of which were incorporated in varying
degrees by British intelligence in Northern Ireland. This chapter will provide an
overview of the British use of clandestine collection (specifically the use of informers),
covert action, and the role of intelligence technology in Northern Ireland.
A. CLANDESTINE COLLECTION
It has been estimated that in Northern Ireland over two-thirds of all intelligence
came from HUMINT. In Ulster, HUMINT collection was overwhelmingly through the
use of clandestine penetration of the paramilitary organizations.
71 The British
intelligence community basically employed two types of clandestine collection: direct
penetration by British intelligence officers and the use of agents and informers.
Unlike the role of agents and informers, which is widely discussed in the studies
of Northern Ireland, the use of British intelligence officers in actual penetration of the
IRA is hardly mentioned. The apparent reason is not that the practice was successful and
thus remained secret, but that it was so difficult a task, it was rarely attempted. Even
casual penetration of Republican circles was problematic, and the one known instance of
such an attempt by the British ended in the officer's kidnapping, torture and subsequent
murder by the IRA. 72
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An obvious obstacle for an Englishman to overcome would be the differences in
accent and dialect. Although it might seem a small obstacle, developing the right accent
was not as simple as one might imagine, and being precise was crucial as the proper
accent could make all the difference in the world.
Local accents in Britain and Ireland are far more prevalent than in the United
States and are used to distinguish not only where a person comes from, but social class as
well. Accents may be markedly different in localities that are separated by no more than
3-5 miles. In an area as small as Ulster, it would be tricky for a foreigner to assume a
local accent and have the requisite knowledge of the respective area to withstand any
critical scrutiny. This did not deter the British from trying, however. James Rennie
mentions that as part of the extensive training for the 14th Intelligence Company, the
operators were versed in Irish accents:
The final aspect of our training was to perfect our Irish accents To
operate effectively we had to be able to hold our own in everyday
conversations in the different areas that we would deploy to, and to
achieve this we had been voiced-coached regularly by a charming retired
Irish actor and his wife. They played us tapes of the different regional
accents, from the relatively soft lilt of South Armagh, with its galloping
delivery, to the harsher, slightly clipped, and more measured tones of
North Belfast. 73
Accents were, of course, but one hurdle that a British intelligence officer would
face. Equally important was an understanding of the unique culture of Northern Ireland
and how it was manifested through the Troubles. Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix's
biography of Ian Phoenix, a senior Special Branch officer killed in 1994, discussed Ian
Phoenix's concern that the MI5 officers with whom he worked simply did not understand
James Reniue. The Operators: On the Streets with Britain 's Most Secret Sen'ice (London:




James Rennie recounts an example of a little peculiarity of Ulster of
which if one was unaware could draw immediate and unwanted attention.
In hard rural areas even a friendly wave of the hand can have a sectarian
connotation. A single finger lifted in acknowledgement as you squeeze
slowly past an oncoming vehicle in a narrow lane is a predominantly
Catholic gesture. The Protestant equivalent is to raise the flat palm,
echoing as it does the symbolism of the Red Hand of Ulster. Make the
wrong sign in an area and you unnecessarily draw attention to yourself.
Of course one could choose simply not to acknowledge other drivers, but
in a small rural community where a strange face stands out, this too would
seem a little unusual, particularly as the Irish are naturally a very warm
and friendly race.
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Peter Taylor wrote, "In Northern Ireland, agents were not trained by the security
services and then infiltrated into the IRA's ranks. That was the stuff of thrillers. The
reality of close-knit Republican areas and the IRA's cellular structure made such attacks
almost impossible or suicidal"
76 As Taylor suggests, the true insurmountable object was
the Republican culture itself. An argument can be made that while it was critical to
understand the nature ofNorthern Ireland's culture, once an outsider understood it, the
more apparently futile it became to try to breach it. In other words, an outsider who truly
knew Northern Ireland and its clannish society would not attempt to personally penetrate
the IRA
The nature of this close-knit and somewhat paranoid society suggests that not
only would an Englishman have inherent difficulties gaining access to IRA circles, but so
would a Protestant Irishman. One key aspect of the IRA profile was the likelihood of a
family connection in joining the IRA. In the absence of familial or other Republican
74
Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix, Phoenix: Policing the Shadows, The Secret War Against




Peter Taylor. Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Fein (New York: TV Books, 1 997), 298.
38
bona fides, the task of penetrating the IRA for an outsider would be almost
insurmountable.
Thus the most realistic method to gain human intelligence from the ranks of the
IRA came from co-opting the IRA itself through the use of agents and informers There
is no real clear distinction offered throughout most of the literature on Northern Ireland as
to the difference between agents and informers, and in most cases the terms appear to be
used interchangeably. Martin Dillon breaks with this practice and offers the distinction
that the agent is an employee of the government and collects intelligence willingly The
informer, on the other hand, is one that is connected with criminal activities and is
essentially coerced into working for the Crown. 77 Using this definition, an agent might
be someone within Republican circles that volunteered to work for Special Branch, while
an informer might be a person of similar background who is coerced into working for
Special Branch. The second person may or may not be paid for services rendered, but is
almost certainly cooperating with the Special Branch in exchange for leniency of some
sort. The distinction between the two may be professionally interesting, but somewhat
realistically irrelevant as the difference between the two definitions seems to lie not in the
nature of the service performed, but whether service on behalf of the Crown was willing
or not. In Northern Ireland, "willing
1
' is decidedly a relative term For immediate
purposes, therefore, no distinction will be made between agents and informers and the
terms will continue to be used interchangeably.
Informers then become the best and most productive clandestine avenues into the
IRA as well as the Protestant paramilitary organizations MI5, Special Branch and
Ibid. 308-310.
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military intelligence all have had dozens of informers on their payrolls and as noted,
many informers have been on more than one payroll. The process of penetrating the IRA
with informers naturally begins with recruitment. Other areas of the intelligence use of
informers to be covered include the art of agent handling as well as the informers'
tasking, compensation and fate.
Recruitment of informers may come through a variety of means: voluntary walk-
ins, individuals pursuing vendettas or other agendas, or those that were coerced into
informing. Of the few voluntary informers that the British have used in Northern Ireland,
the motivation is either, oddly enough, conscience or greed. An incident regarding one of
the former variety was recounted by Desmond Hamill:
One unit pulled in a suspect one day and as usual left him in the
courtyard at the back of the police station to get cold. Then he was
brought in and an intelligence officer soon realized that the man was
morally disturbed by what was going on. The officer said later the
floodgates opened. "From what he told us we began raking in people
we'd never heard of Suddenly we can see the whole structure of the
organization. It was like the lights being turned on."
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Sometimes as in the case of Martin McGartland, cash was offered to a Catholic
who fit the IRA profile, but had been previously unassociated with the terrorist
organization. In an area like Belfast with massive unemployment, where families have
been unemployed for successive generations, such incentives obviously would be
appealing.
Martin McGartland was a teenager in Belfast when he was recruited by the RUC
Special Branch. Prior to his recruitment, he was a petty criminal with no record, no job
78 Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland, 1969-1984 (London:
Methuen, 1985), 136.
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and no particular ties to the Republican community. He was approached by a Special
Branch officer who paid him initially to do non-essential tasks, which grew over time
into identification of IRA gunmen and later into actual enlistment into and penetration of
the IRA
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1987, I continued to supply the
Special Branch with information they requested, identifying the hard men
and reporting their movements. Once a week I would meet my two
controllers, varying the places we met and, once a month, they would hand
over four hundred pounds in cash, which I would stuff into my trousers
pocket before walking home
There are several cases involving informers whose recruitment was based on a
voluntary acceptance of a retainer, but the most frequent method of securing an informer
in the IRA was through coercion or blackmail. 80 Something is held over the head of the
informer that coerces him to turn against the IRA. Usually, the informer has committed a
crime and the Security Forces offer immunity from prosecution in exchange for
informing against the IRA.
An example of this method of recruitment is the case of Joe Fenton, who worked
as an informer at the behest of Special Branch and MI5.
81
In 1980, Fenton did some
small "favors'
1
for the IRA including transferring explosives from one site to another As
Fenton was neither IRA nor a Republican sympathizer, his motivations for helping the
terrorists were probably grounded in fear. Shortly after finishing his work with the IRA.
Fenton was approached by Special Branch and MI5 officers who told him that they were
aware of his activities and that he was open to prosecution for his actions It was then
9
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made clear to Fenton that if he agreed to do some "favors" for the two officers, that the
government would be willing to overlook his illegal terrorist activities. During the 1982-
1983 timeframe, Fenton' s handlers, a Special Branch sergeant and an English MI5
officer, established Fenton in a new business as a real estate agent.
82
Fenton then made
certain houses that were for sale by his company available to the IRA as safe houses,
temporary arms dumps, and meeting places. Unknown to the ERA, the houses were
bugged and tracking devices placed in the weapons. According to Martin Dillon, the
information provided by Fenton and the associated bugging operations resulted in the
arrests of over twenty members of the IRA. 83
Fenton was obviously a valuable agent for the British, but unfortunately his luck
ran out beginning with a Security Forces raid on a mortar-bomb production site at one of
his houses in 1988. Following this raid, IRA attention became focused on Fenton, and in
1989 he was kidnapped, interrogated and executed by the IRA. 84
Both Fenton and McGartland had two handlers, which was typical for the
intelligence services in Northern Ireland. Martin Dillon wrote on the subject of handlers,
"The use oftwo handlers ensures that there's always one available to attend meetings;
that two minds are constantly assessing the behavior and value of an agent or informer;
and that in the dangerous climate ofNorthern Ireland the untimely death of one handler
does not mean that intimate knowledge of an agent or informer is lost."
85
Perhaps more
importantly, as a Special Branch officer said to Dillon, if there is only one handler and he
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is killed, the informer might think that he is off the hook The use of two handlers avoids
that problem.
86
The tasking of collection by informers is diverse and naturally reflects the
requirements of the handling organization or the cognizant Tasking and Coordination
Group. Priority, though, has always been given to identification and location of the IRA
leaders and gunmen; the shipment and storage of IRA weapons; and notice of impending
IRA operations. Certain informers, based on their position relative to the IRA, were
conduits of only specific types of information. One example of a British agent who was
recruited for a specific type of intelligence was Frank Hegarty.
In 1980, the RUC Special Branch and MI5 recruited a former IRA quartermaster
named Frank Hegarty who had drifted away from the IRA, although he had not formally
severed any ties.
87
Like Marty McGartland, Hegarty was not coerced into working for
British intelligence. As Hegarty had a gambling problem, his recruitment came through
money. He was initially asked to do some minor, inconsequential work for his handlers
in Londonderry. One handler was from Special Branch, the other was from MI5. Before
long, British intelligence asked him to actively rejoin the IRA and to return to
quartermaster duties. An IRA source interviewed by Dillon said that Hegarty was a good
and trusted member who worked with arms transshipments while receiving a £25 per
week retainer from Special Branch. 88
By late 1985, when the first arms shipments to the IRA from Libya arrived and
their impact was felt in Northern Ireland, Hegarty was tasked by his handlers to discover
Ibid.. 368.
Quartermasters are in charge of IRA weapons and arms dumps
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what information he could about the increase in arms. Hegarty reported back to MI5 and
Special Branch that a massive shipment of mostly Soviet-bloc equipment had been
received from overseas and was being stored in specially built underground bunkers in
the Irish Republic. The RUC notified the Gardai about the arms dumps and on 26
January 1986, the Irish police seized the largest IRA arms dump ever located in the
Republic.
Hegarty shared the same fate as Fenton, and one that McGartland narrowly
avoided. The British knew that Hegarty would be a prime suspect for the IRA and
relocated him in England before the Gardai acted on the RUC/MI5 information. As with
many other informers, Hegarty returned to Northern Ireland after a few months and was
subsequently kidnapped, interrogated and executed by the IRA. Martin Dillon offers an
interesting theory about Hegarty 's motives for returning to Londonderry. According to
Dillon, the ERA asserts that Hegarty became homesick and convinced himself that the
IRA would not seek him out, that he was inconsequential. There were also rumors that
the IRA had offered Hegarty immunity because they were afraid that he was going to
become a supergrass. 89 Although Dillon writes that his source in the IRA denies that this
was the case, he believes that the IRA did in fact lure him back to Ulster with a promise
of immunity. Dillon's argument is that "homesickness would not, I believe, have been
sufficient incentive to a man who knew he was going to die."90
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This type of clandestine intelligence collection obviously does not occur in a
vacuum as the IRA has an active and aggressive counter-intelligence program. 91 Several
authors have commented on the devastating effect of the use of informers against the
IRA, not only from a purely military vantage, but also from a perspective of morale and
unit cohesion.
92
Consequently, informers within the IRA ranks are aggressively searched
out and if found, they are turned over to an IRA unit known euphemistically as the "Civil
Administration Team" for disposition. The Civil Administration Team was responsible
for interrogations of suspected informers and their methods frequently included torture of
the suspects. Following a "confession," it was standard policy for the IRA to execute the
informer. Occasionally, the informer may be turned against the British and become a
double agent, but the IRA has found that torture and execution as a deterrent was more
effective. This is one of the reasons that the British go to great lengths to protect their
sources. Desmond Hamill wrote that the British taught their soldiers that "...the worst
crime he can commit—worse than buggery, rape or shooting another soldier, is to
compromise a source."93
What does British intelligence do with an informer that is no longer effective or
has been compromised or detected by IRA counter-intelligence9 Although the record is
not entirely clear that the British have held their end of the bargain in each case, the
standard procedure was to get the informant out of Northern Ireland as quickly as






however, of informers iike Frank Hegarty returning to Northern Ireland only a few
months after being resettled. Their motivations are usually homesickness and loneliness
or perhaps sometimes guilt. It may be that the informers who return to Ulster convince
themselves that their actions were insignificant and that the IRA would not hold a grudge
against them. Unfortunately, numerous bodies that have been found along the Irish
border since 1969 include those of informers who had been resettled out of Ireland and
decided to return.
Martin McGartland, who was not an insignificant informant, was left with no
doubt as to his fate if he was caught by the IRA. A funeral sympathy card was sent to his
mother's house three years after he had been resettled in England, which read, "The Holy
Sacrifice of the Mass will be offered for the repose of the soul of Marty McGartland with
sincere sympathy from your friends in Connelly House, Crumlin Road and Long Kesh."
"
B. COVERT OPERATIONS
The tradecraft of covert activities is somewhat more elusive than the British use
of informers. British covert operations in Northern Ireland are not as well documented as
are British clandestine collection operations. Furthermore, as covert activities are
operations that do not fall into a single conveniently defined category, the tradecraft
involved varies from one operation to the next.
Roy Godson, an American author on intelligence activities, offers three generic
fields of covert action that would be applicable to intelligence operations in Northern
95 McGartland 247. Connelly House is Sinn Fein Headquarters; Crumlin Road is the holding
center where suspected terrorists are remanded m custody; Long Kesh is the prison where convicted
terrorists are held.
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Ireland: propaganda, political action, and paramilitary activity/
6
These three fields will
be used as a guideline to examine British covert activities in Northern Ireland
Before beginning with an examination of British propaganda operations, a few
words about covert activity in general might be helpful. According to Godson, "Covert
action, or, to use the British term, special political action, is the attempt by a government
or group to influence events in another state or territory without revealing its own
involvement."
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Furthermore, an effective covert action ". .. must be part of a well-
coordinated policy. Ends should be thought through, and the means to achieve those ends
reasonably calculated."
98 An example might be a British government campaign to win
the hearts and minds of the Catholic community in Ulster. The overt side of the
campaign might be civic programs designed to improve the lives of the target audience,
such as youth recreation programs or housing reform. The covert side of the same
campaign might be to manipulate the media in order to discredit the competition, e.g.,
branding the IRA as narcotics dealers.
Proponents of covert action feel that such operations offer an avenue to victory' at
little cost, i.e., the gains can be disproportionately greater than the efforts expended. The
corollary to that proposition is, however, that the cost of the exposure and failure of
covert operations is inordinately high. People naturally resent being manipulated by the
government. Trust can be a very tenuous and transitory commodity, and it stands to
reason that once people perceive the government manipulation, trust in the government is
96 Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks and Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence
(Washington, DC: Brassey's. 1995), 3. Godson offers intelligence assistance" as a fourth field of covert
action. As this refers to intelligence support from one government to another, it is not really applicable in
Northern Ireland
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weakened, perhaps irreparably. Bearing this in mind, the intelligence community should
have a high degree of confidence in an operation's success before embarking upon it.
Equally important is that the intelligence service has a high degree of confidence that its
operation will remain covert.
Propaganda was and remains the covert weapon of choice by all sides in Northern
Ireland. Each protagonist has actively used propaganda as a means to discredit its
opponents and further its own cause. Two British propaganda operations against the IRA
are discussed in depth in Chapter V.
Many British covert propaganda operations were run with a view towards
undermining IRA cohesion, in particular the IRA leadership's authority. If there is a
single lesson to be learned from the British experience in this regard, it is "know thine
enemy." For the British to successfully target the IRA leadership, they first had to truly
understand the Republican movement and its supporters. Both sides found over the
course of three decades of war what the other side valued and how it would respond to
threats of certain types. Knowing which "buttons to push" can be a valuable tool in
covert operations. The British covert propaganda campaigns targeted the valuable
support of the Catholic population for the IRA by portraying the leaders as criminal
opportunists and terrorists. By doing so, the British hoped to further the fortunes of the
more moderate, and perhaps malleable, factions of Ulster politics.
The second field of covert action proposed by Godson is political action. He
defines political action as the ". . political means (advice, agents of influence,
information, material support) to influence foreign events. Such efforts can be directed at
foreign governments, nongovernmental entities such as labor, intellectual, and religious
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movements, and nonstate actors such as ethnic groups and criminal cartels."99 As Ulster
was essentially a domestic problem, it is not clear how the British government would use
political action as defined by Godson against the IRA, although one example might be
divined from the British attempt to stem support for the IRA in the United States.
Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, Republican sympathizers in the United
States and Canada provided a significant amount of funding for IRA activities through
the Irish Northern Aid (NORAID) organization. 100 Not only did the United States
provide a substantial share of the funding for IRA arms, it also proved to be the primary
marketplace to buy the weapons. As the hunger strike in the Maze Prison (Long Kesh)
galvanized support for the IRA both in Ireland and in Irish communities in the United
States, the IRA decided in 1981 to step up the war against the British. This necessitated
acquiring automatic assault rifles, machine guns and surface-to-air missiles. An America
that the ERA rightly perceived as largely sympathetic to the Republican cause in the wake
of Bobby Sands' death by starvation was the obvious marketplace to acquire its new
arsenal.
The United States law enforcement community had traditionally ignored Irish
Republican activities in the U.S., but by the time the renewed IRA effort was underway
in 1981, the FBI had established a special squad to investigate ERA operations in North
America. Of particular interest to the FBI were the IRA's American fund-raising and
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led to an arms sale sting.
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This operation culminated in the arrest and imprisonment of
several IRA operatives who were attempting to buy surface-to-air missiles. The FBI
operation also involved the seizure of around sixty assault rifles and dozens of timers
intended for IRA bombs. 102 Weapons availability from the American arms market was
greatly diminished as a result of the FBI operations.
Was this shift in official American interest in the ERA. the result of political action
or did it simply reflect the changing political landscape in the United States? Admittedly,
the case that British intelligence initiated a political action campaign against the IRA
within the American government is circumstantial at best. The anti-IRA operations
conducted by the FBI definitely ran counter to widespread American sympathy for the
Republican movement in the early 1980s, but the only indication that there was British
intelligence involvement was the reported liaison between the FBI and its British
counterpart. However, this can be explained as simply part of the "special relationship"
enjoyed between U.S. and British intelligence. It seems that a far more likely impetus to
the change was the election of Ronald Reagan. President Reagan, despite his Irish
heritage, was a close friend and political ally ofMargaret Thatcher who shared her
contempt for terrorists.
A third form of covert action listed by Godson was the use of force in the form of
paramilitary activity. According to Godson, "This includes support for or defense against
terrorism, resistance movements, insurgents, other unconventional forces, and the use of
101
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force to deny or degrade information to adversaries.
'
,103
Certainly the use of
unconventional units such as the Mobile Reconnaissance Force and the SAS fall into this
category. As selected operations of both of these units are discussed in Chapters IV and
VII, respectively, it might be more fruitful to examine briefly the relationship between
British intelligence and the Protestant paramilitaries. In this regard, the issue is the
possibility that the British government used the Loyalist paramilitaries as a surrogate
force in its fight against the Republican paramilitaries.
The British maintain that there has not been collusion as a matter of policy
between the Security Forces and the Loyalist paramilitaries. By the government account,
any transfer of intelligence or other aid provided by the Security Forces to the Loyalists
has been the work of rogue individuals within the Security Forces and not as the result of
a British policy of support to Loyalists.
104
Republicans disagree citing the case of
Loyalist paramilitary' Brian Nelson.
Nelson was a former Loyalist paramilitary who was recruited by British
intelligence to penetrate the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Both MI5 and the
Army's Field Research Unit (FRU) competed for Nelson's services with the FRU
evidently winning the bidding war. In 1986, at British intelligence direction, Nelson
rejoined the UDA as its intelligence chief. According to Tim Pat Coogan, Nelson
provided the British with intelligence on the Loyalist paramilitaries including information
on planned sectarian assassinations of Catholics. The British in turn used the information
103 Godson. 3.
104 Tim Pat Coogan. The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Searchfor Peace
(Boulder. Colorado: Roberts Rinehart Publishers. 1997), 265.
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to inhibit or avert the assassinations,
105
but according to Coogan, not the planned
assassinations ofIRA or Sinn Fein personnel.
106
Furthermore, there were Republican
allegations that the British provided intelligence on the Republican leadership to the
UDA assassins via Brian Nelson. 107
In 1989, the Nelson affair came to light as a result of a police inquiry into
allegations of intelligence transfers to Loyalist hit squads. An English policeman, Deputy
Chief Constable John Stevens of Cambridgeshire, headed the inquiry.
108 The Stevens
inquiry found enough credible evidence to arrest Nelson on several counts of murder. A
plea bargain was ultimately accepted that dropped the murder charges in exchange for a
ten-year sentence in an English prison for conspiracy to commit murder. Adding fuel to
the fire ofRepublican conspiracy theories, the night before the Stevens team intended to
arrest Nelson, a fire broke out in the Police Authority building destroying much of the
evidence against Nelson. Two alarms on the floor failed to go off.
At Nelson's trial in 1992, a former Commanding Officer of the Army's FRU
testified that Nelson's work had resulted in the saving of 217 lives, including Gerry
Adams. 110 As a result of this unnamed officer's testimony, the sentencing judge stated
that Nelson in the course of his work on behalf of British intelligence "... had shown the
greatest courage."
111
Moreover, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Tom King,











111 Quoted in Coogan. 263. The officer's name was not given to the court and he testified as
"Colonel J."
52
interest, according to Republicans, is that the British were obviously concerned about the
possibility of being implicated in court of conspiracy to commit crimes including murder
They therefore worked hard behind the scenes to reduce the sentence of Nelson.
According to Coogan:
. . by pleading guilty Nelson ensured that no FRU personnel were called
upon to explain their involvement with him. I am reliably informed that
had this been done, documents uncovered by the Stevens team would have
proven FRU involvement in many more murders and woundings than
came out in court.
112
If the allegations against Nelson and British intelligence were true, then the
British adopted the sentiment of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend. " Granting for the
sake of argument that this is the case, then British intelligence most likely used the
Loyalist paramilitaries as a surrogate force. Not all authors are convinced that this is the
case, however. Mark Urban doubts the strength of Republican claims that such collusion
was indicative of British policy. What concerns Urban, however, was the adoption of a
double standard by the British in employing the intelligence gained from their sources
within the Loyalist community. Urban maintains that the Security Forces failed to utilize
Nelson's intelligence to ambush the Loyalist terrorists. There is no question that
intelligence from Republican informers had been used to ambush IRA units in the
process of carrying out attacks. Urban questions the motives of the Security Forces by






How successful were British covert actions? Not surprisingly, the degree of
success of these operations is a matter of some debate. J. Bowyer Bell wrote,
After all MI6 had been run for years as a branch office of the KGB so
there was no reason to assume, as the romantics did, that the British had a
talent for the covert—and MI5 was apt to prove as inept as MI6 or army
intelligence units shaped especially for the Irish assignment. Even the
locals in the RUC Special Branch units had their problems. 114
Certainly several British covert operations have come to light over the years. On
the other hand, without access to British intelligence documentation there is no way of
knowing how many covert operations were successfully and secretly conducted. Despite
Bell's assertion that the British have no talent for covert operations, it is likely that
British covert action has enjoyed a degree of success as one propaganda campaign nearly
caused the collapse of the IRA in 1975.
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C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF SURVEILLANCE AND DIRTY TRICKS
Although the intelligence war in Northern Ireland was fought largely through
human sources, the use of intelligence derived from technical collection means increased
as the war dragged on. The conflict in Northern Ireland was decidedly low tech by
current American standards; however, certain collection means and other techniques bear
brief examination here.
Basic information on the populace of the Catholic neighborhoods was maintained
on note cards for most of the first decade of the Troubles. The use of computers was not
as prevalent, naturally, at the beginning of the Troubles as would be the case later in the
conflict. Early British experiments with computers had met with mixed success resulting
114
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in the Army and RUC retaining the note card filing system. By 1973, Army intelligence
was using computers to store and sort some information, but for political reasons, the
computer was largely limited to vehicle registration information. Civil rights activists
were concerned that the use of computers portended government monitoring of issues
beyond the security requirements of the anti-terrorist campaign. 116
Computerization did not really become integrated into British intelligence
procedures until the early 1980s when advances in computer technology made
computerized data storage a more efficient option than maintaining tens of thousands of
note cards.
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Again, the most practical use of computing power came with the tracking
of vehicles. Covert surveillance teams along the border, as well as overt vehicle
checkpoints throughout the province, would input the license number of cars traveling
through Ulster into a central database maintained at Lisburn. The computers allowed the
Security Forces to track thousands of vehicles in Northern Ireland, and helped identify
patterns of movements of Republican suspects. 118 Martin Dillon wrote that "When a
dangerous terrorist does not appear on [computer] surveillance lists over a given period,
alarm bells begin to ring, and the police and the Army begin to believe that something
unusual is being planned." 119 The three-person ASU killed in Gibraltar by the SAS in









Another way of using technology in maintaining surveillance of suspected
terrorists was through the increasing use of helicopters, which became a ubiquitous
feature over the Ulster countryside. James Rennie wrote that helicopters with specially
configured telescopic cameras were used to conduct airborne surveillance from great
distances:
So powerful was the sight that, on maximum magnification at a height of
8000 feet and a horizontal distance of eight kilometers, it was possible to
watch the front door of an individual house. The enormous advantage
from our point of view was the fact that at that height and distance a
hovering helicopter is inaudible and invisible to the naked eye from the
ground. In fact, even if the heli was spotted with binoculars from the
ground, it wouldn't have been possible to tell in which direction the sight
was looking, since it could rotate almost 360 degrees and the heli always
hovered nose into the wind, no matter which way it was blowing.
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Another application of the helicopter was to track suspect vehicles. Selected cars
would be stopped at a vehicle checkpoint, and while one Security Force- officer would
check the identification of the driver and passengers, another officer would
surreptitiously spray a Special Branch-developed liquid on the top of the car. According
to Marty McGartland, this liquid, which was invisible to the naked eye, created an optical
signature that could be tracked by specially configured helicopters for weeks, even if the
car were washed and polished. 122
The vehicles ofIRA suspects were occasionally bugged or tracking devices
attached that would give the intelligence services access to the conversations of the
passengers as well as providing locational data to the surveillance teams. James Rennie







Intelligence Company operator conducted. The target vehicle was locked inside a garage
in a hard Republican village that was patrolled by the IRA In deciding how to gain
access to the car, the decision was made to go through a window in the back of the
garage:
We. . . spent some time rehearsing how to open a secure casement window
from the outside, using long and very thin metal tools to manipulate the
fittings. Fortunately, there was a low wall from the top of which we could
access the roof. We would have to do it in the pitch dark and in silence
because the window was in full view of the back of the house Once the
window was ajar we would slip a flexible endoscope, containing its own
tiny integral light source, over the raised sill and peer around inside, so
that we could see what lay immediately below and how best to climb
down inside without making any noise. 123
What they saw immediately below them was a growling dog, which had been
awakened by the two operators. Rennie and his companion extricated themselves from
the back of the garage, left the village and radioed back to the TCG explaining their
situation. An hour later, a helicopter from Lisburn met the two operators at a rendezvous
site providing them with steak and narcotics for the dog. After drugging the animal the
two men proceeded with their work on the car. 124
Rennie' s anecdote illustrates an interesting talent of the surveillance teams:
breaking and entering houses. The Intelligence and Surveillance Group conducted the
bulk of these operations, which Mark Urban refers to as "covert search" missions. 125
Frequently, after obtaining a search warrant through the Home Office, 14th Intelligence








technical team into the house.
126 Once inside, a search would be conducted for weapons,
which if found could be rendered inoperable or have bugging/tracking devices implanted
in them. According to Mark Urban, this technique is known within British intelligence as
"jarking." 127 Alternately, the aim of the mission might be to place bugs and miniature
surveillance cameras around the premises. These bugs, i.e., miniature transmitters, could
transmit conversations for months, but had a limited transmission range. This
necessitated having the surveillance team situated close-by in abandoned houses, local
police stations, or ad hoc facilities such as portable cabins.
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Another trick that was used to some effect was the bugging and booby-trapping of
IRA arms caches in the country. Intelligence, usually from an informer, would cue the
Security Forces as to the whereabouts ofIRA arms dumps. If the intelligence was good
and an arms dump discovered, the Security Forces had several options. One possibility
would be to place the dump under surveillance by a team from the 14th Intelligence
Company, E4A, or a Close Observation Platoon, which could then cue the RUC to arrest
the IRA quartermasters when they came to collect weapons. As this would result in the
arrest of only one person and not an ASU, a preferred second option would be to place
tracking devices in the weapons and explosives. The Security Forces would then attempt
to catch the IRA active service unit in the process of committing terrorism. A third
option that was reportedly used was to booby-trap the weapons or explosives and attempt
to kill the terrorist. According to an IRA source interviewed by Martin Dillon,
We also believe that the Brits have not only used tracking devices but





people have been killed on bombing missions. Now if the Brits discover a
sealed dump they have the technology to open and reseal it We know this
because they've done it to our cost. If they get into a sealed weapons
dump they place a small tracking device or bug inside a rifle butt or in a
rifle barrel. They can also booby-trap guns so that they will explode when
fired.
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In conclusion, it should not be surprising that in the twenty years of warfare in
Northern Ireland covered in this history, that the British intelligence community devised
multiple and diverse techniques of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. Moreover,
the British methods, as they were being developed, were matched by counter-initiatives
by the IRA. 130 An example of this is the British use of aerial imagery in the search for
IRA weapons caches. The IRA countered by using bunkers that were less easily detected
by the air. 131 Each technological innovation was met with counter-innovation
Furthermore, the British were not the only side interested in the use of intelligence-
gathering technology. In 1979, the IRA succeeded in tapping the landlines running to
and from Lisburn. 132 This gave the IRA access to the telephone conversations of senior
Army commanders in Northern Ireland. The British responded with a more secure
communications system, which the IRA allegedly succeeded in penetrating a decade
later.
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For all of the technological innovation, the intelligence war in Northern Ireland
largely continued to be fought through informers as it had since time immemorial In a
lesson sometimes lost on the American intelligence community, the British learned.
^ Dillon. 401-402.
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again, in Northern Ireland that sometimes the best intelligence about the enemy comes
directly from the enemy itself.
IV. MOBILE RECONNAISSANCE FORCE OPERATIONS IN
BELFAST, 1971-1973
The operations by the Mobile Reconnaissance Force analyzed in this chapter took
place in Belfast during 1971-1973 and occurred against a backdrop of rapid IRA growth
and the consequential British escalation in the province During this particularly unhappy
and confusing period of the Troubles, several events had not only highlighted the
ineffectiveness of British intelligence in Ulster, but also brought British rule in general
into question. Colonel Michael Dewar wrote of the early part of this period:
From the end of March 1971 the PIRA bombing campaign started in
earnest. There were 37 explosions during April, 47 in May and 50 in
June. From January to August, thirteen soldiers, two policemen and
sixteen civilians died in the violence. During the same period there were a
total of 3 1 1 bomb explosions which injured more than 100 people. In
July, 194 rounds of ammunition were fired at British troops and in the first
nine days of August, 150 rounds. In one hectic 12-hour period in July, no
fewer than twenty explosions wrecked pubs, shops and banks, injuring a
dozen civilians. The Provisionals had now embarked on a full-scale
guerrilla war, striking indiscriminately at civilian and military targets in an
endeavour to make the Province ungovernable.... 134
In August 1971, the Stormont government responded by introducing internment
without trial. This not only hardened Catholic sentiment against the British, but also
illustrated the poor condition of British intelligence. In an effort to compensate for the
lack of good intelligence, the British used the controversial technique of interrogation in
depth techniques against several internees. The harsh treatment of prisoners resulted in
the United Kingdom being brought before the European Court ofHuman Rights and a
Michael Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland. Revised ed. (London: .Arms and
Armour Press, 1997), 52-53.
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subsequent IRA propaganda victory against the British.
13:>
Furthermore, by the time
British soldiers forcibly reopened the no-go areas of Londonderry and Belfast during
Operation Motorman in July 1972, British operational intelligence was virtually non-
existent on the paramilitary forces on the other side of the barricades, both Catholic and
Protestant.
It was Operation Motorman, the biggest operation conducted by the British Army
and Royal Marines since Suez, which cleared the way for the MRF to penetrate the
Nationalist areas in Belfast. Operation Motorman involved over 21,000 troops and it
successfully brought down the barricades in Londonderry and Belfast—allowing British
troops their first real access to the hard Catholic ghettos of those cities. It is in this
context of escalation of the Troubles and the hardening of British determination to remain
in Ulster that British authorities recognized the dire need for better intelligence in the
province. The Mobile Reconnaissance Force was one part of their answer to this
dilemma of how to improve intelligence. This chapter will be divided into three
component parts: first, an exploration of the origins of the Mobile Reconnaissance Force;
second, the operations of the MRF in Belfast during the period 1971-1973 will be
examined; and finally, this chapter will conclude with an assessment of these operations.
A. THE FOUNDING OF THE MOBILE RECONNAISSANCE FORCE
The Mobile Reconnaissance Force was the brainchild of Brigadier Frank Kitson,
the Commander of 39 Brigade in Belfast. Although the MRF was born of the need for
135 Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Searchfor Peace
(Boulder, Colorado: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1997), 127-129. The techniques used are descnbed in
Chapter VIII.
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better operational intelligence about the IRA, it had its true origins in the villages and
jungles of Kenya during the Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s
In 1953, then Captain Kitson was posted to Kenya as a District Intelligence
Officer as part of the British campaign to eliminate the Mau Mau terrorists. 136 During his
two years in Kenya, Kitson was personally responsible for the initiation of a unique and
devastating method of penetrating the various Mau Mau gangs After operations where
Mau Mau prisoners were taken, Kitson recruited selected prisoners to work for his
intelligence organization. The ex-terrorists working for Kitson, known as pseudo
gangsters, would join a different Mau Mau gang after training and indoctrination The
pseudo gangsters would then either provide intelligence about that gang to Kitson or
would lead the gang into an ambush by British security forces. Another method of
employing the pseudo gangsters was to use them to assist Kitson and other British
soldiers in personally penetrating the gangs prior to an ambush. 137 In exchange for
cooperation with British authorities, the pseudo gangsters avoided capital punishment,
which was the mandatory fate of captured terrorists
It is obvious from Kitson' s autobiographical account of the Mau Mau rebellion
that he regarded penetration of the terrorist organizations as critical in defeating the
Kenyan gangs. In 1960, he wrote, "There can be little doubt that the most effective
means of getting information and killing Mau Mau gangsters was the pseudo gang
technique. . . ,"
138 By September 1970, when Kitson was appointed Commander of 39
136
Frank Kitson, Gangs and Counter-gangs (London: Barnc and Rock] iff. 1960). 17.
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Brigade, it was apparent that this soldier had given much thought to the problems of
terrorism and insurgency and it was inevitable that his intelligence experience in Britain's
colonial wars would be brought to bear against the IRA. 139
Tim Pat Coogan wrote that as the 39 Brigade Commander and as Britain's leading
theorist on counter-insurgency, Brigadier Kitson was responsible for introducing two
seemingly contradictory concepts of counter-insurgency warfare to the Troubles in the
early 1970s: "de-escalation and attrition
" 14
° In his book, Low Intensity Operations,
Kitson discusses at length the benefits of effective civil-military relations in countering
subversion by addressing the grievances from which public unrest stem.
141
This is what
Coogan refers to as de-escalation, and defines in the Irish context as ". . removing the
water of civilian support in which the IRA swam by using propaganda and spending
money on community projects." 142 Although Coogan further states that "'Attrition,'
directed against the IRA, meant what it said,"
143
it really was not as simple as physically
eliminating the IRA or its leadership. Brigadier Kitson was acutely aware of the need to
remain within the confines of British law, especially while operating under the critical
examination ofthe media's scrutiny, so the concept of attrition had to be broadened to
include arrest and imprisonment.
144
Therefore, the problem for Kitson was not simply
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how to bring the power of the British Army to bear in Northern Ireland as an implement
of attrition, but rather how to selectively use the British Army in attrition while remaining
within the law and simultaneously pursuing de-escalation.
To Kitson, the key to this problem lay in intelligence and psychological
operations, which were viewed as critical force-multipliers in counter-insurgency
operations. Kitson felt that through good intelligence, the political leaders and the
underlying issues of the insurgency as well as the enemy force structure could be
identified, and a combination of de-escalation tactics and attrition quickly applied to the
problem In Northern Ireland, this theory was to be translated into attempting to win the
hearts and minds of the Catholics, while addressing the issue of the leadership of the IRA
through attrition—a theme that will be revisited in the next chapter.
Kitson believed that it was critical at the outset of a counter-insurgency campaign
for the intelligence structure to be in place and operating effortlessly as soon as possible,
but none of his statements on the subject seem as prophetic as the following: "The
problem of preparing an intelligence organization to deal with subversion and insurgency
is not therefore merely one of expansion. Developing new methods to deal with the new
requirement is just as important, and far more difficult." 145 This is the role that Kitson
envisioned for his innovative Mobile Reconnaissance Force.
Upon taking command of 39 Brigade in 1970, Brigadier Kitson convinced his
superiors in Whitehall and Lisburn to allow him to establish the MRF. In doing so,
Kitson doubtlessly argued the same line of reasoning about de-escalation, attrition and
Kitsoa Low Intensity Operations, 72.
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innovation as presented here. The MRF was set up in eariy 1971 under the command of a
captain and was to be a combination of British soldiers, carefully selected for the
command, and ex-IRA terrorists. For several weeks the unit was known as the "bomb
squad" before the name of Mobile Reconnaissance Force was given. 146 The soldiers were
selected from the Regular Army including military intelligence, as well as some Special
Boat Service (SBS) commandos and perhaps some Special Air Service (SAS) troopers. 147
Despite some Republican claims, the MRF was not an SAS-run operation although it has
been suggested that individual troopers were seconded to the unit to instruct special
tactics and weapons to the MRF operatives. 148 Tony Geraghty writes that at the time the
MRF was established, the SAS as a regiment was heavily committed in Oman and in any
case, British politicians still felt that a commitment of the SAS Regiment to the province
would be too inflammatory if publicized. 149 The ex-IRA members were to be recruited
into the MRF through the traditional methods of arrest for crimes including terrorism
followed by persuasion into turning and the promise of redemption at the end. These ex-
IRA terrorists that were known as "Freds" (some ten former gunmen at the beginning)
were to be Kitson's Irish pseudo gangsters.
B. MISSION AND OPERATIONS
Although it is difficult to be certain of the precise program of the MRF, viewed
with the benefit of time it can be seen that the executed operations of the MRF fell into
two overlapping categories of surveillance and covert operations. However, the
1 46 Mark Urban, Big Boys ' Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle against the IRA (London:
Faber and Faber. 1992), 36
147
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fundamental mission of the MRF in the early days was simply to get to know the
operations areas. At this stage of the Troubles (1971), there were still some integrated
neighborhoods in Belfast so that not all Catholics lived in the no-go areas or even in
predominantly Catholic estates in the city. Learning the areas of the city that were open
and under the control of the Army would have been the first steps of the MRF. However,
the true surveillance mission of the MRF was "to allow the Army to penetrate the
Republican heartlands, where the presence of strangers. . .is noticed quickly." 150 After the
breaching of the barricades following Operation Motorman, the MRF had vastly
expanded access to the hard Republican areas of Belfast such as the Lower Falls and
Andersonstown.
The MRF was divided into three or four man (or mixed gender) teams and were
billeted at the Army's Palace Barracks at Holywood—roughly six kilometers northeast of
Belfast in a predominantly Protestant environs. Surveillance missions were run in a
variety of ways, but a typical mission would involve placing a team in an armored
personnel carrier where the Fred could identify (and the team could photograph) IRA
paramilitaries as they drove through the Catholic neighborhoods. Other surveillance
missions would have an armed team, generally including a Fred, driving through the
Republican areas of Belfast in unmarked cars. The Fred would point out places of
interest, such as Republican pubs or homes of prominent Republicans, as well as identify'






information would be subsequently collated and used to build a growing picture of life
and personalities in the Republican neighborhoods.
There were obvious dangers to surveillance of the latter type, namely as a result
of the tight-knit clannish environment of Northern Ireland. Strangers are quickly noted
and in the paranoid world of Ulster, carefully scrutinized. Despite this characteristic, no
community, even in Northern Ireland, is an island entire of itself. In order to minimize
detection of the teams including problems of dialect, the British ensured that many of the
soldiers recruited into the MRF were of Irish origin.
One of the ways to bring strangers into communities with a minimum of scrutiny
was through infiltrating or impersonating the Belfast service sector, which was the modus
operandi of the MRF's most well-known operation, the Four Squares Laundry. The
Mobile Reconnaissance Force had been in operation for about a year when the Four
Squares Laundry operation was conceived in 1972.
During the summer of 1972, the MRF established a pick-up laundry service in the
Twinbrook estate of Catholic West Belfast, which was becoming known as an IRA
stronghold. The Four Squares Laundry, as the MRF-run domestic service was called,
would travel into Twinbrook twice per week to pick up and delivery laundry. What the
Catholic residents of Twinbrook did not know was that the couple that ran the service
were British Army personnel, Sapper Ted Stuart and Lance Corporal Sarah Jane
Warke. 152 The customers of the Four Squares Laundry found the couple with Belfast
accents to be pleasant and engaging.
153
The service was dependable and the Four Squares
Dillon, 32.
Ibid. Stuart was an Ulster native.
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Laundry proved to be the least expensive service in Belfast. 154 Unknown to the
inhabitants of West Belfast was that the van used by the laundry service was specially
configured to hold two MRF soldiers within a false ceiling. The ceiling was built so that
the soldiers were able to lay prone between the false and the real ceiling and take pictures
of pedestrians through concealed observation ports. Sometimes the Freds under the
employment of the MRF rode in the van and pointed out IRA men and sympathizers
Meanwhile, the laundry of the residents of Twinbrook was duly collected by the British
and forwarded to a legitimate laundry service in Belfast that had been subcontracted by
the intelligence organization. Laundry belonging to suspected IRA gunmen was taken to
a forensics laboratory, where it was tested for blood and traces of gunpowder and other
explosives. If the clothing tested positive, the intelligence might be used to cue the
Regular Army to conduct a search of the owner's property, which would appear as
simply one of thousands of house searches being conducted by the British Army.
155
After the forensics lab work was finished and the laundry completed, the British
operatives returned the laundry to the paying customers of Twinbrook.
156
On 2 October 1972, Warke and Stuart were ambushed during a laundry collection
trip into Twinbrook. As Lance Corporal Warke stood in a doorway talking to a
housewife, an IRA hit team from the l sl Battalion of the Belfast Brigade drove up to the
van and raked it with automatic weapons fire. Sapper Stuart, the driver, was killed and
154
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then the IRA team directed their fire into the false ceiling of the van. Contrary to
subsequent IRA claims, no surveillance team was assigned that day. When the gunmen
turned towards her, Lance Corporal Warke moved from the doorway into the house
dragging the housewife and her children in with her. As Warke escaped through the back
of the house and into the neighborhood, she explained to the housewife that the gunmen
must be a Loyalist hit squad.
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Simultaneously with the attack on Stuart and Warke, IRA hit teams from the 2nd
and 3
rd
Battalions of the Belfast Brigade assaulted what they believed were two other
MRF operations in Belfast.
Incorporating a distinctly different part of the Ulster service sector, the MRF had
co-opted a Belfast massage parlor in 1971, which offered sexual services to a broad range
of clientele including IRA gunmen and prominent Republicans. The MRF team,
consisting of a retired Army major and an active duty soldier who was the daughter of a
British brigadier, occupied an office above the massage parlor. The massage parlor itself
was bugged by the MRF. The prostitute, who ran the massage parlor in cooperation with
her husband, was encouraged to talk about the Troubles with her clients and all
conversations were duly noted and recorded by the MRF team in the office above.
While the Four Squares Laundry operation was coming under fire from the IRA
gunmen, an IRA hit team from the 3 rd Battalion moved into position to attack the MRF
offices above the massage parlor. At this stage, the IRA appeared unaware that the
massage parlor was directly involved in the operation. As the ERA hit team ascended the
stairs leading to the office, one of the gunmen stumbled and accidentally discharged his
Ibid.. 30.
70
weapon, injuring a waiting customer in the massage parlor. The three-man IRA unit then
panicked and fled the premises. 1
^ 8
Yet another supposed MRF operation was hit on 2 October 1 972, when gunmen
from the 2nd Battalion conducted a drive-by shooting at office spaces near the Belfast city-
center. The MRF had vacated the premise several days before and no one was hurt. 159
C. ASSESSMENT OF THE MOBILE RECONNAISSANCE FORCE
The Mobile Reconnaissance Force left behind a mixed legacy when it was
decommissioned in 1973. It was an ad hoc body that was quickly brought on line to
fulfill rapidly emerging intelligence requirements during a period of intense escalation of
the war in Northern Ireland. There can be no question that it successfully rattled the IRA
(one devastating operation in particular will be discussed in the next chapter), and its
operations firmly established Frank Kitson as the bete noire of the Republican
movement.
An assessment of the positive aspects of the MRF is somewhat problematical as
its operations are still covered by the Official Secrets Act, and therefore the British
personnel who participated in its operations are prohibited from discussing them. Some
details have leaked out over the years, which are reported by Martin Dillon, while other
aspects lend themselves to speculation.
Taking the latter case first, it can be safely assumed that the MRF contributed
significantly to the development of an overall picture of the Republican neighborhoods




Regular Army soldiers while on patrols, the addition of undercover surveillance units
must have beneficial. In addition to operations such as the Four Squares Laundry, female
MRF operatives went door-to-door through the Belfast neighborhoods selling cosmetics
and talking to housewives. Although such tactics are obviously geared towards low-level
collection, the intelligence cumulates over time. Gradually, the Security Forces were to
identify the majority of the households in Republican neighborhoods, collecting family
information and taking photographs, through low-level intelligence collection.
Moreover, the IRA was not as security conscious during the early years of the Troubles
as they might have been. Tim Pat Coogan wrote that at Republican pubs during this
period,
One only had to stroll into an IRA haunt like the Prisoners Defense Fund
Club in Andersonstown and listen to the audience joining in a rousing
rebel chorus to the music of the Wolfehounds or some other group popular
in Republican areas, to tell where the spectators came from—they used to
raise their arms in the air, swaying in time to the music, holding up one,
two or three fingers on each hand to show which battalion they belonged
to, supported, or lived under the aegis of. 16°
Information such as this simply could not be collected by uniformed soldiers or
police and had to come through undercover operatives or informers. As a more tangible
example of hard intelligence collected by the MRF, Martin Dillon reports one incident
from the massage parlor operation that was quite profitable for the MRF. This particular
collection operation was directed against a Republican activist named Paddy Wilson, who
was a Belfast City Councilor. Throughout the course of his visits, Wilson was
encouraged by the masseuse to brag about his IRA connections. In the summer of 1971,
355.
160 Tim Pat Coogan. The IRA: A History (Niwot Colorado: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1994),
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the masseuse was directed by her MRF handlers to ask Wilson about the IRA murderers
of three Scottish soldiers the previous March. Wilson not only indiscreetly named the
three Provisional gunmen, but also included details of the assassinations that had been
unknown to British authorities. 161
The use of the Freds proved to be the critical error of the MRF. Frank Kitson
argues that there are three factors that must be considered in order to cause a man to
change sides:
In the first place, he must be given an incentive which is strong enough to
make him want to do so. This is the carrot. Then he must be made to
realize that failure will result in something very unpleasant happening to
him. This is the stick. Thirdly he must be given a reasonable opportunity
of proving both to himself and his friends that there is nothing
fundamentally dishonorable about his action. 162
The use of pseudo gangs was effective in Kenya; it turned out to be less so in
Northern Ireland. Of the above listed conditions of Kitson' s, only the second factor truly
came into play in Northern Ireland. The only carrot offered to the Freds was a small
stipend and a new life outside of Northern Ireland, but informers in Ulster's intelligence
war did not willingly seek a new life elsewhere. The call of home and community is
strong in Northern Ireland. The second factor, the stick, was the real motivator to
recruiting Freds, whereas nothing the British Army could do would convince a true
Republican that betraying the cause was not dishonorable. Therefore, the loyalty of the
161
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Freds to the MRF was based on whatever coercive lever was used against them and was
consequently tenuous at best.
What happened to the Mobile Reconnaissance Force? One of the MRF's Freds
was an ex-IRA gunman named Seamus Wright who had been coerced into working for
Special Branch and Army Intelligence following his arrest for suspicion of a bombing
that killed a man. Wright was picked up in the late summer of 1972 by IRA counter-
intelligence for questioning about his arrest and subsequent absenteeism from the IRA.
During his interrogation by the IRA, Wright not only admitted to having been turned by
the British, he named other Freds in the employ of Army Intelligence.
It was during the IRA's interrogation of Billy McKee, one of the Freds named by
Wright, that the IRA first learned of the MRF, the Four Squares Laundry, and other
British intelligence operations. The IRA was then forced to decide on how to act on the
information that they had received from Wright and McKee. Some argued that the best
thing to do would be to execute the two men straight away—a good example to set for
other would-be Freds. On the other hand, the information provided by McKee and Wright
offered a tremendous opportunity to strike at British intelligence. The decision was made
at the IRA Brigade level in Belfast to release the two men to return to MRF in the hopes
that their absence had not created undue alarm in British intelligence. It had not. In the
meantime, the Brigade OC and the battalion commanders developed their plans for the
simultaneous hits against the Four Squares Laundry, the massage parlor, and the MRF
office downtown. In exchange for McKee and Wright turning against the MRF, the two
men were told that they would be protected by the IRA. They were not.
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Twenty-four hours before the IRA assaults on the MRf operations, McKee and
Wright were taken into custody by the IRA and moved to South Armagh while their fate
was decided. Both men came from prominent Republican families, so in order not to
embarrass the families it was decided to quietly execute the two men and secretly bury
them.
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This was done three months after the ambush of the Four Squares Laundry
There were other problems associated with the MRF that became publicized once
the unit's cover was blown in October 1972. In June 1972, during a truce with the LRA, a
MRF sergeant was accused of attempted murder as he fired on two unarmed civilians
with a submachine gun from a car in West Belfast. At his trial, where he was acquitted,
he detailed much of the structure and tactics employed by the MRF and his testimony
was used by the IRA propaganda machine to support their claims that the SAS was
involved in systematic sectarian assassinations.
164 By 1973, the units value as a covert
tool of British intelligence was finished and the MRF was disbanded early in that year
Some of the literature uses the example of the Four Squares Laundry to illustrate
the amateur quality of British intelligence in Northern Ireland and as a condemnation of
covert operations in general.
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Even British intelligence is sometimes retrospectively
critical of the MRF. One intelligence officer quoted by Mark Urban called the MRF
operations "a series of cock-ups.
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The criticism of the Four Squares Laundry
operation is generally based on two aspects: that the IRA uncovered the operation and
that a British soldier was killed as a result Yet the facts remain that war is a dangerous
lt>3
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business and fear of exposure and loss should not be an automatic inhibition to all covert
operations. There is no such thing as a risk-free operation. As with any other facet of
military operations, covert intelligence operations must be viewed from a perspective of
potential loss versus potential gain. Moreover, the British learned valuable lessons from
the MRP operations against the IRA: first and foremost, the IRA was vulnerable to
penetration. Although co-opting an IRA gunman was a dicey proposition, the MRF
proved that it could be done. Second, the British took away from the MRF the lesson that
the professionalism of its elite intelligence units needed to be improved, mostly because
mistakes might end up being aired in court. Professionalism was taken to heart with the
successor unit to the MRF, the 14th Intelligence Company. The cover of the 14th
Intelligence Company was to hold for more than a decade in Northern Ireland. 167
The Four Squares Laundry was an ingenuous little operation that successfully ran
for three months. It offered the British Army nearly unlimited access to the hard areas of
West Belfast in a most unassuming manner. The details regarding the quality and
volume of intelligence collected during those three months may be unavailable in the
literature, but the potential of such collection efforts is easily imagined. Perhaps the real
worth of the MRF, however, was not found in its surveillance operations, but in the




V. BRITISH COVERT PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE IRA LEADERSHIP, 1973-1974
The betrayal of the Mobile Reconnaissance Force and the subsequent ambush of
their operations were a blow to the MRF, but did not bring an end to British covert
operations in the early 1970s. The following case study examines two cleverly designed
and implemented propaganda campaigns that set in motion events that nearly caused the
internal collapse of the IRA in 1975. This chapter will examine these two operations
beginning with an analysis of British motivations. Furthermore, the complicated
propaganda campaigns, as they are understood, will be explained through a layout of the
operations. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an analysis of the British operations
and their tradecraft.
A. BRITISH MOTIVATIONS
The literature on intelligence operations in Northern Ireland does not deal
extensively with the two operations that Martin Dillon collectively refers to as 'The
Sting " The primary reason, of course, is that if the operations were a concerted effort to
undermine the leadership of the IRA, they have remained tightly classified by British
intelligence. Successful operations are not discussed so that the techniques and the
personnel might be used again. Unless, of course, leaking details of the operation serves
a British purpose. Furthermore, as the IRA's panicked reaction to the British
provocations resulted in the deaths of numerous Republicans, the IRA has been
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understandably reticent to discuss this dark period in their history. Nevertheless, a few
members did discuss the operations with Martin Dillon. 168
The two propaganda operations described below were not necessarily run by the
same organizations, nor (probably) were the operations individual components of a single
multi-phased operation. Despite being distinct operations, they both targeted the IRA
leadership in a similar manner. Propaganda is delivered with a specific audience in mind,
and the two operations of the Sting were intended to rattle the faith of the rank and file
paramilitaries in their leadership. The first operation, which will be referred to as the
"Embezzlement Sting" for purposes of clarity, definitely involved the Mobile
Reconnaissance Force and was a parting shot fired by the MRF and its pseudo gangsters
before being disbanded in 1973. The second operation, referred to here as the "Prison
Sting," has the characteristics of a joint Special Branch-MI5 operation, although it easily
could have been crafted and conducted by Special Branch and military intelligence in
cooperation. There is also an outside chance that the Prison Sting was only a Special
Branch operation. 169
The motivations of British intelligence were not necessarily the same for the two
operations, although they had the commonality of targeting the senior military leadership
of the Republican movement. The Embezzlement Sting in 1973, as an MRF operation,
was probably conceived in a desire to strike back at the IRA following the October 1972
IRA ambushes of the MRF. In particular, the IRA's 1
st
Battalion in Belfast was targeted
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for attention by the MRF, and it most likely was not a coincidence that the 1 st Battalion
provided the active service unit that ambushed the Four Squares Laundry and killed
Sapper Stuart. Beyond revenge, however, the Embezzlement Sting provided an
opportunity to strike at the base of support for the Provisionals within the Catholic
community and therefore was definitely in the pattern of simultaneously pursuing de-
escalation and attrition. In this case, the de-escalation phase was aimed at portraying the
IRA as gangsters and racketeers, thus striking at civilian support for the organization. If
everything worked right and the IRA took the bait, the attrition would come from inside
the Republican organization, hopefully leaving the hands of the British clean.
British motivations in initiating the Prison Sting were apparently more specific in
origins and tied the operation into the pursuit of manipulation of the IRA to meet the
political goals of the British government. It was concurrent with the Prison Sting in
1974, that clandestine negotiations began between the Westminster government and the
leadership of the Provisionals on the possibility of a cease-fire. Although the British
recognized by 1974 that Britain was deeply enmeshed in a difficult war in Northern
Ireland, they also believed that the tide of the conflict, particularly in the cities, had
turned in their favor.
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Perhaps the time was right to seek a negotiated peace in the
province. Moreover, the dominant faction within the IRA felt that a good fight had been
fought, but as with Anglo-Irish conflicts in the past, they also felt that it was time to seek
a negotiated end to the Troubles. Furthermore, this faction believed that a cease-fire
1
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meant that a British withdrawal was imminent.'
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Not all within the IRA felt that the turn
of the tide was irreparably in favor of the British nor did they believe that the British
were prepared to withdraw from Ulster. The increasingly acrimonious debate within the
IRA during this period portended an eventual struggle for control of the movement. 172 It
also provided an interesting target for exploitation by the British. A younger faction was
emerging in the North led by Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness, who wanted to
pursue a more aggressive long-term strategy against the British that did not include a
cease-fire. The older and dominant leadership in Dublin was prepared to negotiate with
the British. It was with this emergent power struggle in mind between young and old and
north and south, that British intelligence sought to surreptitiously discredit the Adams
faction and thus improve the prospects of a cease-fire.
B. THE EMBEZZLEMENT STING
Although the British were not positive of the fate ofMcKee and Wright for
several years after the ambush of Stuart and Warke, they were nevertheless aware that the
double agents had betrayed their operation. The Embezzlement Sting was an attempt to
pay back the IRA in kind and was intended to attack the heart of the terrorist
organization, namely the faith and trust of the membership.
The Embezzlement Sting revolved around the carefully prepared allegations of a
MRF Fred named Louis Hammond, a Belfast Catholic who had joined the British Army's
Royal Irish Rangers in 1970. He was trained and stationed in England from where he
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went AWOL in January 1972 to return to Belfast. 173 Shortly after his return to Northern
Ireland, he joined the Provisional IRA and became the intelligence officer for E
Company of the Provisionals' 1 st Battalion in Belfast. He was in this position for only a
few months when he was arrested by the Army and subsequently recruited into the MRF
as a Fred.
The Embezzlement Sting began when the British released a "captured" document
to the press, identified as an internal IRA memorandum, which alleged that the IRA
leadership was embezzling ERA funds. The story that the British released was that the
document was written by the senior IRA leadership in Long Kesh Prison and was
addressed to Seamus Twoomey, the ERA's Belfast Brigade Commander The document
indicted seven leaders of the 1
st
Battalion alleging that they were guilty of embezzling
£1 50,000 from IRA coffers. ' ' 4 Two journalists for the Sunday Times, Paul Eddy and
Chris Ryder, who picked up the embezzlement story, were subsequently approached in
January 1973 by Louis Hammond, who promised them additional information on the
embezzlement. Hammond told Eddy and Ryder that he was an IRA double agent who
had penetrated the MRF on the orders of the IRA. Hammond claimed that he was
contacting the journalists because the leaders of the 1 st Battalion had betrayed the faith
and were in fact embezzling funds. In order to strengthen his claim that he was an IRA
double agent spying on the British, he released basic organizational information about the
MRF, none of which was sensitive, to the journalists. The British subsequently




simple set of codewords painted on designated walls throughout the city, which he
claimed was how he received direction from the IRA. It was through a set of carefully
prepared truths, half-truths and outright lies, such as the codewords, that Hammond was
able to hook the journalists. 175
Convinced that Hammond was genuinely IRA and concerned about the betrayal
of the leadership, Eddy and Ryder published a series of articles in the Sunday Times
detailing ERA graft and corruption. The first article was entitled, "IRA Provo Chiefs
Milk £150,000 from Funds," and corroborated the intercepted memorandum citing as
their source a former intelligence officer ofE Company. 1 '6
The identification of the journalists' source as a former intelligence officer ofE
Company easily led the IRA to suspect Louis Hammond. The IRA kidnapped Hammond
as he was departing his family's home following a visit proscribed by his British
handlers.
177 Hammond was interrogated for three days where he confessed to working
for the MRF and was then shot three times in the head and once in the stomach. The IRA
gunmen took Hammond to a deserted alleyway and dumped the body thinking that he
was dead. Hammond miraculously survived, although partially paralyzed and with the
loss of sight in one eye. But the events that had been set in motion with the journalists
did not end with the attempted murder of Louis Hammond; Eddy and Ryder published
another article in the Sunday Times entitled, "Why the Provos shot their own Double
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The British army deserter who was left for dead in a Belfast Alley two
weeks ago was not shot because he spied on the IRA Although 19-year-
old Louis Hammond did pretend to work for Army Intelligence for seven
months last year, he was in fact a double agent planted by the IRA ' ;
The journalists went on to say that Hammond was shot by the Provisionals as
punishment for his liaison with the journalists and their story about the "wholesale
embezzlement of IRA funds by leading Provisionals/' 1 ' 9
The articles by Eddy and Ryder proved very damaging to the IRA and helped
establish the reputation of the Provisionals as racketeers and gangsters. The interesting
thing about the case of Louis Hammond and this aspect of the British sting was that
although the participation of the IRA in criminal activities has been well established, it
appears that the embezzlement of IRA funds (at least this incident) was fabricated by
British intelligence. This was facilitated by the British practice of creatively reporting on
the amount of money stolen from banks robbed by the IRA. Every time the IRA robbed a
bank to fund their operations, the British announced to the press that an amount slightly
higher was taken than actually was. Desmond Hamill wrote that frequently the effects of
this policy could be seen immediately, "Very often the Army found that soon afterwards,
sometimes even the next day, there would be a number of kneecappings. It was not good
for IRA recruiting." 180 Neither was the incident involving the hapless Louis Hammond
C. THE PRISON STING
If the reverberations from Louis Hammond were damaging to the IRA, the actions
of British agents Vincent Heatherington and Miles McGrogan in the Prison Sting were
Quoted by Dillon, 60
Dillon, 60.
Hamill. 136.
devastating. This was another operation that the ERA believed was run by the MRF,
although it is known now that the MRF had been disbanded by this time. As mentioned
above, Special Branch definitely appeared to have been involved and due to the political
targeting of this propaganda operation was probably in partnership with either MI5 or
military intelligence.
Vincent Heatherington and Miles McGrogan were, again, young Catholic men
from the rougher parts of Belfast, although they did not have extensive Republican ties.
Although there were rumors that both men had been implicated in a rape case, their
recruitment by British intelligence has not been detailed.
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It is possible that if this were
true, the threat of prosecution for the rape was used as a lever against them. Furthermore,
if this were the case, it would tend to suggest the direct involvement of Special Branch.
Regardless of the method of recruitment, the two men appear to have been trained by
British intelligence to withstand interrogation and were then sent to prison to await trial
for the murder of two police officers—a crime that they did not commit (it was actually
committed by the IRA). Their mission was to disrupt the ERA leadership, specifically the
younger leaders like Gerry Adams, from within the Crumlin Road Prison.
At Crumlin Road Prison, where suspects were remanded in custody awaiting trial,
prisoners were allowed to segregate according to their political affiliation. The same
system was followed at Long Kesh Prison (also known as the Maze Prison) where they
served their sentences. The prison authorities explained the system to new prisoners and
allowed them to decide to join Republican, Loyalist or general prison populations. When
Heatherington and McGrogan arrived at Crumlin Road Prison and indicated their
Dillon. 82.
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intentions to join the Republican wing of the prison, both men underwent interrogation
from the IRA officer commanding (OC) and the intelligence officer (IO) as a matter of
standard procedure in order to ensure neither was a British plant As neither man had
extensive ties with the IRA, both were automatically viewed with some suspicion, and
due to discrepancies in their statements, the IRA leadership in prison separated the two
men and intensified the interrogations.
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During the course of the interrogation, both
initially claimed to belong to the 1
st
Battalion, which upon IRA investigation was proved
incorrect. Instead, Heatherington and McGrogan had belonged to the IRA youth
organization, but had been tarred and feathered for larceny, which would have precluded
them from further participation in the IRA.
As the IRA knew who was responsible for the murders, their suspicions were
allayed somewhat when the two men claimed they were innocent and had confessed to
the murders under duress from police interrogators. Still, Heatherington 's demeanor
disturbed the ERA intelligence officer and after several days of intensifying interrogation,
Heatherington "broke" and admitted to being a British informer.
The story that he now told the IRA was that he had been forced to work for the
British since the age of sixteen. Over the course of the following week, he laid out
details of British operations against the IRA including selective assassinations within the
Catholic community that the IRA presumed had been conducted by Loyalist
paramilitaries. Further interrogations of Heatherington also revealed the names of
numerous informers within the IRA that were under the employ of the British. Most of
5
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the names that he provided were of the younger emerging leadership of the IRA that were
prepared to wage a long war against the British.
As Hammond had misled the journalists, Heatherington now told the IRA
interrogators a mixture of truths, half-truths and outright prevarications. Much of what
he told his interrogators was what they had wanted to hear or wished to believe (such as
British sectarian assassinations) and by doing so he gained credibility with the IRA OC
and 10. Furthermore, he named McGrogan as a co-conspirator, yet McGrogan remained
cool under interrogation adding a perverse credibility to his being a British agent. The
coup de grace, however, came when seemingly under the most intense interrogation,
Heatherington "confessed" to have been sent to assassinate the very leadership that was
conducting the interrogation. When details of an assassination plot were made available
to the prison governor and poison was subsequently found in a prison search, the IRA
leadership in Crumlin Road was hooked and Heatherington' s allegations were accepted
in their entirety.
183 One Provisional leader told Martin Dillon,
We battened down the hatches in "A" wing [the Provisional wing within
the prison]. We suddenly believed Heatherington. The names of all those
he mentioned were passed on to relevant people in the IRA in Long Kesh
(the Maze) and on the outside. Interrogations began, and in the Maze
many men were badly treated by their interrogators. The IRA was carried
away in hysteria. Men admitted, under interrogation, crimes they could
not have committed. No one was safe from scrutiny. 184
During what the IRA has described as the darkest days of their movement, the
organization nearly disintegrated under the allegations that emerged from Crumlin Road
Prison. The IRA reacted with violent paranoia and hard men in and out of prison were
"" Ibid.. 74-82.
184 Quoted in Dillon, 82.
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brought in by IRA intelligence and harshly interrogated. Tim Pat Coogan wrote that the
interrogations within the prisons included torture with piano wire and electric current,
and that the allegations of Heatherington launched a two-year witch-hunt within the IRA
for informers.
185 Some of the interrogations were so severe that many men that were
innocent of being British agents were forced to confess and were subsequently executed
by their comrades. Even after Heatherington later recanted his "confession" under
further interrogation, the recriminations within the IRA continued 18°
D. ASSESSMENT OF THE OPERATIONS
In both operations, British intelligence hit the IRA hard through a careful
manipulation of the truth and creative invention of information. By doing so, the British
struck at the foundation of the Provisional IRA. If there is a center of gravity for the
Republican movement, it is their faith in the cause and in other members. It is within this
context that J. Bowyer Bell's thoughts on informers illustrate both the importance and
fragility of faith to the IRA:
While everyone trusted the faithful, that faith was a result of revealed
truth, open to heresy, to schism, and worse to personal interest. The band
of brothers might and often had revealed a traitor, more awful than a spy,
for what was betrayed was the faith. So as in all struggles there was both
the exhilarating feeling of trust among the chosen and fear of betrayal
When the faith was betrayed, more often through co-option, corruption, or
intimidation of the weak and marginal, the whole universe shuddered, and
a special investigation was established to trace the damage, to try the
offender, to repair the seamless garment. The Army Council, the GHQ,
the Northern Command, and the various intelligence officers hardly saw
this as counter-intelligence, for betrayal was as much an ideological matter
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Assessing the former operation first, British intelligence formed a lasting public
image of the IRA as gangsters and common criminals, yet it is important to remember
that that image is not entirely a British concoction. The IRA funded its operations
through bank robberies, protection rackets and a whole range of illicit businesses, yet the
British were successful in painting a portrait of criminals that were so corrupt that they
would steal from the cause as well as for it. Moreover, the MRF portrayed Louis
Hammond, and the media furthered the portrayal, as a loyal Republican whistleblower
who was nearly killed by his own for speaking "the truth." To the IRA and their
sympathizers, it is one thing to rob a bank to fund IRA operations, but it is something else
altogether to steal from the movement.
The Embezzlement Sting was a clever operation that brought confusion to the
ranks of the enemies of British intelligence, yet it was not without cost. Undoubtedly,
Louis Hammond was not a choirboy. He was a deserter from the British Army and was
an active member of a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, Hammond paid a pretty dear
price for his participation in the Sting, more so, one would argue, than had his British
handlers. There is a strong argument that the war in Ulster was what is referred to there
as a "big boys' game" and that Hammond knew the risks. He could have opted to serve
his time in prison instead. Yet his was a fate that was common to the Freds. Tony
Geraghty wrote of the ex-terrorists, "It was a lethal, complex and bewildering game of cat
and mouse and not many of the Freds survived to enjoy the freedom promised them after
MRF service." 188
188 Tony Geraghty, Inside the Special Air Ser\>ice (Agincourt, Ontario: Methuen, 1980), 143.
Geraghty also wrote that "Some attempted to become double agents, and one was murdered by the IRA
after his messages were intercepted by the British and rewritten."
Another disturbing aspect of the Embezzlement Sting was the manipulation of the
media. This was not the first nor the last time that the media was used by the British
intelligence services. It is not against the law in the United Kingdom for the government
to lie to the press, but the net result of having repeatedly done so was that the credibility
of the government was always in question. In a long war, such as the Troubles in
Northern Ireland, the government's campaign to win the hearts and minds of the people is
made infinitely more complex when government officials are rightfully viewed as
inveterate liars and official statements as propaganda.
The Prison Sting was also an inventive use of information, and if the
Embezzlement Sting furthered de-escalation by attacking the support of the IRA, the
Prison Sting was the machinery of attrition. The interesting aspect of the Prison Sting
though was that the attrition was at the hands of the IRA—the British simply knew which
buttons to push and the IRA did the rest. In the words of an IRA leader who was in
Crumlin Road Prison during the Heatherington/McGrogan interrogations:
We were had. We knew we had fallen for it. It was very much in the
mould of the MRF operations: clever, well planned and brilliantly
executed. The IRA knew and found it difficult to admit that British
military intelligence was brilliant. They almost destroyed us. They
created paranoia in the ranks and left us severely damaged.
Retrospectively, you see how simply it was worked Heatherington gave
us what we wanted only after pressure was exerted. Now that was
clever—McGrogan played a game designed to make us feel that he was
holding back so that we could feel pleased that we were making progress
with one of them ... It reinforced our views. Heatherington gave us all
those names of innocent guys and we believed him because he also
supplied us with information which supported our own theories about
various incidents... The Brits and Special Branch had obviously done
their homework on us because we reacted with predictability. 1S
Quoted in Dillon. 84.
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Despite the above ERA assessment that they knew that they "had fallen for it," it
was not an immediate realization The ERA obviously took a long time to properly
realize the scope of the Sting and as noted above, the organization embarked on a two-
year witch-hunt for informers within its ranks. Although no figures are available that
address the resulting fratricide within the ERA, the general consensus within the
Republican community is that the ERA nearly collapsed as a result of what the ERA called
"...a brilliant piece of counter-insurgency."
190
Using the prison as the venue for the Sting
was an interesting and inspired choice by British intelligence. Tim Pat Coogan wrote,
'"Break the lads in prison, and you break the lads outside' is an old IRA maxim," and it
was very nearly the case in 1974-1975.
191 The use ofthe prison to divulge the
information to the ERA had the added benefit of slowing, although not eliminating, the
flow of information between all of the ERA protagonists, i.e., the respective leadership in
Crumlin Road, Long Kesh, Belfast and Dublin. Wheels were set in motion in the prisons
that could not easily be stopped or even slowed from the outside. Consequently, some of
the worst reactions to the information divulged by Heatherington and McGrogan
occurred within the prisons.
In terms of achieving political objectives, the British operation thoroughly
discredited the Adams faction within the IRA. More accurately, the actions of the
younger faction wounded their own cause as they were held responsible for the paranoia
and hysteria following the Crumlin Road revelations. 192 According to an ERA man from
the Adams faction,






The damage to the leadership in 1974 took various forms Military
intelligence and Special Branch eventually put the younger leadership
away and . . discredited many of us. We believe now that they were
softening us up. The leadership that took over comprised the type of men
who stand up with every generation and say that at least they fought but
lost and then left it to another generation. The Brits needed that leadership
in place to negotiate a ceasefire and they got it in February 1975. . . That
truce was .
. a major mistake. It led to four years of feuds and
193
sectarianism.
The downside to this brilliant operation is on two levels. One, the agents
involved, Heatherington and McGrogan, were subsequently tried in absentia, convicted,
and murdered by the IRA after the younger faction acceded to power The leadership in
place in 1974 and 1975 forbade their executions partially because they believed the men
in Crumlin Road over-reacted and probably forced the confession of Heatherington
Furthermore, it is evident that the older IRA leadership was not aware of the extent to
which they had been manipulated by British intelligence. Incidentally, in keeping with
the cover of the operation, both Heatherington and McGrogan were tried and acquitted in
March 1975 for the murder of the two policemen. By the beginning of 1976, the Adams
faction was in the ascendancy and an internal IRA inquiry into the
Heatherington/McGrogan affair was opened, which was probably the first time that the
totality of the operation emerged for the IRA 194
The other downside to this operation was that although the IRA was severely
damaged by the Sting, it emerged from what it called its "darkest hour" definitely
strengthened as an organization.
195
It would be a leap to make the assertion that the Sting
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led to the rise of the younger Adams faction, especially since the rise in fortunes of the
younger Northerners was already underway when the British propaganda campaign was
begun. However, as the Adams faction was not destroyed, in a social-Darwinism way the
ERA surely survived as a smarter and more determined organization. One sign of this
was the ERA's subsequent adoption of a cellular structure replacing the traditional
battalion formations. This move was intended to stop the penetration of the IRA by
British intelligence and to limit the damage caused by informers.
92
VI. CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS LN SOUTH ARMAGH:
THE CASE OF ROBERT NAIRAC, 1977
The case of Robert Nairac, a British agent killed attempting to penetrate the IRA's
periphery, is an interesting and unique chapter in the history of the intelligence war in
Northern Ireland. Since the Troubles began in 1969, there are no other published records
of direct British penetration of Republican circles.
196
As the war in Northern Ireland
unfolded, intelligence penetration of the IRA was accomplished primarily through the use
of informers. Given the clannish nature of Ulster society, it was accepted that clandestine
infiltration of the Republican movement, even on the periphery, would be exceedingly
difficult. The story of Captain Robert Nairac explains why.
By the time the events detailed in this chapter occurred, the ceasefire of 1975 had
long since collapsed, and the IRA was beginning to recover from the British instigated,
but largely self-inflicted, wounds of the Sting. The British were reasonably confident in
their ability to control the cities of Ulster and the initiative was undertaken in 1977 to
return control of the province to civil authorities through the policies of Ulsterization and
criminalization. This entailed an essentially reversed role between the police and the
Army, as the Army moved into a supporting role for the police in the cities 19 ' But as
confident as the Security Forces might have been concerning their domination of the
cities, the countryside was a different matter altogether. The Protestant areas of the
Ulster countryside were considered relatively safe for the Security Forces and were
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therefore firmly under British authority. Predominantly Catholic areas are scattered
throughout Northern Ireland and some were largely quiescent and under British control
while others were considered Republican strongholds where British control was
contested. Despite police primacy, the Army retained authority in security affairs in the
contested areas, in particular along the border, and no area in Northern Ireland contested
British control as fiercely as the Republican heartland of South Armagh. It is here that
the story of Robert Nairac takes place. This chapter will look at the battle for South
Armagh as the historical backdrop for the incident involving Robert Nairac and then will
turn its focus on Nairac himself and the operation in which he was killed. The chapter
will then conclude with an assessment of the British tradecraft in this operation.
A. SOUTH ARMAGH
The Security Forces consider South Armagh to be "bandit country" and 1976-
1977 was to become a pivotal period in the contest for control of this territory. It was not
necessarily that the Security Forces had conceded control of the area to the IRA, but prior
to 1977, British attention was perforce directed elsewhere. In 1977 with the advent of
police primacy, the province was categorized according to levels of safety. According to
Colonel Michael Dewar:
By then it was possible to classify areas as Black, Grey or White: Black
denoting constant terrorist activity, Grey infrequent terrorist activity and a
partial return to normality, and White indicating no indigenous terrorist
activity. In the White areas, where the terrorist threat did not warrant the
permanent presence of soldiers, the RUC could carry out their normal
policing role. In the Grey areas, where there was still a significant, if
sporadic, threat from the terrorists, the RUC would still need some
military support. Only in the Black areas, where the terrorists continued to
pose a dangerous threat, such as the border fringe of South Armagh and
94
small areas in Belfast, would the RUC need a permanent, high-profile
military presence.
198
South Armagh in the mid-1970s was roughly analogous to the no-go areas of
Belfast and Londonderry in the early 1970s. It was an area into which the Army did not
venture lightly and was accordingly an area about which little was known The Army's
record in South Armagh through 1976 was telling: "British Army dead 49, IRA dead
nil."
199
It was an area that offered two distinct advantages to the paramilitaries. First, if
Ulster is considered clannish, then South Armagh is especially so. It is an isolated, hilly
area that has been associated for decades with smuggling across the border into the
Republic of Ireland. The families are especially close-knit and if South Armagh was not
considered a particularly Nationalist area before the Troubles, the presence of the British
Army, and the interference in local affairs the Army implied, ensured that it would
become so. Tim Pat Coogan wrote of South Armagh's relationship with the IRA:
South Armagh is the IRA's safe haven. It is provided by the mothers and
fathers, sons and brothers, uncles and aunts of the volunteers. So deep is
the clan tradition that even the writ of the IRA leadership sometimes has
to contend with the authority of the local chieftains. The phrase 'tell them
nothing' hangs invisible and omnipresent over the fields of South
Armagh. 200
The second advantage enjoyed by the paramilitaries was the proximity of the hard
areas to the Republic of Ireland. The British Security Forces have never had the legal
option of "hot pursuit" of the IRA into Ireland, and the relationship between the Gardai
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and the British Army has never been very comfortable for either side. 201 Cooperation
between the RUC and the Gardai has usually been more extensive than between the Irish
police and the British Army; however, the RUC was not the primary element of the
Security Forces in South Armagh at this time. Consequently, the IRA enjoyed a
sanctuary of sorts across the border in Ireland—even though the IRA is an outlawed
organization in the Republic.
The increased focus on South Armagh was not simply a case of the British Army
being freed from other responsibilities, but also was an attempt to stop a tit-for-tat
sectarian assassination campaign that had begun along the border areas in 1975. Although
the Westminster government committed the Duke of Wellington's Regiment and a
battalion of the Queen's Regiment to the area in late 1975, the conventional forces were
not considered sufficient. In an attempt to level the playing field in South Armagh, in
1976, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced the introduction of the SAS Regiment to
the province.
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It was against this backdrop of escalation in South Armagh that the lack of
intelligence was especially noticeable. As the Army increased patrolling through the
county, the SAS mounted a series of successful ambushes of the IRA in 1976 and
1977.
203
The Army had recognized that South Armagh was a hard intelligence problem,
yet the increase in special forces activity required a concomitant increase in accurate and
timely intelligence. The solution was to bring whatever intelligence assets possible to
201
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bear in South Armagh and in 1977, Lisburn decided to introduce Close Observation
Platoons to the area, although for problems requiring specialized surveillance techniques,
the 14
th
Intelligence Company was used. 204 This is where Captain Robert Nairac comes
into the picture.
B. THE MAN AND THE MISSION
The story of Captain Robert Nairac is as polemical as any issue in the history of
Northern Ireland. Even his unit is a question of debate. Here is what is agreed upon:
Robert Nairac was a British Army Captain nominally assigned to the Grenadier Guards
He was posted to Northern Ireland for a tour in 1973, did a second tour in 1974-75, and
he went back for a third tour in May 1976.
There is no question that he was an intelligence officer, although for whom is at
issue. As part of Fred Holroyd's allegations against the intelligence services in Northern
Ireland, he maintained that Nairac was SAS but worked for MI5 in an assassination
campaign on both sides of the border. 205 Father Raymond Murray and other Republican
authors state emphatically that Nairac was SAS, whereas Martin Dillon believes that he
was probably not SAS, but was SAS trained and assigned to the 14th Intelligence
Company. b Another author, Mark Urban, makes a convincing argument based on SAS
204 Mark Urban, Big Boys ' Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IR\ (London:
Faber and Faber, 1992), 45.
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regimental journals that Nairac never was in the SAS. Urban' s belief is that Nairac was
assigned to 4 Field Survey Troop, which was a cover name for the 14th Intelligence
Company, during his 1974-1975 tour in Northern Ireland. However, Urban believes that
from May 1 976 onwards Nairac was assigned to 3 Brigade headquarters as an
intelligence liaison officer between Special Branch and the SAS. If this was the case,
however, he had uncommonly broad latitude in his billet. A liaison officer's brief would
not normally include clandestine operations. Perhaps Dillon puts the question best into
perspective, "In some respects, the organisation to which Robert Nairac belonged is
irrelevant, in that it is sufficient to recognize that he was an undercover operative."207
The first two postings of Nairac to Northern Ireland were to the Belfast area
where he had the opportunity to familiarize himself with the Catholic neighborhoods as
well as develop an Irish accent. His third assignment to Northern Ireland, however, was
to South Armagh where the decision had been made to post an intelligence officer to the
area of Crossmaglen for a minimum of a year. Hamill wrote about the decision that
"South Armagh was recognized as a very, very, hard target, and the intelligence officer
must have imagination, determination, an ability to adapt and ' . . be reasonably
brave.'"
208 To illustrate the seriousness of the problem in South Armagh, the decision to
put Nairac in Crossmaglen was undertaken even after it was assessed that such an
intelligence operative stood a less than 50 percent chance of surviving a year-long tour.
209
His actions after arriving in Crossmaglen are a matter of some interest as Nairac





was less discrete than one would expect from an intelligence officer posted to a
hazardous station. Hamill wrote that Nairac's activities were largely overt in
Crossmaglen and even entailed a degree of community service working with the local
youth as a hedge against their joining the IRA. He also spent time in local pubs using a
Belfast accent and introducing himself as "Danny." 210 The information that he gathered
on these occasions, sometimes alone but most often with another officer, was low-grade
intelligence. Although Nairac attempted to mingle within the Irish community, there was
no real attempt to remain undercover. It was during this time that Nairac came to the
attention of the IRA. Murray wrote that Nairac was often seen (and photographed) in
Crossmaglen in uniform. 211 Moreover, it appears evident that Nairac was aware that he
had come to the IRA's attention. Desmond Hamill quotes an officer's recollection of a
conversation with Nairac. This officer was told late one night by Nairac, "I've got this
feeling that I'm going to get the chop here. They are after me. They realise I am getting
through to the young people and they know—or think they know—who I am. My only
real worry is that someone looks after my dog"212
In May 1977, Captain Nairac was tasked to switch operations from Crossmaglen
to Drumintree, a small hamlet in Armagh about 25 miles east of Crossmaglen. This was
serious bandit country. Within a three-mile radius of Drumintree, IRA landmines had
killed six soldiers and snipers had shot two others. 213





On the evening of 14 May 1977, Nairac went alone to a Republican club in
Drumintree known as the Three Steps Inn. His car was specially equipped with a radio
and a panic button and he was armed with a Browning 9mm pistol. His command was
aware of his destination; he checked in before entering the pub and was expected to
return at 2330 hours. Inside the crowded pub, he struck up several conversations with the
locals introducing himself as Danny McElean and claiming he was from Belfast. He
even sang two Republican ballads before leaving around midnight, but at some point he
betrayed himself to IRA members inside the pub. Robert Nairac was followed from the
Three Steps Inn and was kidnapped from the parking lot. He was taken south of the Irish
border, beaten severely, interrogated and murdered.
214
His body has never been
recovered.
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There are three possibilities as to Nairac's mission in the Three Steps Inn. One
theory is that as he had done in Crossmaglen, he was attempting to pass himself off as
Irish collecting intelligence through subtle questioning of the pub's patrons. A second
theory, mentioned by Murray, is that Nairac was meeting an ERA informer at the Three
Steps Inn.
216 Of these two theories, the former seems most probable. Although




There has been much speculation concerning the body of Nairac. Dillon believes that the body
was deliberately withheld by the IRA to fuel concerns among British intelligence that Nairac was alive and
undergoing interrogation. He thinks that the body was destroyed and not returned to Nairac's Catholic
parents because the damage from the beatings would be embarrassing for the IRA. The Irish Times reported
an IRA gunman claimed that Nairac's body was rendered to meat and bone-meal at a meatpacking plant—
a
rumor that Dillon mentions on p. 182. Jim Cusack, "Nairac's Body 'May Have Been Rendered,'" The Irish
Times. On-line, available: Http: www.Irish-Times.com. April 11. 1997. The theory that the body was
destroyed in some fashion is further supported by the IRA's current refusal to reveal his gravesite despite
announcing that all secret burial sites would be revealed. "IRA Set to Reveal Terror Victims' Grave
Sites,'" CompuServe News, On-line, available: Http: www.compuserve.co.uk/newsarchive/politics/




unlikely that an IRA informer could be convinced to meet a British intelligence officer at
a Republican pub surrounded by IRA hard men Furthermore, Nairac' s actions, such as
singing Republican songs, drew attention to himself at the Three Steps Inn. This is
certainly questionable behavior for an agent handler conducting a clandestine meeting.
This may suggest a possible third, yet unlikely, course of action. An IRA theory is that
Nairac was a sideshow and was diverting attention away from another intelligence
operation.
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Yet it seems that if this was the case, an SAS or 14th Intelligence Company
quick reaction team would have been nearby as back-up, but there was no such support
Given Nairac 's modus operandi in Crossmaglen, it seems most probable that he believed
that he could successfully penetrate Republican circles in Drumintree.
C. ASSESSMENT OF THE MISSION AND TRADECRAFT
What went wrong at the Three Steps Inn? None of the sources consulted for this
case study could provide a definitive answer, but Martin Dillon interviewed IRA leaders
about the subject. Dillon's research indicates that the abduction and assassination of
Robert Nairac was not premeditated by the IRA. One IRA leader interviewed by Dillon
who was familiar with the case said,
On the night of his death those involved were drinking and were not in
possession of the whole picture. They didn't know what IRA. intelligence
knew, nor did they behave in a manner, which would have suggested that
they knew his significance. A real intelligence operation would have
necessitated Nairac being taken to a safe-house to be interrogated by
people who would have been in a position to know what to ask him and
how to extract it from him. While Nairac was alive the IRA was content
to leave him in the open where they could see him and know what he was
up to. He was no use dead. 218
Dillon, 185-186.
Quoted by Dillon. 186.
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If it was not a premeditated assassination, what happened at the Three Steps Inn?
The IRA was definitely involved, but it appears that the murder was not done with the
sanction of the IRA leadership and was, in fact, the independent action of local hard men
taking advantage of a situation. It seems likely that one oftwo events transpired. Nairac
might have been recognized by one of the IRA men in the Three Steps Inn from either
Crossmaglen or Belfast. Ulster is not a large place and Crossmaglen and Drumintree are
in the same county. Moreover, Nairac was seen occasionally in uniform in Crossmaglen
and photographs had been taken of him and circulated by IRA intelligence. 219 Another
possibility, which in light of events at his assassination may prove most likely, was that
Robert Nairac inadvertently betrayed himself.
Martin Dillon believes that the betrayal may have come through his choice of a
name. Police transcripts of interviews with patrons of the Three Steps Inn that evening
indicate that the name he used in the pub was McElean, which Dillon writes is not a
Catholic name. Instead, Dillon believes that the name Nairac was attempting to use was
the Catholic McErlean (Murray agrees), from which an Englishman would have a
tendency to drop the "r" during pronunciation. In the suspicious atmosphere of
Drumintree, such a mistake might have been sufficient to cause lethal scrutiny of
Nairac.
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The betrayal probably came from another cause, however, although no alternative
answer easily comes to mind other than perhaps his questioning technique was less subtle
than he might have desired. The problem with the explanations proffered above from
Dillon, 171; Murray, 151.
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Dillon and Murray lies with the IRA actions after Nairac was kidnapped According to
the trials of the six men convicted of kidnapping and murdering Robert Nairac, they were
unsure whether he was SAS, UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force, a Loyalist paramilitary
group) or Official IRA. Nairac repeatedly told his executioners that he was a Sticky
(Official IRA) and much of his violent impromptu interrogation centered on that claim. 221
This does not seem consistent with the theories about Nairac's kidnapping. If the IRA
hard men had recognized him as SAS from Crossmaglen, then there would be no need to
waste time interrogating him about the Official IRA. By the same token, if his accent had
betrayed him as an Englishman, there would not be much question of his belonging to
either the Official IRA or the UVF.
The entire operation is questionable from the perspective of tradecraft. It was
usual British practice to operate in areas like Drumintree with an SAS back-up or with a
partner, yet Nairac was operating alone.
222 By the time that the British responded to
Nairac's overdue return, he was already in the Republic of Ireland undergoing
interrogation. The IRA perspective on this is that it implies he was acting beyond the law
in support of special SAS operations.
He was permitted to operate alone, and the intelligence he acquired did not
go through the normal Special Branch/Military Intelligence channels The
reason is that everything connected with the SAS is highly sensitive and
secret and is handled outside normal security channels. Therefore,
because no one was entitled to know what the SAS were doing, Nairac
was operating on the edge without proper back up protection. Now, that
implies that what the SAS were doing, as the IRA knows, was not within
the law. The SAS depends on accurate intelligence and people like Nairac
were being sent out alone to acquire it. The only thing even the IRA will




This explanation does not fit comfortably with the facts either. Even if Nairac
was on a special collection mission in support of SAS operations, that would not preclude
a SAS quick reaction team in support. Furthermore, Nairac was not at great pains to
conceal his whereabouts from his command, i.e., "normal security channels," as might be
the case if he was acting illegally or in support of a black operation. Another
questionable decision was his use of the Official IRA as a cover story. The enmity
between the Provisionals and the Officials was such that had his kidnappers believed his
story, the end result might have been the same.
The effect of Robert Nairac' s kidnapping on operations in Northern Ireland was
devastating—both in terms of morale and operationally. The officer was both popular
and highly regarded.
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Furthermore, British intelligence had to assume that he was
being interrogated and that their operations were consequently compromised, although it
was widely believed within Nairac' s unit that he would not break under interrogation, and
according to the testimony of his murderers, he did not. Even though Nairac did not
break under interrogation, IRA intelligence put the following out in the Republiccm News,
the Provisional newspaper: "The elimination of Nairac is an obvious breakthrough in the
war against the Special Air Service. Sources close to the IRA refused to say how much
detailed knowledge they now have of the SAS but they are obviously highly pleased with
what Nairac has either given them or confirmed."
225 However, since British intelligence
could not be sure and no body was found, the British had to assume that he was
undergoing a protracted interrogation and had to adjust their operations accordingly.
226
224
Nairac was posthumously awarded the George Cross.




VII. IN SEARCH OF A CLEAN KILL: THE
AMBUSH AT LOUGHGALL, 1987
Northern Ireland was a tremendous training ground for the British Army. Regular
Army battalions that were mostly from the British Army of the Rhine rotated through
Ulster for four month tours. These rotations occurred on average about once every two
years. Frequently in Northern Ireland, battalions had the opportunity to work as cohesive
units, but the true benefits lay at the company echelon and below Companies assigned to
the major urban areas were able to concentrate their energies on improving urban war
fighting skills, such as city patrolling. Units that were assigned to rural duty found
equally challenging tasks to master, in particular the units that were assigned to the hard
areas known as ''bandit country."
Despite its advantages as a training ground, Northern Ireland was not considered
desirable duty. It was not so much the pace or hardships of duty in Ulster that the
soldiers objected to as much as the lack of clarity in the missions. Support to law
enforcement was officially at the heart of the British military's role in Northern Ireland
By the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the RUC had mostly supplanted the British
Army as the primary law enforcement agency, but not in the hard Republican areas. In
the hard areas, the RUC simply could not maintain control without the explicit support of
the Army Consequently, in Republican strongholds like Andersonstown, as many as
sixteen soldiers found themselves on patrol around one policeman walking a beat In the
rural bandit country, the Army remained in charge of law enforcement. Yet the soldiers
found themselves in Northern Ireland conducting law enforcement without law
enforcement authority beyond the power of common law arrest (i.e., citizen's arrest), and
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it is not an understatement to say that the legal landscape for the British military in
Northern Ireland was truly alien territory. In other words, the military aspects of the
counter-insurgency campaign in Northern Ireland were understandable to the British
soldiers, but as far as the policing aspects of the same campaign were concerned, the
Army had neither the training nor the inclination for the work.
Perhaps confusing the issue even more for the British soldier was the fact that
although the soldier was constrained by the law, his adversary was not. In this regard, the
Republican paramilitaries refused to recognize the authority of British law in its
application to the IRA, yet insisted on its protection in confrontation with the Security
Forces. This is at the core of perhaps the most fundamental frustration of the British
soldier: that one side (the IRA) is fighting a war to kill its enemies, and the other side (the
Security Forces) is fighting a war to make arrests. There are profound explanations for
why this is so, but simply put, for political reasons the Crown could not declare war on
the IRA. As British policy was to minimize the IRA, it could not recognize the IRA as a
belligerent and thus give it defacto political status. Even some hard-line Unionists
recognized the logic in this. Enoch Powell, a Unionist Member of Parliament, explains,
"Ifwe make it [the IRA] a nation state and say we are going to treat you as a nation state
and recognize you as a nation and declare war upon you, then you would in fact have
installed the IRA in the very position which it seeks to attain by means of terror."
227
This
is an excellent point, which explains much about the manner in which the United
221 Quoted in Mark Urban, Big Boys ' Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IRA
(London: Faber and Faber. 1992), 205.
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Kingdom pursued the war, but it does not answer the dilemma and the frustration of the
soldiers
It would not be unreasonable to assert that, as a rule, the British are a fair-minded
people and, moreover, the British military is an extremely professional organization
Having said that, even though the British may have given the world the Marquess of
Queensbury's Rules, at no time in the shared Anglo-Irish history has either side felt
overly obliged to follow them. While the British Army may set the standards for military
professionalism, it should not be terribly surprising that the soldiers would push the legal
envelope. In other words, the British Army looked for ways to engage the IRA in
combat, which under most circumstances was proscribed, while remaining technically
within the limits of the law.
The SAS ambush of the IRA in the small village of Loughgall in 1987 was
perhaps the crowning moment of the British effort to meet the IRA in combat and stay
within the law. Two violent and opposing offensives collided at Loughgall: on the one
hand, the East Tyrone Brigade attempting to subvert government authority in the
province by attacking the rural police structure and on the other, the SAS in a search of a
clean kill.
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Together with an examination of these two colliding forces in the Loughgall
operation, this chapter will describe the ambush and look to bring to light the role of
intelligence in this shoot-to-kill incident.
:&
Technically speaking, there was no such thing as the East Tyrone Brigade in the IRA structure
The actnities chronicled in this chapter were conducted by two or more mutual ly supporting active service
units that nevertheless referred to themselves loosely as the East T>Tone Brigade.
lir
A. THE EAST TYRONE BRIGADE
By the mid-1980s, the IRA in county Tyrone was second only to the IRA
paramilitaries of South Armagh in levels of activity. The number of active terrorists in
the various active service units (ASUs) across Tyrone probably never exceeded fifty or
sixty, with an additional 200 or so Sinn Fein activists and hard core supporters, but they
were more active than their more numerous urban counterparts in Londonderry or
Belfast.
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Characterizing the activities of the Tyrone ASUs were an increasing number of
complex operations targeting the authority of the RUC in rural areas. Rural police
stations in small villages interspersed throughout Tyrone and North Armagh were
brought under attack by the Tyrone ASUs using bombs, mortars and direct assault by hit
teams. By this period, the ASUs had acquired sophisticated weaponry and equipment,
some was of Soviet-bloc manufacture and some was indigenously produced, including
night vision goggles and body armor. 230 The rural constables were hopelessly
outmatched in numbers and firepower making them dependent on the British Army for
support, which was the impression the IRA intended to give.
Several attacks against rural RUC stations were mounted in 1985 and early 1986
before British authorities increased troop strength in the province by bringing in an
additional two battalions for duty in Ulster.
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This had no apparent deterrent effect as
attacks on RUC stations in the countryside continued though 1986, with a particularly








case, Tyrone IRA had combined several ASUs in a complex operation involving
diversionary and main attack teams utilizing spotters, hijackers, bombers and gunmen
The total number of IRA involved, according to British intelligence, was in excess of
35.
232 The attack on The Birches entailed one team mounting a diversionary attack in
Pomeroy (a town about 20 kilometers away from The Birches) to tie down the Security
Forces. A second team hijacked several vehicles and a tractor with a front-loading scoop
The tractor's scoop was loaded with a bomb and driven into the police station where it
was detonated by a third team. The IRA ASUs escaped by boat across Lough Neagh.
No one was killed in the attack on The Birches although the building was
destroyed. The organization then targeted contractors hired to rebuild the rural police
stations, and in one incident the East Tyrone Brigade "executed" a contractor named
Harold Henry against the back wall of his house. 233 One Special Branch officer, calling
this murder a turning point in the struggle against the Tyrone IRA, said, "we were under
pressure from the government to get results."
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One factor operating in favor of the Security Forces was the large numbers of
people involved in The Birches attack, which made the East Tyrone Brigade vulnerable
to British intelligence penetration. Certainly by mid-April 1987 and perhaps as early as
the end of 1986, British intelligence had found at least one informer close to the Tyrone
IRA and its key leaders, Patrick Kelly and Jim Lynagh. British intelligence established
close surveillance on the two men and their respective ASUs. The operation was placed
~*- Quoted in Urban, 222.
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Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix. Phoenix: Policing the Shadows, The Secret War Against
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under the direction of the Tasking and Coordination Group at Gough Barracks, Armagh.
In early 1987, as these two IRA leaders decided to combine forces and attack the police
station in Loughgall, North Armagh, the Security Forces were assessing the problem of
how to come to grips with the Tyrone IRA. 235
B. THE SAS IN SEARCH OF A CLEAN KILL
During the first twenty years of the Troubles, the SAS involvement in Northern
Ireland can be generalized as occurring within four phases. The first phase can be
characterized as minimal involvement and ran through the years 1969-1975. During this
period, the SAS was not committed as a regiment in the province and was largely limited
to contributing SAS personnel to specific operations or training personnel for covert
activities. The second phase, as noted in Chapter VI, began when Prime Minister Wilson
officially committed the Regiment to Northern Ireland in 1976. This phase, which lasted
through 1978, was characterized by several aggressive and lethal confrontations with the
IRA and included the first serious allegations of the SAS being employed in a shoot-to-
kill role in Northern Ireland.
236 A third period of SAS involvement began in 1979 and
was to last until late 1983.
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This was a time in which the SAS was used extensively
throughout the province, but was not involved in any fatal shooting incidents with the
IRA. The final phase of this period of history, which began in late 1983, entailed a
resumption of lethal encounters between the IRA and the SAS. 238










not reflect governmental policy regarding employment of the SAS Regiment as much as
the intent and the inclination of the mid-level military commanders in Northern Ireland to
aggressively deal with the IRA. 239 Although this may in fact be the case, the resumption
of lethal SAS ambushes of the IRA in December 1983, nearly coincided with a
diminution ofRUC Headquarters Mobile Surveillance Units (HMSU) activity following
the Stalker inquiry into the shoot-to-kill allegations against the RUC. These allegations,
which will be discussed in the next chapter, brought to an end to RUC ambushes and
greatly diminished the use of the RUC in situations requiring firepower and special
tactics.
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Moreover, the Regular Army's entanglement with the IRA in combat
situations also dropped dramatically. Following the introduction of the SAS into the
province in 1976, fatal Regular Army shootings of Republican paramilitaries were rare
An examination of IRA casualties from 1976 to 1987 shows that the Intelligence and
Surveillance Group killed three times as many Republican paramilitaries in Northern
Ireland as the entire British Army.
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What does this mean9 Republican authors will argue that the trends indicate that
as the public scrutiny tightened on the operations of the RUC, the SAS was tasked to
resume lethal ambushes of the IRA. Even if this was not the case, and there was not a
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Urban. 254. The Intelligence and Surveillance Group (SAS and 14th Intelligence Company)
killed a total of 32 Republican paramilitaries (IRA and INLA). The rest of the Army killed 9 during the
same period. Furthermore in the period 1979-1982, the RUC HMSU killed 5 Republican paramilitaries,
but none after the Stalker inquiry began. Incidentally, not counting the 10 Republican deaths during the
1981 hunger strike, the Republican paramilitaries killed slightly more of their own (36) through accidents
or vendettas than did the Intelligence and Surveillance Group (32).
the Intelligence and Surveillance Group had been made the vanguard of the war against
the IRA.
Another thought to bear in mind is that no shooting ofIRA men escaped public
scrutiny, so switching the point from the HMSUs to the SAS really did not relieve the
Security Forces from undesirable attention, and in fact probably increased it. The SAS
has a notorious reputation in the Catholic community, and the Republican propaganda
machine was more than willing to vilify the Regiment at any opportunity. Such calumny,
in addition to being offensive to the Regiment, was also dangerous to SAS operations. It
not only increased pressure on the Westminster government to hold public inquiries into
each shooting, but also increased pressure on the Crown to try SAS troopers involved in
lethal shootings for murder. Not only was a trooper then under trial for doing his job, but
the SAS was open to questioning from attorneys on the Sinn Fein payroll. This
potentially exposed SAS operations, personnel, intelligence sources and methods to the
IRA. Mark Urban wrote:
Some officers in covert operations regard courts as a dangerous
inconvenience. They feel republican lawyers use the proceedings to
obtain operational information about special forces. One officer says,
'There is all this talk about "shoot-to-kill". What do you think the IRA
do—shoot-to-tickle?' He argues that republican use of court proceedings
is an obscenity, given the way the IRA kills its own people suspected of
informing or shoots defenceless reservists in their homes.
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In order to combat the ERA and still avoid adverse attention and/or trial, the SAS
had essentially two options: (1) to arrest, rather than kill, the terrorists; or (2) to get a
clean kill on the ERA, which was a kill of armed terrorists under circumstances that even
the IRA and Sinn Fein had to admit were fair. The SAS pursued the first option during
Ibid., 205.
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the period 1979-1983 while continuing to confront terrorism in Northern Ireland
Outside of the problems associated with soldiers in law enforcement, the arrest option
also has the disadvantage of being extremely dangerous to the soldiers attempting the
arrest. Furthermore, the danger increased as the years went on and the IRA acquired
better equipment and became more proficient tactically. Consequently, the gunmen were
less inclined to surrender. Another downside to the arrest option, from the perspective of
the Security Forces, was the likelihood of recidivism. The environment and structure of
the prisons at Crumlin Road and Long Kesh made it difficult, although not impossible,
for IRA prisoners to break their Republican bonds upon release. James Lynagh, the
leader of the attack at Loughgall, is a good case in point. He had been "involved in
dozens of killings and hundreds of actions" and had served three separate prison terms in
the Republic and in Ulster for his crimes. 243 Upon his release from the Republic's
Portaloise prison in April 1986, Lynagh immediately rejoined the Tyrone IRA taking
command of an ASU. 244 The second option may or may not have been acceptable in
either moral or legal terms for a liberal democracy to undertake, but it cannot be argued
that lethal solutions end recidivism.
As the second option apparently became the modus operandi for the SAS after
1983, what exactly did a "clean kill" entail7 There were two sets of rules to which the
SAS adhered depending on circumstances: the legal and the actual. Policy and common
law precedence established the legal set of rules regarding the lethal use of force in
Northern Ireland, whereby a soldier was allowed to use force only if he felt his life or the
24
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lives of others were endangered.
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These rules regulating the use of force were made
clear to each soldier that served in Northern Ireland in the form of the "Yellow Card,"
which was a card that each soldier carried with him imprinted with the guidelines.
According to Mark Urban:
The Card, amended in 1980, stressed that, 'Firearms must only be used as
a last resort.' It told soldiers that they must challenge somebody unless an
engagement had already begun or if doing so 'would increase the risk of
death or grave injury to you or any other person'. Opening fire is correct
only if the person is committing or about to commit an act likely to
endanger life and there is no other way to prevent the danger.' 246
The actual set of rules (those the SAS really adopted) were summed up in the
Northern Ireland saying, "Big boys' games, big boys' rules," which meant "any IRA man
caught with a rifle or bomb can expect to be shot, whatever the Yellow Card may say."247
C. TWO OFFENSIVES MEETING
In the hopes of achieving another "spectacular," in April 1987 the Tyrone IRA
decided that they would hit the police station in the Protestant village of Loughgall
sometime during the following month. Loughgall, which is in North Armagh, promised
to be not just another easy target, but would reap significant propaganda rewards for the
IRA as well. The Protestant Orange Order was founded in Loughgall in 1795. The
decision was made to pursue an attack similar to The Birches where a hijacked digger
would be used to crash a bomb into the police building. The attack was to take place at
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1900 hours on 8 May, which indicates that the IRA intended to attack after normal
working hours at the police station.
248
This was a particularly busy time for the East Tyrone Brigade and for the IRA in
general. On 21 April 1987, Tyrone IRA killed Harold Henry for rebuilding police
stations.
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Four days later, the same ASU murdered William Graham, a UDR soldier, at
his home in East Tyrone in front of his wife. Graham was shot in the back as he was
working in his yard and two IRA gunmen stood over him and fired nineteen rounds into
his body.
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Later, forensics were to show that the weapons used to kill Graham and
Henry were carried by the gunmen in the Loughgall attack. On the same day as the
murder of William Graham, IRA gunmen in South Armagh killed Lord Justice Maurice
Gibson and his wife as they were returning from vacation in the Republic of Ireland.
Gibson, the second-most senior judge in Ulster, had been escorted to the border by the
Gardai but was not met by the RUC on the northern side of the border. The RUC quit
escorting VIPs through South Armagh after four constables were killed in escort duty in
1985.
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The Security Forces were busy at this time as well. The decision was made,
based on informer intelligence, to allow the ERA to proceed with its attack and ambush
the ASUs in the process. The timeline to develop an operational plan was short.
Ibid.. 227. It may be that the ERA. by attacking after working hours, intended to destroy the
police station and not kill anyone, but as they began their attack, they opened fire on the police station with
automatic weapons.
249 The IRA and Sum Fern maintain that they do not participate in sectarian killings like the
Loyalist paramilitaries, but only kill civilians who support the government, e.g.. Henry This, of course, is
a disingenuous argument since the overwhelming majority of Protestants support the government, and






Nevertheless, the TCG that was tasked with running the operation, code-named
Operation Judy, had sufficient lead time to allow it to brief (and gain the approval of)
Tom King, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. 252
Surveillance was the first active step undertaken by the Security Forces, as good
intelligence would be critical to mounting the ambush—either with intent to arrest or to
kill the terrorists. The intelligence machinery in Northern Ireland spun into action and
the leaders of the ASUs, Kelly and Lynagh, were put under surveillance as was, probably,
the arms cache of the terrorists. Units involved in the surveillance included the Special
Branch's E4A and the 14th Intelligence Company at a minimum, and Peter Taylor asserts
that the MI5 technical unit, i.e., the bugging experts, was involved as well. 253
The issue ofMI5 involvement raises an interesting question. According to
Taylor, MI5 had bugged the arms cache and therefore the Security Forces would have
been in position to arrest the teams when they picked up the arms. Since this approach
probably would have only resulted in the arrest of the quartermaster as he collected the
weapons, a more pertinent question is why were the weapons not rendered inoperable?
There are three possible answers to this question: (1) the Security Forces were unaware of
the cache or for other reasons did not attempt to enter the arms dump. James Rennie, a
14
th
Intelligence Company operator, was the operations officer at the TCG during the
Loughgall ambush and does not mention the involvement ofMI5 or surveillance of the
arms dump. 254 Neither does Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix's work, which was largely
Holland and Phoenix. 141.
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based on the notes of Ian Phoenix who ran the Special Branch HMSU involved at
Loughgall.
255
(2) The arms dump was under surveillance, but the weapons were not
jarked because of fear the IRA would detect it. This had happened in the past and the
Loughgall ambush would be deemed too important to risk. (3) The Security Forces had
no intentions of arresting the IRA. If the weapons had been rendered inoperable, that
would have robbed the Security Forces of their clean kill and the ambush would not have
met the guidelines established by the Yellow Card. 25b The answer probably lies in either
the second or third possibility. Mark Urban wrote that following the ambush at
Loughgall, several newspaper accounts mentioned Security Forces' surveillance of the
cache that went back for days or even weeks before the attack, although Urban believes
that the surveillance team was generally thought to be E4A. 257 This, of course, would not
preclude the participation ofMB's technical team and in some ways the intelligence
methods used might be reminiscent of one of the shoot-to-kill incidents investigated by
John Stalker. 258
Another controversial aspect of the British surveillance operation involves the
shooting of William Graham. According to most of the sources consulted, the East
Tyrone Brigade was under surveillance by British intelligence at the time of the shooting
of William Graham, the UDR soldier, on 25 April 1987. As it would be difficult to
maintain complete surveillance simultaneously on the eight principle gunmen of the two
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1982. a hayshcd was used by the IRA as an arms dump, which had been bugged by MI5. When two men
were later shot (one fatally) at the hayshed by HMSU officers. MIS refused to release the tape recording of
the incident to Stalker in the course of his investigation. See Chapter VIII for additional details regarding
the Stalker un estigation.
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ASUs, this does not mean that surveillance was either around the clock or without
inadvertent gaps. It does raise the disturbing prospect that the attack of Graham was
allowed to proceed under the view of British intelligence. Mark Urban wrote of this
incident:
A member of the security forces in a position to know alleged to
me during the preparation of this book that Graham's killers had been
under surveillance when they carried out the attack. The attack on
Graham may have been allowed to proceed because the intelligence
officers handling the case did not want to jeopardize their plans to mount a
major ambush, and Graham's death may have been part of a plan to let the
East Tyrone ASUs get so cocky that they would mount the Loughgall
operation.
I have not found people prepared to corroborate the allegation that
the IRA was allowed to kill Graham. I have included it because the
person making it was, I believe, saying what he believed to be the truth. 259
If this incident is true as alleged, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that
the intelligence officers who stood by and allowed the attack on Graham to proceed were
to a degree accomplices in his murder. If the allegations were false, i.e., the gunmen
were not under surveillance at the time, the murder of Graham was no less tragic and it
still provided grist for the Republican propaganda mill, which propagated the allegations
as fact.
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As the expected date of the IRA attack on Loughgall neared, the Security Forces
brought in additional units to participate in the ambush. Fifteen additional members of
the SAS, from the alert anti-terrorist G Squadron, were brought in from Hereford to
supplement the existing 24-member squadron in Ulster. 261 Additionally, a Special
438. Coogan repeats the above allegation and adds speculation that the informer had notified British




Branch HMSU was called in to provide a backup reserve to the SAS as well as seal off
avenues of escape after the ASUs had entered the village. 262 In all, the Security Forces in
the village participating in the ambush included SAS, 14th Intelligence Company, E4A,
and the HMSU, as well as several companies of Regular Army and UDR soldiers that
were used to support the operation from outside the immediate vicinity of Loughgall
The operation entailed the use of hundreds of soldiers and police. 263
James Rennie stated that by 8 May 1987, the expected date of the IRA attack, the
Security Forces were aware of the general outline of the IRA plan, but lacked sufficient
detail to plan an arrest that would safeguard the members of the Security Forces
involved.
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Therefore, the decision was made to proceed with the expectation that the
confrontation would involve the use offeree. The SAS was divided into two main
groups. One group armed with machine guns was placed in a copse of trees overlooking
the police station and the village football field, which the IRA was erroneously expected
to traverse. The other SAS group was placed in and around the police station
The stationing of soldiers inside a police barracks that was expected to be bombed
was an interesting operational decision that apparently reflected the SAS desire for a
clean kill. As one SAS trooper explained to Mark Urban, "The Yellow Card rules are
officially seen to cover Loughgall, but of course they don't. You put your men in the
station. That way they [the IRA] are threatening you without even knowing it. That's
how you get around the Yellow Card."265
~6






Quoted in Urban. 230.
ll l >
During the afternoon of 8 May, members of Lynagh and Kelly's ASUs hijacked a
van and a digger. The digger was to be used to carry a two-man team with a bomb in its
front-loader as in The Birches attack, and the van would carry the remainder of the team.
At 1900 hours, the surveillance teams dug in throughout Loughgall noted the van driving
slowly past the police station. The van left the village and returned twenty minutes later
followed by the digger with a 300-pound bomb concealed by rubble in its bucket. 266 The
van drove past the police station and stopped; several gunmen got out, including Patrick
Kelly, and opened fire on the police station with their assault rifles. From this point,
events began to move very swiftly. As the two SAS groups opened up on the IRA team
in and around the van killing Kelly and two others immediately, the two terrorists on the
tractor lit the fuse on the bomb, pointed the tractor towards the station and jumped off.
Both were shot dead by the SAS, although one man, Michael Gormley was unarmed
except for the zippo lighter with which he had lit the bomb's fuse.
267 As the tractor hit
the building's wall, the bomb detonated nearly flattening the police station. Several SAS
troopers inside the police station were wounded although no one was killed. Meanwhile
the gun battle continued as the SAS destroyed the van with 7.62mm machine gun fire
killing the occupants, James Lynagh, Seamus Donnelly and Patrick McKearney.
Donnelly was the driver of the van and the other two had jumped back into the van once
the firing began. As the battle ended, all eight gunmen from the Tyrone IRA had been
killed by the SAS. 268
266
Holland and Phoenix, 143.
267
Urban, 232; Taylor, 32 1. Taylor reports that Declan Arthurs was the IRA man killed with the




Marring the operation, from the British perspective, was the killing of an innocent
civilian named Anthony Hughes who was a thirty-six year-old father of three Hughes
and his brother, Oliver, were driving through the village when the firing began. When
the men heard the gunfire, Anthony put the car into reverse and started to back away
from the action. A hidden SAS team opened fire on the car killing Anthony and
wounding Oliver. From the covert SAS position, the two men who were wearing blue
overalls identical to the IRA team looked like IRA gunmen trying to escape. 269
What about the informer intelligence that tipped off the Security Forces to the
impending attack at Loughgall? There is no conclusive evidence that reveals who it was,
although some unlikely speculation has it that it was one of the IRA men killed at
Loughgall.
270
The IRA conducted an internal investigation, which appears to have
centered on a woman named Collette O'Neill, with close ties to the Tyrone Republican
community Mrs. O'Neill was kidnapped by two IRA gunmen on 21 May 1987, but had
apparently hit a panic button before her abduction alerting the RUC, who subsequently
rescued her and arrested the kidnappers. Over time, O'Neill told conflicting stories to the
press about both her abduction and her knowledge of the Loughgall operation, and it
emerged that under pressure from her family she struck a deal with the IRA whereby she
withdrew charges against her kidnappers in exchange for an IRA guarantee of safety. 271
In conclusion, the SAS achieved a nearly clean kill at Loughgall and succeeded in







" ~ O'Brien, 141. According to O'Brien. RUC forensics were to show that the weapons earned b\
the IRA at Loughgall were used in seven murders and twelve attempted murders
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IRA since the Irish Civil War over sixty years before. Even Gerry Adams' initial
reaction indicated that the Republicans viewed Loughgall as a fair fight: "I believe that
the IRA volunteers would understand the risk they were taking."273 In other words, such
are the fortunes of war. That position was to change as the ERA and Sinn Fein recognized
the hardening of British policy that the ambush implied, and it was not long before the
Republican propaganda machine was reporting that only five men were killed in combat,
and the remaining three were executed by the SAS as prisoners. 274 The IRA has always
been successful at creating martyrs of their dead, and Loughgall dramatically increased
the roll call of Republican martyrs. Tim Pat Coogan stated, no doubt with some
hyperbole, that the funeral of each Loughgall martyr recruited fifty new volunteers for the
cause. Even accounting for exaggeration the IRA soon made up its losses. 275 What the
IRA could not immediately replace, however, was the experience and proficiency of the
eight men killed in Loughgall. Mark Urban wrote, "Loughgall was the apotheosis of the
'clean kill', a cleverly planned exploitation of intelligence resulting in the humiliation of
the IRA. Whether supplying the republican movement with eight new martyrs furthered
or hindered the cause of peace is another matter."276 This is perhaps a good argument for
arrest. If the men were left alive and in prison, they still would have been the object of
Republican respect, but they would not be martyrs.
Loughgall was not the last incident in which the SAS was accused of conducting a










more IRA terrorists were killed by the SAS. This time the deaths were in Gibraltar and
the IRA unarmed. The next chapter, "Intelligence Operations and Democracy," looks
again at the role of the Security Forces in shoot-to-kill operations as well as some of the
other troubling aspects of the secret war in Northern Ireland
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Vm. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND DEMOCRACY
This work has thus far laid out the myriad intelligence organizations that operated
in Northern Ireland as well as their methods and a representation of their operations. All
of the intelligence activities recorded in this history were conducted in the absence of
parliamentary oversight.
277 No organization existed within either the British intelligence
community or the Whitehall civil bureaucracy to ensure that intelligence activity was
conducted within the legal framework of British law. To be sure, British intelligence ran
some ingenious operations against an innovative and implacable enemy, but at the same
time routinely operated beyond the pale of British law. When the courts became
inconvenient or public scrutiny too severe, the intelligence services instinctively and
invariably prevaricated behind the veil of the Official Secrets Act.
This chapter will look at the uneasy relationship between the aggressive British
intelligence community and the democracy it serves. While there may have been a
general recognition by the intelligence services that the rule of law must be maintained,
the frustrations and the difficulties faced in combating the IRA undoubtedly led the
intelligence community to adopt harsher and more illiberal measures. Furthermore,
intelligence operations that are conducted within the letter of the law frequently do not
conform to the spirit of the law and thus may violate the morality and ethics of the
society.
There are three parts to the equation of intelligence and democratic society in
Richard Thurlow, The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century- (Oxford
Basil Blackw ell. 1994). 321.
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Northern Ireland that do not mesh well together. One concerns the effects of the
ubiquitous intelligence presence upon daily life within Northern Ireland. The Security
Forces, in an effort to control the terrorists, essentially turned the hard areas into enclaves
resembling zones of military occupation. As the intelligence services played a critical
role in supporting the British presence in these areas, what effect did the ever-present
intelligence agencies have on Ulster society9 A second uneasy part to this equation is the
relationship of the law and the intelligence operations. The British intelligence
community in Northern Ireland adopted harsh illiberal measures in its campaign against
Irish terrorism. This section looks at three incidents where the law and the intelligence
community came into conflict. Finally, the last part of the equation is the issue of
intelligence activities within the moral framework of a liberal democracy. Of particular
interest in this section is the question of whether the intelligence community can properly
serve its democracy by adopting immoral means in its pursuit of the IRA.
A. THE UBIQUITOUS INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE
J. Bowyer Bell wrote, "The British are as prone as any to respond to provocation
with the boot, more so than their image of a people disciplined by law, police without
guns and ruled with an unwritten constitution."
2 g When the British Army was sent into
Northern Ireland in 1969 at the start of the Troubles, it did not begin operations with a
tabula rasa. Centuries of Anglo-Irish history ensured that this simply could not be the
case. Even in 1969 the memory of Army repression in Ireland following the First World
War, in particular the use of the Black and Tans, remained a vivid part of Republican
278





Despite immediate relief that the British Army would save them from
massacre at the hands of the Protestants, many within the Catholic community regarded
the British as the ancient enemy and viewed the British Army with cynicism and
suspicion.
280 The growing British military presence in the Nationalist communities
would not go far in allaying Catholic fears.
While the British may not have come into Northern Ireland with a tabula rasa vis-
a-vis the Nationalists, "blank slate" might be an apt term to describe the state of
intelligence in the province at that time. British intelligence was simply inadequate from
the beginning of the peace operations. Intelligence on the paramilitaries in Northern
Ireland was lacking in historical accuracy, and it is not an exaggeration to say that in the
first two years of the conflict the expanding paramilitary organizations grew faster than
British intelligence could respond. Moreover, as the government had effectively
decapitated the RUC with disarmament and the disbanding of the B-Specials, the brunt of
the security mission including intelligence activities fell to the Army.
The intelligence process had to begin from essentially ground zero in 1970, but
once the Security Forces realized the scope of the problem, their response was to develop
a methodical and meticulous intelligence presence throughout Ulster The cities of
Belfast and Londonderry, in particular, drew increased attention as the public disorder
there had the greatest potential to threaten the overall stability of the province.
""
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British ex-servicemen. They were brought mto Ireland as an auxiliary force to supplement the British
Army and were regarded by nationalists as a particularly brutal and sectarian force.
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How did the British respond to this intelligence shortfall about their adversaries?
One member of the Stormont Parliament asserted that the problem was that the Security
Forces did not know the people on the other side of the barricades,281 so Army
intelligence began the long process of learning the faces, names and histories of the
citizens of Catholic areas in Londonderry and Belfast. This included the hard areas like
the Catholic Bogside and Falls Road, as well as Protestant districts like Shankill. After
Operation Motorman, which broke down the barricades, the Army moved into the hard
areas in force. According to Tim Pat Coogan,
. . . Catholic West Belfast became an occupied zone. Public
buildings such as schools, recreational halls, even blocks of flats and
football grounds including the Casement Park GAA grounds, were all
occupied by soldiers. This occupancy was gradually transferred to fixed
army posts. The Andersonstown area, for example, eventually wound up
with sixteen fortified posts, some of the stockades being more reminiscent
of something out ofBeau Geste, with huge iron stockades, than anything
recently built in western Europe. And the behaviour of the troops in the
saturated areas was heavy-handed in the extreme.
282
The first requirement of the Army in the hard areas was the reestablishment of
government authority, which was largely accomplished by making their presence felt in
the Catholic ghettoes. Troops moved through the streets of Belfast and Londonderry in
armored personnel carriers or as interdependent infantry squads patrolling the streets on
foot. The behavior of the troops was a polemical issue. The Republican position was
that the troops were heavy-handed, implying a lack of restraint in the use of batons or
firearms. The counter-argument is that the soldiers, overall, acted with considerable
restraint under constant provocation. One journalist quoted by Desmond Hamill stated,
a
' Hamill, 60.
282 Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland 's Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Searchfor Peace
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"In Belfast they [the Army] have to suffer abuse from a people particularly eloquent in
obscenity. They have been stoned and have had broken bottles thrown at them. ,,2i '3 Not
only were the soldiers open to taunts and minor physical abuse, but the IRA made an
early decision to assassinate no less than thirty-six soldiers.
284
The government felt that the key to reestablishing law and order in the province
was through the presence of troops. Colonel Michael Dewar wrote, "It is patrolling on
foot or in vehicles, that actually dominates an area. The physical presence of soldiers
prevents the enemy from preparing or planning an illegal activity. Having said this, the
IRA would argue that the presence of soldiers on the streets is provocative and the
catalyst for their terrorist activities. But the rule of law cannot be maintained without
regular visits from those upholding the law." 285
Assuming for the sake of argument that the soldiers were well disciplined under
the circumstances, the fact remains that the Catholic areas of Belfast and Londonderry
took on the appearance of zones of military occupation. As the patrols moved through
the streets of the cities, the Squaddies used the telescopic sights on their rifles to search
the rooftops and the windows for snipers. They looked through windows on the ground
floors and noted locations of rooms, occupants and furniture. People were stopped on the
street and questioned by soldiers. Tens of thousands of homes were searched by the
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endure what was perceived as martial iaw, although by statute it was not. Even the most
understanding of the Nationalists were soon alienated by the experience.
Without question, the Army needed good intelligence to support its operations.
First military intelligence and then the other intelligence organizations began to work up
meticulous dossiers in the hard areas of the cities and the bandit country in rural Ulster.
Hamill wrote that Army intelligence units had to be augmented to handle the influx of
information:
It was decided that these units must be enlarged; which they were, until
they became quite a large office organization. Each unit built up a card
index system where every boy over 12 and every girl over 14 got a card.
Everything about them would be on that card, including photographs. If
any review of this information revealed a close involvement with the IRA,
that person would then be put under personal surveillance which might
well mean that he or she became a subject for an Interim Custody
Order.
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Intelligence of this nature was generally low-level and mostly gathered overtly by
soldiers on patrol, but long-term surveillance was also conducted in the cities against
high-value IRA targets. In addition to their card system, the British Army also acquired a
computer in the mid-1970s to assist in the collation of information, although political
pressure was brought against military intelligence to restrict the use of the computer to
vehicle registration checks for fear of infringement of civil rights. 28 ' Vehicle checkpoints
were everywhere and were used to track traffic patterns of individuals; vehicles traveling





' Ibid.. Hamill wrote that the outcry against the computer was largely from Labour Party
politicians. "'No doubt they thought we would log them on our computers." said a senior officer. Quite
right, we would!'"'
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Practices such as the citizen dossiers and vehicle checks were only part of the
overall surveillance scheme in Northern Ireland. Bell wrote that the effect on Belfast was
gradual but significant:
Belfast was slowly being transformed into a gigantic camp, where the hard
core Nationalist areas were isolated, all in and out traffic monitored, all
residents filtered and filed, and all movement watched The computer
systems grew grand
—
people, vehicles, letters, telephones, social welfare,
licenses, all sorts of data went into the data banks. The danger areas were
surveyed by television cameras, by army observation posts, overt to
intimidate and covert for more secret surveillance There were regular and
irregular patrols. There were watchers hidden in the military barracks in
police stations, watchers in marked and unmarked vehicles and watchers
with cameras and giant lenses in the ubiquitous helicopters. There were
daily reports from informers, from friends, and from overheard
conversations All the hints and guesses, hard data, enlarged photographs,
taped conversations were sifted, analyzed, compiled and transformed into
operational intelligence fed back to the patrols and watchers and agents as
needed.
288
Despite appearances, the British Army was not an occupying power. Northern
Ireland is a province of the United Kingdom, and the citizens of Ulster, Catholic and
Protestant alike, are British citizens. At its height in the mid-1970s, the IRA was
estimated to number approximately 1,500 active members and, as a result of the switch to
the cellular system, by the mid-1980s that number had dropped to around 250-350
members. 289 Moreover, even in the worst of the Troubles, Belfast was never as
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transformation of Ulster into what was perceived by the Nationalists as an Orwellian
society?
The answer to this question is not self-evident. But a likely scenario is that such a
transformation occurred as an evolutionary process in the absence of an intentional
framework of design. That 'it just happened" may be a banal answer, but without
independent oversight of the intelligence services, those organizations were allowed to
pursue intelligence collection to its logical extremes. As it is reasonable to assume that
the Security Forces deemed that more information on the population was better than less,
it follows that without outside checks on the intelligence services, they would feel free to
pursue their mission with vigor and without much restraint.
The British were being forced on a daily basis to demonstrate that they could
control Northern Ireland, and their response showed that they would not be pressured by
a small minority of violent extremists into deserting the province. No doubt British
decision-makers felt that if in order to maintain this control, illiberal measures were
adopted, that would be regrettable but necessary.
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In other words, the ends would
justify the means. The tenuous morality of this type of British consequentialism,
particularly in reference to British intelligence activities, will be discussed below.
B. INTELLIGENCE AND THE LAW
In their pursuit of information about IRA and other paramilitary organizations, the
Security Forces occasionally ran into conflict with the courts. The Security Forces in
general operated under the umbrella of emergency legislation including the Civil
Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922; the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act,
Thurlow, 358.
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1973; and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974. All of these
acts authorized a degree of repressive behavior by the government including suspension
of habeas corpus during internment, which was later reduced to the power to detain
suspects without charge for 72 hours Suspects also could be fingerprinted and
photographed without charge. The acts, however, did not provide unlimited authority to
the Security Forces. For example, the emergency legislation stopped short of establishing
martial law, and although soldiers were actively engaged in law enforcement, their
authority was established by the parameters ofcommon law This section will look at
some of the key arenas highlighting the relationship between the law and the intelligence
services, specifically, interrogation techniques, the use of intelligence assets
(supergrasses) in courts, and the shoot-to-kill allegations against the RUC.
The controversy surrounding British intelligence interrogation of Republican
suspects goes hand-in-hand with the adoption of internment without trial, which was
reintroduced in Northern Ireland in August 1971 Antonio Vercher wrote that internment
was used in Northern Ireland ". . as an extra-judicial repressive and preventative measure,
sometimes to repress an initial period of disorder, sometimes to prevent that
possibility. . .
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The danger that was being repressed and/or prevented was sectarian
violence, in particular of the militant Republican variety
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The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act of 1922 was the legal basis of
internment and ". . conferred upon the executive [the Northern Ireland Prime Minister]
the power to arrest without warrant any person who had acted, was acting, or was about
to act in a manner prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order in
Northern Ireland."
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Obviously, this conferred broad powers on the government at
Stormont. As a result of poor execution, internment was to prove to be an unmitigated
political disaster for both the Stormont and Westminster governments.
The shortcomings of internment were legion. Some of the failures of the policy
have already been noted, in particular the poor intelligence used in selecting the
internees. Not only were many people picked up by the Army that were innocent of
either terrorist involvement or intent, but the internment arrests focused almost
exclusively on the Catholic community. Of the 342 initial internees, only two were
Protestants.
295 The widespread sectarian violence that followed internment showed the
weakness of the initial assumptions on which the policy was based. In the first three days
after the initial arrests on 9 August 1971, twenty-two people were killed in the resulting
rioting and an additional 7,000 were left homeless.
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For reasons beyond the abrogation
of civil rights, internment was a failure. It was an implicit admission on the part of
Stormont that it could not control the militants of either Irish tribe, and it drove many
Catholics into the arms of Republican extremists. Stormont would not survive the







29 The Northern Ireland Parliament was suspended in March 1972. and all parliamentary
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Adding insult to injury from the Catholic perspective was the treatment the
internees allegedly received at the internment camps Accusations of torture began to
come from the detainment centers and included allegations of physical and mental abuse
of internees. 298 Although Lisburn quickly dismissed such allegations as propaganda,
credible evidence began to emerge that suggested British intelligence was using severe
interrogation techniques.
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The Joint Services Intelligence School at Maresfield developed the interrogation
methods used by the British Army in Northern Ireland as a result of lessons learned from
the Korean War.
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They were not developed specifically with the counter-insurgency
operation in Northern Ireland in mind, but had in fact been part of Army intelligence
doctrine for years. The problem that the British faced, however, was that techniques that
might be deemed suitable during a full-scale war with, say, the Soviet Union were
considered extreme by civil rights standards for use against domestic opponents of the
government.
British techniques included a method called "interrogation in depth," which at a
minimum constituted physical "ill-treatment" if not actual abuse. 301 According to J.
Bowyer Bell,
Suspects were routinely beaten Some have even been thrown blindfolded
and screaming from helicopters they thought were high over Belfast
instead of three feet off the ground. All this could happen as the result of
"mistakes" made in action situations, although few Catholics thought so,
but soon it became clear that men had been questioned at Palace Army
Barracks, Holywood, County Down, by British soldiers using "deep






hours, disoriented by strange noises while their heads were covered with
bags, threatened and abused—and this for days on end in quite cold
blood.
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There are not many apologists for the deep interrogation techniques employed by
the British. One of the few, Colonel Michael Dewar, points out that the same techniques
were used on British soldiers to teach them to resist interrogation. Furthermore, he
disputes that torture was used: "The methods were inevitably frightening and
psychologically disorienting, and intentionally so. But they did not involve physical
force nor was any physical injury inflicted."
An inquiry into allegations of torture of the August internees was conducted by
Sir Edmund Compton, which found that British methods constituted "ill treatment," but
did not amount to brutality.
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In one section of the report, Compton asserted that the
interrogation in depth did not meet the definition of brutality because there was no
"disposition to inflict suffering, coupled with indifference to, or pleasure in, the victim's
pain."
305 The Republican propaganda machine, which had a field day with the
allegations of interrogation brutality, seized on the above statement by Compton as
indicative of a British whitewash.
306
Republicans rightly noted that from the victim's
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The Irish government referred the allegations to the European Court of Human
Rights In 1976, the European Commission on Human Rights found that British
techniques constituted torture. This finding was reduced in 1978 upon British appeal to
the European Court ofHuman Rights, which rejected the use of the word "torture. " but
sustained the argument that the techniques entailed "inhuman and degrading
treatment."
307
Without passing judgement on the propriety of such techniques, the British
interrogations were, not surprisingly, effective as a source of gaining information It was
when the negative publicity and judicial attention became too severe that interrogation in
depth was banned in 1972, and the British Army was forced to move to other methods of
gaining information.
The remainder of the 1970s was not void of conflict between the intelligence
services and the law, but it was not until the early 1980s that this conflict again became a
key focal point for criticism of British policies in Northern Ireland. The years 1981-1982
were a critical period in the war against the Republican paramilitaries. During 1981. the
hunger strike began. The hunger strike had two fundamental effects: it energized the
Republican movement as had no other event before or since; and, it hardened the British
determination not to submit to terrorism.
Perhaps it was the hunger strike that motivated the British to change the rules
somewhat in the early 1980s. In 1981, the British introduced the policy of using
intelligence informers (supergrasses) in the courts, and in 1982, the Special Branch
embarked on what Republicans allege was a campaign of selective assassination
Coogan. 129.
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The Ulster slang for an informer is "tout" or "grass." The etymology of the word
"grass" in its Northern Ireland context is interesting. Police in Britain historically have
been known as "coppers." In the rhyming Cockney vernacular of the 19
th
century, copper
became "grasshopper," and was subsequently shortened to "grass."308 "Grass" as a noun
then came to be used as a synonym for informer and as a verb meaning to inform on
one's associates. The word was to undergo a further transformation in 1981 when the
British introduced the first "supergrass" to the Northern Ireland judicial system.
Before examining how British intelligence assets came to testify against the IRA
in a British court of law, a brief digression on the transformation of Northern Ireland's
court system might be helpful. In late 1972, a commission established to review the
administration of law in Northern Ireland found that the existing jury system was not
effective due to the intimidation ofjuries by the paramilitaries. The Diplock
Commission, named after its chairman Lord Diplock, recommended the replacement of
jury trials with a single judge tribunal. The courts, which became known as Diplock
courts after 1973, had the authority under the Emergency Provisions Act to convict
terrorists on the basis of uncorroborated testimony or evidence.
309
According to Tim Pat
Coogan, the Diplock process not only eliminated the juries, but shifted "the burden of
proof of innocence to the accused."
310
This judicial process for expediting the trial of suspected terrorists was without
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introduced the first " supergrass.
"
3I
' The supergrasses were yet another aberration in
British judicial tradition Supergrasses, known euphemistically by the RUC as
"converted terrorists" included former informers for British intelligence, which were put
on the stand as witnesses for the Crown Their testimony in a Diplock court was
sufficient without corroboration to convict other terrorists
The recruitment of the supergrasses naturally followed along the same lines as the
recruitment for informers. Sometimes the motivation for the supergrasses was money;
most frequently supergrasses were coerced. Of the twenty-five "converted terrorists"
who agreed to become supergrasses, only one volunteered out of conscience. lx
The initial results of supergrass testimony were spectacular. The first supergrass
was a gunman from the Belfast Brigade named Christopher Black. Black had been
arrested by the RUC in 1981 for conducting an illegal IRA roadblock, and in the course
of his interrogation at Castlereagh agreed to testify in court against the IRA. 313 Based on
Black's uncorroborated testimony, forty-one people were arrested; thirty-eight people
were charged; and thirty-five were convicted as ERA terrorists 3U According to Mark
Urban:
During the latter part of 1981 and 1982 more than 200 people were
arrested on the evidence of supergrasses The arrests offered the RUC the
chance to cut right through the terrorist infrastructure in parts of Ulster In
effect, it was a more discriminating form of internment Supergrasses
were not confined to the Provisionals: there were also several in the INLA
and the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force, organizations with less discipline
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As with internment in the 1970s, this form of "internment by remand" offered the
intelligence services the opportunity to interrogate large numbers of suspected terrorists.
This was one oftwo satisfying aspects of the supergrass process for the intelligence
services. The other was that the intelligence community in Northern Ireland felt that the
supergrasses would have a devastating impact on the morale and cohesion of the IRA. 316
Urban wrote that many intelligence officers felt that the resulting paranoia in the IRA
would inhibit operations while the ERA conducted internal investigations. 317 If true, this
could be seen as an evolutionary step in the tradition of Heatherington and McGrogan.
Although initially successful, the supergrass process was to fall apart under IRA
counter-measures and appellate scrutiny According to Coogan, the IRA was successful
in coercing fifteen of the original twenty-five supergrasses into retracting either their
agreement to testify, or if they had already done so, their testimony. This was done in a
traditionally Republican fashion. The supergrasses were promised amnesty in return for
refusing to testify. As an added incentive to amnesty, family members of the
supergrasses were kidnapped and held by the ERA.
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The appellate courts largely were to reverse the testimony of the supergrasses that
the IRA could not co-opt. According to Mark Urban,
...of the 120 people convicted on the evidence of the ten principal
supergrasses, sixty-seven were released after subsequent appeal. (Sixty-
five were convicted solely on informer evidence; other evidence had been
offered in the other two cases.) The appeal judges had in several cases
found supergrasses to have been liars who implicated other people simply











The appellate judges, who also sat in Diplock courts, effectively ended the
supergrass process. For the intelligence community, the process was a negative
experience on balance Although the anticipated reduction in LRA activities was borne
out, the end result was also a reduction in intelligence collection Many intelligence
officers felt that the supergrass process was a waste of intelligence assets with negligible
long-term results. Moreover, in the eyes of many people, the use of uncorroborated
supergrass testimony to convict people was further evidence that the British were not
playing fair. Ultimately, the use of supergrasses would prove to be another counter-
productive tactic by the British. Stating a somewhat cynical alternative view, however,
Coogan notes that following internment, the hunger strike and other perceived injustices,
the British government had no credibility left in the Catholic community to lose through
the supergrasses.
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More damaging to British credibility than the supergrasses were the emerging
allegations of a RUC shoot-to-kill policy. In November and December 1982. RUC
officers were involved in three separate lethal shootings of Republican suspects. These
all took place against a backdrop of an IRA ambush that resulted in the deaths of three
RUC officers in late October.
One of the RUC's special firearms units, officers from either the Special Support
Unit (SSU) or from one of the Headquarters Mobile Surveillance Units (HMSU)
conducted the first of the RUC shootings. It began as a car chase when three IRA men
Coogan. The Troubles, 276.
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refused to pull over in their car for the RUC. It ended with the three unarmed men being
shot 109 times by the RUC firearms team. 321
The second incident involved the shooting of two men at an ERA arms cache
hidden in a hayshed in County Armagh. In this case, the arms cache was not only under
surveillance by the Special Branch, but a technical team from MI5 had bugged the
premises. One of the men was shot dead by the HMSU and the other man was seriously
wounded. Three old rifles were found with the men, although no ammunition was
present.
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The third shoot-to-kill incident in late 1982 again involved the Special Branch and
a member of the HMSU. Two INLA paramilitaries were returning to Northern Ireland
from the Republic of Ireland, where they had been under surveillance by British
intelligence. Immediately after crossing into British territory, their car was stopped by
two policemen. An HMSU officer, Constable John Robinson, walked up to the passenger
side of the car and shot and killed the passenger, Roddy Carroll, through the window.
Robinson walked around the front of the car, reloaded his pistol and shot and killed the
driver, Seamus Grew. Both men were unarmed. 323
In the course of the resulting outcry from the Nationalist community, the three
incidents were investigated by the RUC CH) and the Director of Public Prosecutions
(DPP). 324 The DPP brought murder charges against the three officers involved in the first
shooting and against Constable Robinson for the killing of Grew and Carroll. No charges
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Similar to an American district attorney.
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were brought against the poiice officers involved in the hayshed shooting. Not only were
all four officers acquitted, but Lord Justice Gibson, the judge trying the officers accused
in the first incident, also criticized the DPP for bringing charges against the officers in the
first place. According to John Stalker, the Diplock judge commended the three officers
for bringing the terrorists to "the final court ofjustice." 3 5 This statement, belatedly
retracted, was all the confirmation the Catholic community needed that the Security
Forces were pursuing a coordinated shoot-to-kill policy
John Stalker, the Deputy Chief Constable of Manchester, was appointed in 1984
by the Home Office to investigate the three shootings. Stalker saw his terms of reference
as including the investigation of a possible shoot-to-kill policy as well as the apparent
Special Branch obfiiscation of the CED internal investigations
Stalker's arrival in Northern Ireland was met with unbridled hostility from the
RUC and its Chief Constable, Sir John Hermon. It was made plain to Stalker that his
presence was unwanted and that cooperation from the RUC would be minimal Not only
was Stalker the subject ofRUC obstructionism, but after learning of an MIS tape
recording of the shootings at the hayshed, he became the subject of a personal smear
campaign in Manchester. Spurious allegations against Stalker were raised about his
association with a Manchester businessman accused of illegal business practices and an
investigation into his private life was begun by the Manchester C1D. After two years of a
very frustrating inquiry into the events in Northern Ireland and three days before he was
to deliver his draft report to the RUC, John Stalker was removed from the investigation
3:5
Stalker, 38. Gibson and his wife were killed b\ the IRA in April 1987 Sec Chapter \1I for
details.
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Stalker not only was replaced in the Northern Ireland investigation, but he was also
suspended from his position in the Manchester police department.
Stalker was eventually cleared of any wrongdoing, as was Kevin Taylor, the
businessman accused of illegal business practices, but the damage to Stalker's career and
reputation was complete. Even though he was reinstated to his position as the Deputy
Chief Constable, he left the force in disgust shortly thereafter. Furthermore, as Stalker
had uncovered credible evidence of British malfeasance, the damage to Britain's image in
Northern Ireland and internationally was severe If the Gibson commentary was
illuminating to the Catholic community, the entire Stalker affair vividly demonstrated
that there was not equal justice in Northern Ireland.
What happened to John Stalker'? He believed that he was the subject of a
concerted effort by ".. .Masonic influences in the RUC, Orange Order, and the Greater
Manchester Police. . ." to undermine his position in order to "protect" the RUC. 326
Although it may sound somewhat paranoid, none of the works referenced for this history
suggest that Stalker's assessment was inaccurate or even remotely tinged with paranoia.
It seems likely that Stalker's investigation struck a raw nerve with the besieged police
force in Northern Ireland, and it was more expedient to destroy Stalker than to accept his
judgement, which the RUC knew would be critical.
Regarding the role of the intelligence community in relation to the shoot-to-kill
allegations and the Stalker Affair, there are no claims that the intelligence community,
outside of the RUC Special Branch, orchestrated the smear campaign. The Security
Service was not cooperative with Stalker regarding his demand for the tape recording of
Stalker, 153.
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the hayshed incident, but MI5, perhaps correctly, claimed that the RUC had the tape, not
MI5. 327 The true involvement of the intelligence services lay in the shootings
themselves.
There are three common elements to each of these shootings. AJ1 three operations
were being run by the Tasking and Coordination Group at Gough Barracks, Armagh
This means that all three incidents occurred during ongoing intelligence operations A
second shared element is that the shooters in each case were from a RUC special firearms
unit, probably from the same HMSU. A final commonality was that in each case, there
was a Special Branch campaign to keep the true course of events from becoming public
knowledge. It was Special Branch's role that particularly disturbed Stalker
The Special Branch targeted the suspected terrorist, they briefed the
officers, and after the shootings they removed the men's car and guns for a
private de-briefing before the CED officers were allowed access to these
crucial matters. They provided the cover stories, and they decided at what
point the CID were to be allowed to commence the official investigation
of what occurred. The Special Branch interpreted the information and
decided what was, or was not, evidence; they attached labels—whether a
man was 'wanted' for an offence, for instance or whether he was an 'on-
the-run terrorist'. 1 have never experienced, nor had any of my team, such
an influence over an entire police force by one small section. We
discovered an instance of a junior Special Branch officer" s giving
operational instructions to much more senior CID officers—and of his
being meekly obeyed. 328
Were the shootings part of an emergent policy of selective assassinations of the
Republican terrorists'7 Stalker did not think so initially. But in a 1988 interview, he said
"There was no written instruction, nothing pinned up on the notice-board But there was
a clear understanding on the part of the men whose job it was to pull the trigger that that
,:




was what was expected of them."
3"9
This "clear understanding" was probably born from
a desire to avenge the deaths of the three police officers in October 1981 . If there was
direction from the RUC leadership to do so, it may be reminiscent of the type of direction
heard by the knights of Henry II who murdered Thomas a Becket.
C. INTELLIGENCE AND MORALITY
The saying goes that intelligence is the world's second oldest profession—it just
lacks the scruples of the first. Regardless of how much truth there might be in that
aphorism, intelligence operations, generally speaking, are neither moral nor immoral
Any conclusions regarding the morality of an intelligence operation must be reached as a
result of analyzing the context of the operation, e.g., the historical antecedents, the
methods used, and the resulting consequences.
There is no easy answer to the question of whether the British intelligence
operations in Northern Ireland were moral The Republican community would
undoubtedly offer a wholesale condemnation of British intelligence. This argument
might run along the lines of "the British occupation of Northern Ireland is inherently
immoral and therefore so are any operations conducted by their agents." The Loyalists
would very likely offer a counter-argument that "the British represent the forces of law
and order, and that it is the terrorism of the Republican community that is immoral." If
both sides were asked to evaluate any given operation, each side would view the same
activity from a different perspective and would thus draw a different moral conclusion.
This illustrates the difficulty posed by relativism in evaluating the moral legitimacy of
British intelligence operations in Northern Ireland.
Quoted in Urban. 157.
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That this is a difficult task does not mean that it should not be attempted, but there
are other obstacles as well. First and foremost, the author of this history does not feel
particularly competent in establishing a moral demarcation whereby a figurative line is
drawn in the sand. On one side of the line are intelligence operations that meet some
universal standard of moral propriety, on the other side of the line is immorality and its
attendant evils. The issue cannot be resolved that simply Furthermore, although one
might like to believe that moral precepts are a constant force regardless of circumstance,
it is not entirely clear that this is the case in wartime. Judgements are easy to make with
the benefit of hindsight and from a rarefied academic perspective, but the people making
the decisions in the violent and bloody environment of Ulster generally lacked this
vantage.
Perhaps a more appropriate tack from which to approach this problem is not to
draw that line in the sand, but rather to lay out some of the moral issues as objectively as
possible and then allow the reader to draw the conclusions. Since the intelligence war in
Northern Ireland largely revolved around the use of informers, so will this examination
Furthermore, as the war in Northern Ireland is widely regarded as a "dirty" war, the
reader might in the same spirit wish to revisit some other aspects of intelligence activity
such as the shoot-to-kill incidents and dirty tricks
Perhaps the most fundamental and practical moral issue regarding the use of
informers is the consequentialism of British actions. In other words, do the ends justify
the means9 Obviously the British have had to weigh the balance between utility and
morality, utility being defined as what it takes to win, and morality representing the
principles of rule of law and proper democratic behavior. Michael Walzer writes that,
L47
"Belligerent armies are entitled to try to win their wars, but they are not entitled to do
anything that is or seems to them necessary to win."
30
It would seem that this precept is
no less valid when opposing terrorism and when applied to intelligence operations.
Peter Gill captured this conflict between utility and morality in respect to the
British use of informers in Northern Ireland. Gill stated that "... of all the methods by
which security intelligence agencies obtain information covertly, this [the use of
informers] is both the most productive and most problematic, respectively, in terms of
agency effectiveness and civil rights."
331
This strikes at the heart of the issue involving
the use of informers: they have the potential to be highly productive and they offer
avenues of information that simply cannot be obtained through other means. At the same
time, the employment of informers has a tendency to cloud the moral landscape. More
frequently than not in Northern Ireland, informers have criminal records and may be
coerced into working for the state.
As previously discussed in Chapter III, informers can be categorized according to
whether their service to the Crown is voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary informers will
work for the security services for a variety of motivations including money, revenge,
conscience, etc. They may be recruited by the intelligence organizations or they may
truly volunteer their services, but the common denominator is that they are freely in the
hire of the state. Marty McGartland was an example of this type of informer. According
to his biography, he was approached by Special Branch and began to work for them
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because of the money they offered. His moral support for their cause came later Legally
and ethically there should be few reservations about the use of these informers They
may not be choirboys by any stretch of the imagination and their use may be distasteful,
but as volunteers they would seem to be a legitimate tool of the intelligence services But
even supposing that their initial association with British intelligence was voluntary, it
does not follow that they could quit as easily as they joined if they so desired Once the
informer is on the British payroll, the intelligence service has a permanent coercive
influence over that individual. While British intelligence might not initially have a hook
into the individual volunteering to work for them, once they have worked against the
IRA, they are surely hooked by the British. "Once in, never out" is an old ERA saying,
but it easily could apply to British intelligence as well.
Assuming for the sake of argument however, that voluntary service is truly that,
there would seem to be little moral difference between the informer and the handlers
Involuntary recruitment of informers is a different matter and opens up several legal and
ethical questions. The standard practice in Northern Ireland to recruit an involuntary
informer is through the use of coercion and blackmail. Usually the potential recruit
comes to the attention of the Security Forces through illegal action on his part and
immunity or quiet escape from prosecution is the incentive for the recruit to cooperate
Joe Fenton was recruited this way.
Another method is to find an IRA member involved in crimes against the cause,
embezzlement perhaps, and threaten the disclosure of his activities to the IRA unless he
agrees to inform. In this case failure to cooperate could mean a death sentence or at a
minimum, a knee-capping from the IRA. Therefore, the common denominator in the use
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of involuntary informers is that service for the Crown is preferable to the alternative,
which may be imprisonment or even death.
There are three aspects of this practice, which are questionable both legally and
morally. First, if British intelligence resorts to blackmail to recruit an informer, it is in
violation of the laws of the state. Second, does the intelligence agency have the legal and
ethical mandate to ignore the crimes that the recruited informer may have committed?
Third, does the state have the right to place an involuntary informer in harm's way? The
argument might be made that the state frequently performs a similar legal function when
it conscripts individuals into the armed forces, but does that logic apply to someone who
is blackmailed into service for the state9 As seen in the case studies and throughout this
history, becoming an informer against the IRA is placing oneself very much in harm's
way.
The case of Vincent Heatherington and Myles McGrogan discussed in Chapter V
provides an insight into the difficulties of making moral judgements about intelligence
operations. From a utilitarian standpoint, the covert operation offered tremendous
payoffs at minimal cost; at greatest risk in the operation were two informers that were
implicated in a rape case. The British succeeded in getting a ceasefire, which was
certainly to everyone's advantage except perhaps the IRA. Undoubtedly, the IRA was
devastated by the operation, but in truth was not the damage to the IRA self-inflicted?
Even the IRA admits that the Republicans' frenetic reaction to the British provocations
nearly destroyed the Irish Republican Army.
When viewed from this perspective, the operation does not seem too
objectionable. Certainly, most would agree to the benefits of a ceasefire. Many would
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argue that had the IRA been destroyed as a consequence of this operation, the means used
would have been worthwhile On the other hand, what legal and ethical authority
allowed their handling agency to presumably offer immunity from prosecution for a
crime such as rape9 Was their victim not entitled to justice, or were the supposed needs
of the state more important than those of the victim 9 It is not clear that any assessment of
this nature was ever undertaken Moreover, Heatherington and McGrogan were both
killed by the IRA. This was a direct consequence of being coerced by British
intelligence. What about the IRA men falsely accused by Heatherington who were
subsequently tortured and executed by their compatriots'7 While some might argue that
they had been brought to what Lord Justice Gibson referred to as '"the final court of
justice," it was at the hands of the IRA and not the proper arbiter of their fate, namely the
judicial system
If the circumstances surrounding McGrogan and Heatherington are too
ambiguous to evaluate, what about the case of Joe Fenton? Here was a man who was
apolitical by all accounts, certainly, he was not a Republican. The work that he
performed for the IRA appears to have been motivated by fear, which was the same
method of entrapment used by Special Branch Although it seems that the hapless Fenton
just wished to get along in life, neither the IRA nor the Special Branch factored that into
their decision to use him. Not only did Special Branch coerce Fenton into becoming one
of their informers, but there are allegations that Fenton was purposely allowed to betray
other informers to sidetrack IRA investigations into his own trustworthiness. 33 " If true.
"~~ Dillon, 324-325. The informers were Gerard and Catherine Mahon. They were kidnapped,
interrogated and executed by the IRA.
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what debased notion oiraison d'etat allowed Special Branch and MI5 to make the
decision to trade the lives oftwo other informers for Joe Fenton, who in any case was
killed by the IRA three years later9 Was there no other way to extricate Fenton from
suspicion or were these allegations just more Republican propaganda to cloud the moral
issues of their own deeds? In an eloquent testimony to the disturbing implications to
society of such events, Father Tom Toner said at Fenton' s funeral, "Fighting evil by
corrupt means kills pawns like Joe and leaves every one of us vulnerable and afraid. And
it allows Joe's killers to draw a sickening veneer of respectability over cold-blooded
murder and to wash their hands like Pontius Pilate."
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D. CONCLUSION
The conduct of the Irish Republican Army has largely escaped criticism in this
work and in this chapter in particular. That this is so should be interpreted neither as
support for the Republican movement nor as condonation for their methods. The
Republican terrorist activities largely speak for themselves in terms of legality and
morality. While it is the conduct of the intelligence community in Northern Ireland that
has been the immediate focus here, it should not be forgotten that it was the violence of
the ERA and the other paramilitary organizations that provided the catalyst for many of
the intelligence activities discussed in this history.
There are numerous lessons that can be derived from the experience of British
intelligence in Ulster, although the value of the lessons may depend to some extent on the
perspectives of the readers of this history. Not surprisingly, there is much in the British
experience to be learned from both the successes and failures of British intelligence.
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1 aking the former first, British intelligence ran some ingenuous operations that
may serve as models for other intelligence services operating in different environments
The Four Squares Laundry is a good example of an innovative method of collecting
intelligence. Using the Belfast service sector as a means of penetrating the hard
Republican communities gave British intelligence access to areas that might otherwise
have been denied While a pick-up laundry service may not have universal application,
the British use of the Four Squares Laundry shows the possibilities and the value of
alternative surveillance methods
Something else that the British did right was their use of the average soldier as a
means of gathering intelligence. Although most of the intelligence collected by the
Squaddies on patrol was low-level information, it was critical in developing a coherent
picture of the IRA and the other paramilitary organizations. The main lesson in this is
not that the average soldier needs to be an intelligence professional, but rather that the
soldier simply needs to be directed and debriefed properly to become an important
intelligence tool.
Setting aside for the moment the societal implications of a ubiquitous intelligence
community, the British effectively learned about their adversaries. Whether the
information came from electronic surveillance, informers, covert observation platoons,
etc., there can be no question that British intelligence came to know the IRA intimatelv
As seen in this history, hard intelligence on the IRA was sometimes used to lethally
ambush the IRA, but far more frequently, it was used to arrest IRA members or to deter
IRA operations The point is that after some initial confusion, their methodical and
meticulous intelligence collection eave the Securitv Forces sufficient information to
effectively controi Northern Ireland, although perhaps not to dominate it. The Union
Jack over Stormont Castle is testimony to that fact.
Having said that, as good as British intelligence proved itself to be in Northern
Ireland, it could have been better. Of all the British errors that could serve as lessons to
professional intelligence organizations, perhaps the most fundamental shortcoming on the
part of the British was the failure to centrally coordinate intelligence activities in
Northern Ireland before 1979. This may have been excusable given the chaos prevalent
in the early days of the conflict, but the British intelligence community remained
disorganized and incoherent well past the initial phases of the conflict. Although the
British had not intended in 1969 to remain deployed in force for an indefinite period of
time, by 1972 it should have been apparent that there was no early end to the Troubles in
sight. The Tasking and Coordination Group concept worked well, but a decade had
passed by before it was implemented. Lack of coordination between the intelligence
services furthered the internecine rivalries, degraded the overall security mission, and
perhaps contributed to the loss of life.
The need for high professional standards was another hard lesson for the British
intelligence community. That all intelligence entities in Northern Ireland fell short in
professional standards would be inaccurate, some like the 14
th
Intelligence Company
were extremely professional, but others obviously missed the mark. Despite the above
praise for the Four Squares Laundry operation, the MRF was, arguably, one of these
organizations. The agent-handlers of the rotating Regular Army regiments would be
another example, as would Special Branch in the early years of the conflict. The British




Company, Echo Four Alpha, and the Field Research Unit as the solution to their
problems of professionalism.
Specialized intelligence units may have solved one problem, but their activities
highlighted yet another: the lack of independent parliamentary oversight As the United
Kingdom does not have intelligence oversight in Northern Ireland, or elsewhere for that
matter, this is a lesson that remains lost on the British. While it is understood that
governments might be forced by events to adopt illiberal measures in the face of
unremitting terrorism, it should also be understood what the consequences might be if
there is no mechanism with which to check illiberal tendencies.
There is no question that British intelligence services routinely operated outside
of British law in Northern Ireland. Yet, as the enforcers of law and order, the Security
Forces have a legal obligation and a moral duty to uphold the laws of the United
Kingdom The government cannot be seen to be above the law and if the rule of law is to
be maintained, it must apply to everyone equally. As agents of the government, this
perforce applies to the intelligence services. By the nature of their business, intelligence
services are inherently powerful. They are developers and controllers of information.
When not divorced from operations, they then have the ability to not only collect and
analyze information, but also have the capability to act upon it. In the absence of an
independent oversight authority, intelligence organizations seem to gravitate towards
extreme and illiberal practices. It can be seen from their experience in Northern Ireland
that the British, despite their rich tradition of liberalism, are no less susceptible to this
than any other country.
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